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Introduction
Emily P. Hoffman 
Western Michigan University
While the implementation of affirmative action by means of legisla 
tion and judicial actions is currently much in the news, it is not a new 
issue. In 1941, President Roosevelt instituted affirmative action by means 
of Executive Order 8802. The exigencies of the war effort opened new 
opportunities for blacks and women in the labor market. Albeit with 
setbacks, the general economic expansion of the postwar years allow 
ed some of these gains to be retained.
More explicit attempts to achieve equality of treatment were contained 
in the antidiscrimination laws of the 1960s (the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and the affirmative ac 
tion regulations of the 1970s (Executive Order 11246 in 1974). Even 
with all these legal initiatives, the economic status of women and 
minorities is far below parity with that of white males.
Comparing full-time, year-round workers in 1989, women earned 
only $.66 for every $1.00 men earned, and the median family income 
of blacks was only $.56 for every $1.00 of income for white families. 
Some part (but not all) of these differences can be attributed to 
discrimination, which is unequal treatment based on gender, race, age, 
national origin, religion, or similar characteristics irrelevant to the ability 
to perform on a job. While always unethical, discrimination is now 
definitely illegal, even though it has yet to be eliminated.
Determining what part of the income gap between males and females 
or blacks and whites is due to discrimination and what part is due to 
productivity differences is a challenging exercise. Economists measure 
discrimination using a residual methodology; any wage gap not due to 
legitimate productivity-related variables such as education, experience, 
and occupation is attributed to discrimination. It is difficult for economists
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to both reach consensus on the legitimate determinants of wage differen 
tials and be able to measure them. For example, quality of education 
is a legitimate determinant of wage differentials for which data are not 
typically available; therefore, one cannot distinguish what part of the 
wage gap is due to discrimination and what part is due to an omitted 
variable such as quality of education.
Economic discrimination is unequal treatment based on criteria ir 
relevant to the activity involved. Labor market discrimination is un 
equal treatment in the labor market based on irrelevant criteria; it oc 
curs in the form of wage discrimination or nonwage discrimination in 
such areas as hiring, retention, training, and promotion. Prelabor market 
discrimination is unequal treatment based on irrelevant criteria in such 
areas as type and amount of education and training and career aspirations.
Much of the research concerning labor market discrimination focuses 
on wage discrimination. An inconsistency arises in reconciling the theory 
of the firm with the existence of wage discrimination. Economic theory 
assumes that perfectly competitive firms maximize profit; in the long 
run, the firms produce at the minimum of their long-run average cost 
curve. The firms that survive in the long run all have the same minimum 
average cost and the most efficient technology, which means none of 
them will be practicing wage discrimination, since it is inconsistent with 
minimum cost. Wage discrimination raises labor cost because the favored 
group is overpaid relative to the discriminated-against group. Perfectly 
competitive firms in the long run are predicted to employ only the under 
paid discriminated-against group, since this results in the least-cost 
method of production. Since the test of a good theory is whether its 
predictions are consistent with reality, and since that is not the case 
here, I conclude that the theory of the profit-maximizing, perfectly com 
petitive firm is not appropriate for explaining discrimination. Some others 
at this point conclude that there is no wage discrimination
Economic theorists who observe discrimination next turn to models 
of imperfect competition to find a theory consistent with wage discrimina 
tion. Imperfect competition in either the labor market or the product 
market has been proposed as being consistent with discrimination. If 
the males and females or blacks and whites do not compete with each
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other for jobs due to hiring discrimination, then a reduced labor supply 
for white and male jobs results in higher wages for whites and males. 
If the product market exhibits imperfect competition, firms can sur 
vive and prosper without achieving minimum cost, unlike the perfectly 
competitive firm.
Economic theory suggests that there will be discrimination if the 
employer perceives or expects the benefits of discriminating to exceed 
the costs of discriminating. Traditionally, especially before the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963, men were paid more than women, with the justifica 
tion that men had to support a family and women did not. While society 
today has accepted that pay is to be based on worker productivity rather 
than gender or marital status, there may still be a residual of these earlier 
beliefs.
Hiring, retention, training, and promotion decisions, especially for 
managerial or professional workers, involve compatibility and personal 
relationships with co-workers and supervisors. The candidates for these 
positions are unique (heterogeneous), and information about their talents, 
skills, and abilities is costly and imperfect. The employment relation 
ship is anticipated to be long term. Women and minority males find 
there is discrimination in promotions, called the "glass ceiling." Pro 
motion discrimination may be due to the employer's desire to lessen 
uncertainty concerning the candidate's abilities; majority males may 
prefer to hire and promote other majority males (of the same 
socioeconomic class) because they believe they have more information 
about them, since they are more likely to "think alike."
This collection of essays expands on the presentations of seven 
distinguished economists at the 26th annual economics lecture series 
at Western Michigan University. Topics addressed in the papers include: 
the theory and evidence of labor market discrimination; the impact of 
laws and policies concerning discrimination; the treatment of children 
compared to the elderly; discrimination within the family; the economic 
underclass; and the treatment of minority members of our society.
In his paper, "Discrimination in Labor Markets," Edward P. Lazear 
presents an overview of the current antidiscrimination laws. Important 
jargon terms, such as "protected category," "disparate treatment,"
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and "disparate impact" are defined by means of examples. Because 
married women can benefit (through their husbands) from discrimina 
tion in favor of males, and everyone can potentially benefit from 
discrimination in favor of youth (when they are young), Lazear argues 
that there is a hierarchy of discrimination, with racial discrimination 
being worse then either sex or age discrimination.
Lazear is quite optimistic about improvement in the status of women 
in the labor force, but is pessimistic concerning the status of a large 
segment of the black population. He argues that a shift in the industrial 
structure is changing the composition of the available jobs. There are 
more white-collar managerial jobs, and many more pink-collar clerical 
and service jobs, all requiring more formal education, but fewer relative 
ly well-paying, unskilled, blue-collar production jobs. These changes 
in the structure of the job market have been instrumental in improving 
the economic status of women, but have been detrimental to the im 
provement of the economic status of blacks lacking education and skills.
For greatest effectiveness in reducing the adverse effects of discrimina 
tion, Lazear argues that enforcement efforts should focus first on hir 
ing, second on promotion, and last on wages. He argues in favor of 
better enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifical 
ly fair hiring, rather than comparable worth legislation (which he believes 
to be inherently arbitrary), as the way to raise female and black wages 
relative to those of white males.
In "Discrimination Within the Family: The Treatment of Daughters 
and Sons," Paul J. Taubman discusses whether parents who treat their 
sons and daughters differently are practicing discrimination. He starts 
with a historical overview of the differential between male and female 
wages, citing numerous studies of differences in education and work 
experience of male and female youth.
Taubman then develops a formal model of parents' utility function, 
in which discrimination exists if parents care unequally for their children 
or weigh the importance of each child's future earnings stream un 
equally. While parental nondiscrimination means that the parents care 
equally about each child, this does not necessarily require investing equal 
resources of the parents' time and/or funds in each child. Taubman
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ultimately concludes that the evidence available indicates that parents 
in the U.S. do not discriminate among their children by gender.
Barbara L. Wolfe investigates whether there is unequal treatment in 
federal government income-transfer programs according to the age of 
the recipient. In "The Deteriorating Economic Circumstances of 
Children," she finds that these policies discriminate against children 
and in favor of the elderly the evidence being that while the poverty 
rate of the elderly has fallen, that of children has risen. Children are 
one-third of those with no health insurance, while nearly all the elderly 
receive Medicare and/or Medicaid.
While 80 percent of the elderly are removed from poverty by cash 
transfers (Social Security and Supplemental Security Income), only 23 
percent of single-parent families with children are removed from poverty 
by cash transfers (principally Aid to Families with Dependent Children). 
Wolfe contrasts the percent of the elderly poor who receive Supplemental 
Security Income, and how those amounts compare to the poverty line, 
with the percent of poor children benefiting from Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children and their status relative to the poverty line.
Wolfe discusses public spending on education, which is our society's 
principal investment in children. She presents evidence that schools 
treat children from low-income and single-parent households unequal 
ly compared to children from middle-class families. Thus, the means 
that may facilitate their escaping from poverty are denied to those who 
are in the greatest need. As a remedy, Wolfe proposes national health 
insurance for all children, and a method of financing higher education 
or apprenticeships for all children.
In his paper, "Underclass and Overclass: Race, Class, and Economic 
Inequality in the Managerial Age," William A. Darity asserts that an 
understanding of the nature of the overclass is a prerequisite to an 
understanding of the underclass. He reaches back to twelfth century 
England to show the rigidity of hereditary class structure, when in 
telligence was neither evaluated nor valued. He argues that intelligence, 
which began to be valued in the nineteenth century, is particularly valued 
now because of increased geographic and social mobility, our ability 
to measure intelligence, and rewards to intellectual ability.
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According to Darity, the managerial class is at the apex of power, 
directing and designing social policies. Capitalism perpetuates poverty 
and racism because a reservoir of the poor are needed to keep wages 
low. Darity sees the Reagan years as a counterrevolution in the class 
warfare between the managerial class and the business (capitalist) class; 
the managerial class designs social policy, while the business class is 
against most social policies. Darity feels that the social policies of the 
federal government, from the New Deal to the Great Society, have 
polarized the black population, geographically and socially separating 
a new professional class of black social workers and care givers from 
a repressed underclass of black care receivers.
Darity finds that minority (and Wolfe finds that low-income) children 
receive unequal education. Darity is fearful that this is a harbinger of 
the emergence of a policy of eugenic anti-natalism, ostensibly based 
on intelligence, which would impinge most heavily on the poor and 
blacks. Since he doubts poverty can be eliminated, Darity argues for 
the reallocation of the incidence of poverty, so that it is distributed equally 
on the basis of race and without intergenerational transmission. Darity 
considers equal opportunity to be a myth; the result of affirmative ac 
tion is the stigmatization of those it is intended to help. Darity is 
pessimistic about future prospects for blacks.
Jonathan S. Leonard's paper, "The Federal Anti-Bias Effort," con 
cerns the effectiveness of Executive Order 11246 (1974), which ap 
plies to government contractors, both prohibiting discrimination and 
requiring affirmative action. In discussing the history of affirmative ac 
tion, which dates back to Executive Order 8802 (1941), Leonard reviews 
earlier studies of the effectiveness of affirmative action.
Leonard studied the employment patterns at establishments that dif 
fered only in whether or not they were subject to affirmative action. 
Based on this work, and studies by others, he concludes that anti 
discrimination and affirmative action efforts have been effective in reduc 
ing discrimination without significantly inducing the possible hazard 
of affirmative action, namely, reverse discrimination.
Almost all modern economic investigation of discrimination follows 
from the germinal work of Gary Becker. In particular, Glen G. Cain
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examines the current evidence of discrimination in the United States 
according to Seeker's ideas. Cain tries to answer the question of how 
much discrimination exists. Both Becker and Cain acknowledge that 
economists cannot accurately answer the question; not only are there 
problems in precisely defining discrimination, but there are limitations 
in the data available from which to try to measure discrimination.
In "The Uses and Limits of Statistical Analysis in Measuring 
Economic Discrimination," Cain considers the main problem in the 
measurement of discrimination, namely, that productive capacity and 
opportunity structure are difficult to measure, so economists tend to 
focus on income or earnings, which are far easier to quantify.
Cain considers the history of Irish and Japanese immigrants, who 
originally faced great discrimination but no longer do. In comparing 
the occupational distribution and earnings of Irish-American men in 1900 
and 1970 and Japanese-American men in 1940 and 1980, both relative 
to the majority white males, Cain concludes that traditional measures 
of discrimination result in a paradox; from being discriminated against, 
these groups have become discriminated for. Cain's theme is that con 
sistency requires the consideration of statistics to be supplementary to 
institutional-theoretical analysis. When historical and sociological fac 
tors are included, these cases show that while there was discrimination 
in the early period, there was no "reverse discrimination" in recent 
times, Cain concludes.
In "Occupational Segregation and the Earnings Gap: Further 
Evidence," Marianne A. Ferber and Carole A. Green, using a unique 
and detailed data set consisting of a sample of Illinois employees in 1982, 
investigate the male-female earnings gap, considering such detailed job- 
related variables as supervisory authority and control over money. They 
find the gender composition of the occupation significantly affects 
earnings; the higher the percent female in an occupation, the lower the 
earnings are for both males and females. Ferber and Green's study 
defines discrimination as males and females not having the same deter 
minants of earnings, as well as gender affecting earnings. They find 
evidence of discrimination in their sample.

Discrimination in Labor Markets
Edward P. Lazear 
University of Chicago
Labor market discrimination in this country has been illegal at least 
since 1964 when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act outlawed it. The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the 1963 Equal Pay Act, which requires that in 
dividuals doing the same job must receive the same pay, are primarily 
responsible for protecting individuals against race and sex discrimina 
tion. Age discrimination is covered under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, which was designed to prevent disparate treatment 
of older workers. This act has been sporadically amended and now essen 
tially eliminates mandatory retirement.
Before analyzing the specifics of age discrimination, I will briefly 
describe what is and what is not discrimination in the labor market. 
First, in order to have been discriminated against, an individual must 
be in a protected category. Not all workers are members of protected 
classes. The largest protected classes in this country consist of females, 
blacks, and individuals who are covered by the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act. Old is now defined as over 40.
Other minorities are also protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and the definition of protected categories has evolved over time. Hispanics 
are protected workers, but, in most circumstances, Asians are not. For 
example, at the University of California, Asians do not count toward 
meeting any kind of quotas for racial balance. In fact, they count the 
wrong way, and there has been recent action by white students to limit 
the number of Asians because they are represented in numbers that ex 
ceed their proportion in the population. Other groups, such as Jews, 
are not in a protected class.
Individuals rarely win suits based on discrimination due to physical 
characteristics, such as obesity or baldness. Sexual preference has, with 
only a few exceptions, been deemed a legitimate criterion for employ 
ment, so that homosexuals rarely win discrimination suits. While some
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of these more controversial criteria are interesting, they are probably 
less important at a practical level than discrimination on the basis of 
education. That might seem somewhat bizarre, but it lies at the heart 
of what practices are permitted in the labor market.
For example, suppose that an employer imposes a requirement that 
an individual must possess a college degree in order to obtain a job. 
Suppose further that this requirement has the effect of creating a job 
category that is 98 percent white. Has the employer engaged in 
discrimination by using education as a proxy for race? The answer 
depends on the job-relatedness of the education requirement. If the job 
were garbage collector, for example, the courts would hold that educa 
tion was a guise for a racial barrier, having nothing to do with the skill 
level needed to do the job. On the other hand, if the job required signifi 
cant accounting skills, courts would probably hold that education re 
quirement was appropriate and not merely a facade for discrimination.
There are essentially two ways to prove discrimination in the labor 
market context: first, by showing what is called disparate treatment, and 
second, by showing disparate impact. Disparate treatment is easier to 
prove, but it requires more direct evidence. An example of a disparate 
treatment case would be one where plaintiffs obtain a memo written by 
management that instructs subordinates to send only white applicants 
up for approval, either at the hiring level or for promotion. Another ex 
ample of disparate treatment is one where sexual harassment can be shown 
by the testimony of coworkers or customers. This is sometimes referred 
to as finding a "smoking gun" or, in other words, the murder weapon 
in its just-used state. But smoking guns are rarely found.
Most discrimination actions try to show disparate impact by 
demonstrating that a pattern of discrimination exists. Disparate impact 
cases are almost always statistical in nature, and provide employment 
for a large number of the labor economists in the profession today. Con 
sider the two following examples.
One case involves a local firm, Stroh's Brewery, which had two jobs: 
one called bottler, and the other called brewer. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleged that those two jobs were 
essentially the same. But an examination of the data revealed that brewers
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were primarily first-generation Germans, whereas bottlers were central- 
city blacks from Detroit. Furthermore, a statistical analysis revealed that 
even holding education and experience level constant, a black was less 
likely to be assigned the brewer's job than a white worker with similar 
skills. In this case, three things need to be established. First, that the 
two jobs were essentially identical. Second, that the jobs paid differing 
amounts, and in particular, the job with white employees paid a higher 
amount than the job with black employees. And third, that the distribu 
tion of job assignments was not independent of race.
In order to establish the first, an industrial engineer is generally call 
ed in to testify that the tasks of the two jobs are the same. The second 
is easily established by looking at payroll data and correcting for ex 
perience of the individuals. Those two pieces of evidence then set the 
situation up for a violation of the Equal Pay Act, because the two jobs 
are deemed to be equal, but receive different salaries. This, in conjunc 
tion with a racial distribution that goes against a protected group, im 
plies a violation by disparate impact.
In the particular case of Stroh's Brewery, I was retained by the EEOC 
and worked into the early part of 1981 when the Reagan administration 
took over. There was a dramatic change in the policy of EEOC at that 
point, and the Reagan administration instructed EEOC to settle this case 
within 30 days, for better or worse. On the good side, a settlement was 
reached between Stroh's and the plaintiffs, and costly litigation was prob 
ably avoided. Whether this had a negative effect on the future prospects 
of black workers at Stroh's remains to be shown.
The second disparate impact case example was an age discrimination 
case. New York Life was being sued by nine of its older employees who 
charged that they were forced to retire, and were not offered the same 
terms as similarly situated younger workers. This case was actually a 
combination of disparate impact and disparate treatment, because the 
nine individuals tried to bring in evidence that their superiors told them 
directly that they should retire because of their age. I was asked to testify 
by the defense in this particular case, and was able to show, by using 
statistical evidence, that in fact, not only was there no disparate impact 
that worked against older workers, but if anything, older workers seemed
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to be favored by the firm. That is, holding all worker characteristics 
constant, older general managers at New \brk Life received higher earn 
ings and were more likely to be retained in their jobs than their perfor 
mance would warrant, as compared with younger workers. So even though 
there was some evidence of disparate treatment, it was not sufficient 
to convince the jury, given the counter-evidence on disparate impact, 
that New York Life engaged in any discrimination on the basis of age.
Let me move on to a different topic, which I call the hierarchy of 
discrimination. Frequently, antidiscrimination policies run into conflict 
with one another, as when one protected group is vying with another 
for favorable treatment. A good illustration comes from recent Chicago 
patronage jobs. When Harold Washington was Mayor of Chicago, many 
of the jobs that had previously gone to white workers were given to black 
workers. In addition, a large number of city contracts that had previously 
gone to white firms, went to firms owned by black individuals. But 
Hispanics did not fare well under the Washington administration; and 
although they did not bring any major litigation against the Washington 
administration, they were instrumental in the election of Richard Daley 
over Washington's right-hand man, Tim Evans. Hispanics felt that they 
were coming into direct conflict with blacks for good jobs, and one ex 
planation of their voting pattern is that they felt that they would do bet 
ter under the Daley regime than they would under the Evans regime.
The issue, from an academic's point of view, is: How do we trade 
off the legitimate demands of various protected groups, and how do we 
decide to favor one group over another, because invariably, their demands 
are going to conflict with one another. I believe that labor market 
discrimination has the most negative social impact on equity when it 
is done on the basis of race. Discrimination on the basis of sex is less 
insidious, and discrimination on the basis of age is probably the least 
harmful. So if we have to choose between favoring one group or another, 
either in a specific situation or in terms of using scarce resources for 
enforcement, I would say that we should worry about racial discrimina 
tion first, and the others should follow.
My justification is to pose the following question: Assuming that 
discrimination is rampant and significant, who is hurt by it? If a black
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is discriminated against, the black suffers the full burden of discrimina 
tion. Females who are discriminated against may suffer the full burden 
of discrimination, unless they are married to a male who benefits from 
discrimination. Obviously, not all women are married; nor are women 
who are married, married throughout their lifetimes. But the relevant 
unit for most purposes, in determining the standard of living, is the 
household; and most women live in households that contain males. It 
is not true that most blacks live in households that contain whites. As 
a result, if tough choices have to be made, my personal view is that favor 
ing females over blacks would have negative implications for income 
distribution and would be more harmful than favoring blacks at tne ex 
pense of females. Furthermore, the male-female situation seems to be 
correcting itself, which cannot be said for the black-white situation.
Finally, age discrimination is the least important of all, for the following 
reason: All individuals who are old, were once young. So even if the 
relevant unit is the individual rather than the household, individuals who 
are discriminated against when they are old, will on average have been 
discriminated in favor of, when they were young. A second reason is 
that a contract, either explicit or implicit, made with the worker may 
cover a significant chunk of his lifetime. So, even in the absence of any 
discrimination, one could observe a worker who is treated one way at 
one age and another way at another age, as a result of totally voluntary 
contracts.
Preventing age "discrimination" may prevent employers and workers 
from entering into agreements that make both sides better off. The same 
is not true of racial discrimination. If a white worker and a white employer 
contract to exclude blacks from the job, that makes whites better off, 
but it makes blacks worse off. It is not the case that a black worker merely 
has to wait a few years until he becomes a white one.
Another kind of hierarchy of discrimination that I'd like to mention has 
to do with the focus of discrimination law and enforcement. Should en 
forcement look at the hiring decision, the promotion decision, or wages? 
My view is that hiring is most important; promotion is second; and wages 
are third. Wages are least important because once hiring and promotion 
have been covered, there is not much discrimination on the basis of
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wages. If two workers who are at the same firm holding the same job 
are compared, it is very unlikely that the one who is black will be receiv 
ing significantly lower wages than one who is white in some way that 
is not explained by seniority.
Most of the differences in earnings of black and white workers, and 
particularly of male and female workers, take the form not so much of 
wage differences within the job, but rather, finding individuals in dif 
ferent jobs. Men and women who are doing the same job, receive the 
same wages. But women do not work in the same firms that men work 
in; nor, within the firm, are they likely to be in the same jobs. As is 
well-known, women are likely to be concentrated in lower-level white- 
collar jobs, clerical jobs, and less well paid service jobs. So to the ex 
tent that there is discrimination against females, correcting the job assign 
ment is likely to remedy most of the problem. The reason that I put 
hiring first, is that industrial differences and firm differences are really 
quite significant. Women, for example, are found to a much greater ex 
tent in service industries, and males to a much greater extent in durable 
manufacturing. That may be choice rather than chance; but to the ex 
tent that it is discrimination, it is implemented by discrimination in hiring.
Let me turn now to some evidence on what has happened in recent 
years and what we should be worrying about. Perhaps the most impor 
tant statistic shown in recent wage studies is that women are doing bet 
ter; and, some people think, a lot better. Labor force participation rates 
for females continue to rise, and despite this large labor market inflow 
by women, wages of females have not only kept up, but have gained 
on their male counterparts.
Females are much more likely to be found in professional jobs today 
than they were 10 or 15 years ago. In the typical business school today, 
anywhere from 20 to 40 percent of the students are female, whereas 
20 years ago that number would have been closer to 2 percent. The same 
is true in medical schools, and particularly in law schools. So there is 
a substantial professionalization of the female workforce.
While it is still true that females do not seem to have gotten signifi 
cant access to many jobs, such as very high level positions in major
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corporations, there is evidence that we are seeing a vintage effect. That 
is, since females have only recently made progress into middle levels 
of management, it will take a few years before we observe a high pro 
portion of females in upper management as well. I have little doubt that 
females will be moving into those jobs in significant numbers, although 
perhaps not in proportion to their numbers in the population. So I think 
the situation for females is getting much better.
Unfortunately, the same thing cannot be said for blacks. In the last 
presidential campaign, much was made by the Dukakis camp of the 
widening income distribution. The income distribution has gotten less 
equal in recent years for two reasons. First, wages of highly educated, 
highly trained workers have gone up. Second, wages of unskilled workers 
have fallen. This is particularly significant for uneducated blacks.
High school dropouts have been hurt badly by the trends of the '80s. 
Not that new jobs are bad. Just the reverse. But jobs formerly in Michigan 
are now in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
There are at least two interpretations of these data. First, it can be 
argued that wages are felling for blacks, and particularly for less educated 
blacks, because of increased discrimination. This might be attributed 
to political changes for example, the Reagan policies of the '80s; or 
to increased desire by firms for discrimination. The latter seems unlikely, 
but the former remains a candidate.
The second possible explanation is that changes in the industrial struc 
ture of the United States have decreased the wages of unskilled labor 
relative to those of skilled labor, and that this has nothing to do with 
changes in discrimination. My view is that the evidence points to the 
second namely, to the industrial shifts explanation. First, the industries 
that have been hurt the most are those that have had the largest propor 
tion of foreign competition. So it looks as though unskilled workers in 
the United States are unable to compete successfully, at current wages, 
with unskilled workers overseas; but skilled workers in the United States 
seem to do quite well in organizing foreign unskilled workers. The sec 
ond factor pointing in that direction is that if it were merely policies 
of the Reagan administration that were causing the change, then it would
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be difficult to explain why women are doing better and blacks are not. 
It is hard to believe that the Reagan administration targeted women for 
protective enforcement and blacks for neglect. So while discrimination 
may continue to be an issue in the United States, it is my view that 
it cannot explain changes in black-white or male-female wage 
differentials.
I'd like to turn now to what in some sense is the fundamental ques 
tion whenever discrimination is discussed: whether differences between 
races or sexes reflect choice or chance. Are blacks in low-paying jobs 
because they choose not to undertake training to the same extent as white 
or are blacks forced into those jobs because of discrimination in the 
system? Similarly, we observe that females tend to be in low-paying 
occupations and low-wage industries. Is that because they are preclud 
ed from entering certain occupations, or is it because women prefer 
to work in occupations that do not require serious commitments to the 
job but rather tolerate high turnover rates?
As difficult a question as this is to answer, there are data that speak 
to the issue. Duncan and Duncan (1955) devised an index to measure 
the amount of segregation in an economy. The Duncan index is a number 
that tells you the normalized proportion of individuals that would have 
to be moved in order to fully integrate a workforce. So for example, 
suppose that 50 percent of the workforce is male and 50 percent of the 
workforce is female; and suppose further that all females are in one 
job and that all males are in another job. Then in order to integrate 
the workforce fully, 50 percent of the females would have to be mov 
ed, and 50 percent of the males would have to be moved. The ratio 
of the number of people moved to the male population is the Duncan 
index; so in that case the number would be one. If women and men 
were assigned jobs randomly so that 50 percent of each set were in each 
job, then the Duncan index would be zero, because no one would have 
to be moved in order to totally integrate the workforce. So a number 
of zero means a fully integrated workforce; a value of one means a 
segregated workforce.
If a Duncan index is computed for males and females, the number 
turns out to be about .6. If the same exercise is done for black males and
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white males, the number is .2 meaning that many fewer workers would 
have to be moved in order to even out the job distribution. So black 
jobs are much more like white jobs than female jobs are like male jobs. 
Now, the ratio of black male wages to white male wages exceeds the 
ratio of white female wages to white male wages, but not substantially 
so. This means that people who receive similar earnings outcome in 
the economy relative to white males have very different occupational 
patterns.
Fuchs (1989) has interpreted this as meaning that the job distribution 
reflects choice and not chance. He argues that it is difficult to believe 
that black men face less discrimination than white females to such an 
extent that their jobs are quite similar to those of white males, whereas 
females are so discriminated against that their jobs are totally different. 
Recently, Francine Blau (1989) found that the Duncan index, which 
was falling for females for a period of time, is now starting to rise again, 
as new jobs are becoming female jobs.
The fact that women are concentrated in jobs that are not likely to 
be held by men has led the women's movement to push for comparable 
worth legislation; the comparable worth doctrine says that jobs have 
some inherent worth that can be measured, perhaps totally independent 
of the marketplace. For example, by assessing the kind of work that 
is done and the kind of responsibility associated with a nurse's job, we 
can determine the value of that job and compare it with the job of an 
electrician by looking at similar factors. This idea has gained legitimacy, 
and has actually been implemented in a number of countries most 
notably, Australia. In Canada, the province of Ontario implemented 
comparable worth across the board about a year ago.
There are several arguments against comparable worth. The first is 
that the market is the only index of worth, and there is never any reason 
for the government to intervene. This view is too strong. To accept 
it is to accept that there is no role, for example, for antitrust policy. 
If the market is the only index of value, then prices set by a monopolistic 
firm are the correct prices, and there is no reason to worry about cartel 
or monopoly behavior of any kind.
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Even the staunchest defenders of the free market at my institutions 
generally allow that firms have an incentive, if through no other way 
than attempting to influence government officials, to restrict markets, 
and to try to monopolize them. This creates inefficiencies in the economy 
that must be undone, and in these limited circumstances, government 
action is appropriate.
Once we allow for those kinds of arguments, then it seems clear that 
we can also extend the arguments to the labor market. Thus the dismissals 
of comparable worth on the grounds that it is a deviation from market 
prices, seem to me insufficient. Additionally, to even discuss comparable 
worth, you have to entertain at least the possibility that discrimination 
occurs in labor markets, so I shall begin with the working assumption 
that wage differentials in jobs may reflect discrimination.
For example, consider two occupations, nurses and electricians, and 
assume that electricians earn higher wages than nurses. First, one must 
ask why, under these circumstances, nurses don't enter the electrician 
occupation? There are two answers. The first answer is that they don't 
want to. If that's the answer, then there is neither a problem nor a 
remedy.
The wage differential between nursing and electrical work here reflects 
what we think of as an equalizing difference. Being an electrician is 
either harder, less interesting, or less rewarding in some other respect, 
and it must command a higher price as a result. The difference in wages 
under those circumstances would merely reflect a return to increased 
effort and pain associated with working that job. So if it is choice, then 
comparable worth clearly is an inappropriate remedy.
The second possibility is that the difference in wages between the 
male and female jobs is not the result of choice but the result of an ex 
clusionary policy by either employers or unions in the electricians' oc 
cupation which has somehow been effective at keeping females out of 
the occupation. Under those circumstances, discrimination has occur 
red and some adjustment is necessary. What comparable worth would 
seek to do is to raise the wage rates of nurses up to the wages of electri 
cians or to some other "comparable" job. The effect of this policy is 
to attract both women and men to the nurses' occupation, which makes 
the problem worse, not better.
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In fact, it does not address the problem at all. The problem, as you'll 
recall, is that women are precluded from entering the other occupa 
tion. If there were free mobility into the other occupation, there would 
be no problem in the first place, and comparable worth would not be 
needed. So the appropriate remedy is not comparable worth, but vigorous 
enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits job 
assignments on the basis of sex.
So by this reasoning, there is no role for comparable worth in the 
economy. Either wage differentials are there as a result of choice, in 
which case there is nothing to remedy; or wage differentials reflect 
discrimination, but the remedy for that discrimination is the removal 
of entry barriers into the segregated occupation, not raising wages in 
the flooded occupation.
There are some counters to this argument. The first counter, and prob 
ably the most compelling one, is that we've had Title VII since 1964 
and it hasn't worked, so we need to think about some other remedies. 
But if Title VII has not worked, why should comparable worth? In order 
for a law to work, enforcement is required, and enforcement can be 
applied to any law, if there is sufficient desire. The fact that Congress 
passes a statute that requires firms to set wages in some particular way 
does not mean that this will happen. If comparable worth can be en 
forced, so can Title VII, and I'd much rather see society's resources 
devoted to enforcing laws that create efficiency rather than laws that 
create inefficiency. The second problem is that enforcement of com 
parable worth is not without its costs. It would have the effect of creating 
an industry of experts and counter-experts, who would assess jobs and 
their worth for all parties. Litigation, as we are all aware, is not without 
its cost.
There are many problems associated with attempting to create indexes 
of worth. The first is that such indexes are subjective, and there are 
two levels of subjectivity. An index is subjective at the level of the in 
dex itself, and it is subjective at the level of the evaluator. First, I will 
provide an illustration of subjectivity at the level of the index.
Let there be two jobs, a schoolbus driver's job, and a sculptor's job, 
and suppose that we are constructing an index of job value by ranking
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the job on two of its characteristics: responsibility associated with the 
job, and know-how and skill associated with the job. Assume we all 
agree that a sculptor's job requires the maximum amount of skill, but 
has the minimum amount of responsibility associated with it, and that 
the schoolbus driver's job requires the minimum amount of skill, but 
the maximum amount of responsibility is associated with it. Let's sup 
pose further that the index for know-how goes between 10 and 15, 
whereas the index for responsibility is between 8 and 12. The sculptor 
receives 8 points for responsibility, but 15 points for know-how, giv 
ing us a total of 23 points. The schoolbus driver receives 12 points for 
responsibility, but only 10 points for know-how, making a total of 22. 
So, by this index, the sculptor is worth more:
Scale: Responsibility 8-12 Know-how 10-15
Sculptor receives 8 + 15 =23 
Bus driver receives 12 -I- 10 = 22
Consider a slightly different scaling, where the know-how scale stays 
the same, but we change the responsibility index so that its values go 
between 7 and 13, as opposed to between 8 and 12. Now the sculptor, 
who has the minimum amount of responsibility associated with his job, 
gets a score of 7 on responsibility, and 15 on know-how, giving us a 
total of 22. The schoolbus driver receives 13 on responsibility now, 
since that job requires the maximum amount, and a 10 on know-how, 
giving a total of 23. The schoolbus driver's job is now worth more.
Scale: Responsibility 7-13 Know-how 10-15
Sculptor receives 7 + 15 = 22 
Bus driver receives 13 + 10 = 23
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But these scalings of 8-12 or 7-13 are somewhat arbitrary. It's very 
difficult, ex ante, to judge which is the appropriate scaling, and very 
few of us would be willing to take a stand on one scale versus another. 
So I can reverse the value of jobs very easily by making minor changes 
in the values of the scales, and they might imply very different things 
about the amount of discrimination in an economy.
A second problem with indexes of this sort is that they are arbitrary 
at the level of the evaluator. Whereas I might assess the responsibility 
level of a sculptor's job at 7, someone else might give it an 8 or a 9. 
Similarly, someone might think that the know-how associated with be 
ing a schoolbus driver is not merely 10, but that it requires a level of 
12. Different evaluators will have different opinions, so that the index 
itself will be a function of the individuals evaluating the job. That is 
not a particularly attractive feature of an index on which salaries are 
going to be based.
The final problem with thinking about indexes and basing judgments 
about discrimination on them is that indexes of this sort focus on between- 
job rather than within-job variations, as illustrated by the following ex 
ample. Suppose that there are two jobs in the economy, one job which 
is called the male job because it has two men in it and one female; and 
one job which is called the female job, because it has two females and 
one male. In the male job, Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones each earn $12,000 
per year; Ms. Johnson earns $18,000 a year; so the average wage in 
the male job is $14,000. In the female job, Ms. Jackson and Ms. Roberts 
earn $15,000 a year; and Mr. Hill, the only man in the job, earns only 
$6,000 a year; so the average is $12,000.
Now in this extreme example, you'll notice that the average wage 
in the male job is higher than the average wage in the female job, and 
we might all agree ex ante that the female job is a more valuable job 
in some sense than the male job. Suppose we do. We might draw the 
inference from those numbers that females are discriminated against 
in this economy, because the jobs in which females happen to be located 
receive the lowest wages, even though those jobs are the higher valued 
jobs. But that inference would be completely inappropriate in this 
economy. If you'll notice, within job, women earn more than men. Also
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there is not one man in this economy who earns as much as the lowest 
paid female in the economy. The highest paid men in the economy are 
Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones, who earn $12,000 a year. The lowest paid 
females in the economy are Ms. Jackson and Ms. Roberts, who earn 
$15,000 a year. All female wages are higher than all male wages, and 
yet we would be inferring from this comparison that women are 
discriminated against. Nothing could be further from the truth. We are 
led to this inappropriate inference because the focus is on between-job 
comparisons, rather than on individual-based comparisons.













Average $14,000 Average $12,000
The absurdity of indexes is perhaps best illustrated by applying the 
technique to the product market, particularly, cognac and milk. It is 
likely that most sensible indexes would value milk more highly than 
cognac. After all, milk can sustain life; cognac cannot; and milk's social 
value seems much higher. Yet the price of cognac can be 30 (or more) 
times that of milk. Inferring that females are discriminated against in 
favor of males, by looking at wages versus external indexes of worth, 
is analogous to inferring that dairy farmers are discriminated against 
and grape producers favored because cognac, which is worth less than 
milk, receives 30 times its price.
Returning finally and briefly to age discrimination, the elimination 
of mandatory retirement by extension of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act to all-age individuals can have adverse effects on the 
economy. The major effect in my view is that mandatory retirement 
is the outgrowth of an incentive scheme which pays young workers less 
than they are worth and old workers more than they are worth, in order 
to provide performance incentives to workers who are close to the retire-
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ment age. The elimination of mandatory retirement makes it more dif 
ficult to use life-cycle compensation as an incentive device. In an era 
when productivity factors are important considerations, I think that the 
generalization of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act cannot 
have positive effects.
On the other hand, the empirical evidence suggests that the elimina 
tion of mandatory retirement is not particularly important. What estimates 
there are, reveal very small increases in the labor force participation 
rates of older workers. The exception is in academics, where work is 
so poorly defined that there is much less reason to retire.
Firms can also easily evade these laws by structuring the pension plan 
so that individuals who continue to work are penalized in the form of 
a lower present value of pension benefits, giving workers an incentive 
to retire. Virtually all defined benefit pension plans in the U.S. have 
the feature that once a worker works beyond a certain age, usually 
somewhere around 60, additional years of service reduce present value 
of the pension. The annual pension goes up, but losing that year's worth 
of pension more than offsets the increase in pension in subsequent years. 
A strategically designed pension plan is a substitute for mandatory retire 
ment and is a way to evade changes in the Age Discrimination in Employ 
ment Act. Courts have looked carefully at such pension provisions, but 
they have not cared much about reductions that are more than actuarial 
as an individual ages.
In conclusion, the effects of antidiscrimination legislation are unclear. 
First, there has been an increase in unemployment rates, and particularly 
unemployment rates among black workers; but the increase began well 
before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, and certainly before 
it had time to really bite. So it would be difficult to argue that the Civil 
Rights Act has had much effect on increasing unemployment. Second, 
in countries where comparable-worth-style legislation has been im 
plemented, a number of researchers have found that there is not much 
effect on employment. An Australian named Bob Gregory has found 
virtually no effect, although some of his colleagues find some signifi 
cant decreases in employment among females.
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But the basic result seems to be that discrimination laws do not have 
obvious detrimental effects on employment in an economy. Nor do they 
seem to have any obvious positive effects on wages. Average wages 
of females are up slightly, relative to males; but average wages of blacks, 
especially low-wage blacks, have not risen, relative to whites since the 
mid-1970s. To the extent that there has been long-term enforcement 
of discrimination laws for any group, blacks should be the most positively 
affected.
In conclusion, then, I believe that the picture on discrimination laws 
is mixed. In theory they are a good idea, but implementation has been 
uneven and the laws are perhaps harmful. But because they are enforc 
ed so poorly, even bad implementation seems to have little detrimental 
effect on the economy.
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Discrimination Within the Family
The Treatment of Daughters and Sons
Paul J. Taubman 
University of Pennsylvania
My topic is the comparative parental treatment of daughters and sons 
and whether any unequal treatment should be labeled "discrimination." 
I have chosen such a strange topic because economists find it difficult 
to explain why a freely functioning, competitive market would allow 
equally skilled employees to receive unequal pay for equal work. Yet, 
as summarized below, such a situation seems to exist between men and 
women. Economists like to argue, therefore, that nonmarket institutions 
such as the school system or the family have produced daughters and 
sons who are not equally skilled in some dimension not yet measured 
by researchers. This paper will cast some doubt on this conclusion.
I first sketch out the historical path of the ratio of female to male wages 
under the assumption that discrimination in the labor market is defined 
as equally qualified men and women not receiving equal pay. Deter 
mining that men and women are equally skilled, however, is a hard task 
empirically.
I then explore the reasons why economists find it difficult to explain 
how discrimination can persist in the long run in markets that are com 
petitive. Hence, I next examine families to see if we can observe parents 
treating daughters and sons differently and thereby creating unequally 
skilled children. In doing this, I examine studies that quantify some 
aspects of family environment that may affect subsequent performance 
in the labor market. I do not, however, cover many psychological aspects 
such as aggressiveness or submissiveness, since they are not 
characteristics studied by economists. Finally, I provide a definition of 
discrimination within the family and discuss what is known on the topic.
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Labor Market Treatment
In a labor market without discrimination, equally qualified men and 
women would receive the same compensation for the same work. Many 
people, therefore, treat as evidence of labor market discrimination un 
equal pay for workers with the same measured qualifications. Sometimes 
these studies compare wages for the same occupation, though this ig 
nores the question of whether discrimination operates by reducing ac 
cess to some occupations for women. In any event, qualifications are 
an imperfect measure of either work or effort.
Even insuring that people have the same qualifications is a tricky 
business. Sometimes "equally qualified" is defined by looking at specific 
age and education groups. Sometimes not even such crude adjustments 
are made. There are other variables that have not been used at all by 
economists in defining equally qualified groups. Loehlin and Nichols 
(1976, p. 11), for example, present average scores for female and male 
high school students for various components of the California Personality 
Inventory. There are noticeable gender differences on items such as 
"social presence" or "communicality."
Labor market differentials between women and men have a long history. 
For example, Leviticus 27: 1-4 indicates that female slaves sold for about 
60 percent of the price of male slaves. 1 It is also possible to reach fur 
ther back in time. The Museum of the University of Pennsylvania has 
a large collection of Sumerian commercial records baked in clay. Some 
economic historian might find it interesting to calcula.e a "weighty" 
average of male and female slave prices for this civilization.
For the U.S., most attention has focused on the post-World War II 
period. However, Goldin (1990) has examined developments in the labor 
market for women back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. She 
finds that the ratio of female to male wages was a bit less than .5 around 
1900. In the 1950s and 1960s, this ratio was about .6. More recently, 
Smith and Ward (1989) show it has risen to about .65.
In judging the level and the time pattern in this ratio, several issues 
must be kept in mind. First, since 1950, the percentage of nonelderly
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married women participating in the labor force has more than doubled, 
reaching 60 percent in recent years. It is quite possible that women 
workers today have different innate and acquired skills from the women 
workers of the 1950s.
Smith and Ward (1989) have calculated the differences in education 
and experience for all and for working men and women.2 The working 
women are not a random draw from the female population. Smith and 
Ward (p. 12) indicate that among workers over the period 1940 to 1970, 
"women on average, lost almost a year of education and gained only 
half a year of market experience" compared to male workers. However, 
for the population at large, the present female and male labor force is 
generally more knowledgeable than the population in 1950, though there 
have been intermediate periods where the population has had greater 
knowledge than today's workers.3 Comparable numbers on knowledge 
levels for the people who work are not available.
The life cycle pattern of labor force participation of women complicates 
the analysis and the interpretation of the female/male wage ratio. To 
understand this, I must digress to explain the concept of general on-the- 
job training. Such training, which can be provided by parents, schools, 
and firms, increases an individual's (marginal) productivity and wages 
at many jobs. In a competitive world, all these jobs should pay the same 
wage; hence, any firm that provides training cannot recapture expen 
ditures on training through reduction in future wages. Therefore, the 
person being trained must pay for these expenditures now via tuition 
or reduced current wages.
It is possible that the influx of women into the labor force in the 1950s, 
60s, and 70s lowered the average amount (stock) of training of women 
in the labor force in some years, since there were so many new workers 
at many ages.4
Two other life cycle-related events are important. Often when a child 
is born, the mother takes formal, temporary maternity leave or drops 
out of the labor force for a more extended time.5 Since any worker's 
return to general training occurs in the form of higher wages when work 
ing, younger women contemplating having children may be reluctant to 
choose positions with higher training components and with lower current
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and higher future earnings. (Of course, this also implies that, when begin 
ning a labor market career, women should receive greater wages than 
men, which we don't observe.) Moreover, Mincer and Ofek (1982) in 
dicate that women who return to the labor force after being out more 
than one year receive lower wages than when they left work, with this 
differential increasing with the amount of time spent out of the labor 
market. However, they argue that this deterioration is quickly overcome. 
Still, a larger increase in reentrants will drag the female/male wage ratio 
down.
Suppose this gender wage ratio is less than 1. Is this an indication 
that sexual discrimination exists in the labor market? As my previous 
discussion indicates, the answer is "not necessarily," because men and 
women could have engaged in different previous on-the-job training pro 
grams. In addition, they can have different skills or may have selected 
jobs with different attributes that trade off for wages. Bound, Griliches, 
and Hall (1986), using a sample of brothers and sisters, find that there 
are unobserved but latent family effects on schooling, IQ, and earnings, 
and that these effects "are sex blind" (p. 97). Lucas (1977) finds substantial 
wage rate tradeoffs for nonpecuniary job characteristics with some dif 
ferences by gender. These differences explain a portion of the gender 
wage differential.
Moreover, average differences in observed characteristics, such as years 
of work experience, account for much of the observed difference in the 
wage ratio (see Neumark 1988). Corcoran and Duncan (1979) find that 
completed years of training on current job and "other work history" 
explain about 40 percent of the wage gap observed in 1976. Yet the ratio 
adjusted for differences in the average of observed characteristics is still 
less than 1.
In spite of this consistent finding, many economists are reluctant to 
label this difference as "labor market discrimination." Let me sketch 
out why.6 We distinguish three types of discrimination: employer in 
which the boss suffers pain or disutility from employing women or non- 
whites in a job; employee in which one type of worker suffers pain 
or disutility from laboring with workers of another demographic type; 
and consumer in which the buyer of a product suffers pain or disutility
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from buying a product made or sold by someone from another ethnic 
or gender group.
For simplicity, assume that all workers have the same skill level and 
that there is full employment. In the employer model with fixed capital, 
there can initially be discrimination with the disfavored group receiv 
ing a smaller wage. The gender wage differential must be set so that 
both female and male labor markets clear at the going wage rates. The 
amount of the wage differential will depend on how much the employer 
of the last woman needs to be compensated (for the disutility he incur 
red) by reduced female wages to hire her. This same gender differential 
will be paid for all equally skilled women, since they are assumed to 
be interchangeable.
However, suppose some employers have less gender distaste and are 
more willing to hire women. The more women capitalists hire, the greater 
will be their profits, since women workers are hired at a lower wage 
than equally skilled men. In the long run, these more profitable employers 
can expand their firms as long as lenders and investors only care about 
interests and profits. This will increase the demand for the female labor 
force. Bigger bigots will have lower profits and their capital will shrink 
over time. As long as some people aren't discriminators, the long-run 
equilibrium is one where all equally skilled people are paid the same 
wage for the same work.
Employee discrimination also can be found in the short run, but if 
mixed workforces cause the employer to pay higher wages, competitors 
can be expected to set up gender "pure" plants. Since by assumption 
all workers are equally skilled, equilibrium requires equal pay at 
segregated plants.
Consumer discrimination may be viable in both the short and long 
run, but this type of discrimination is not thought to be very important 
for the economy as a whole. For most products, you don't know who 
made a good. Of course, you may know from whom you bought it, but 
retail trade, which includes more than sales, accounts for less than 5 
percent of our jobs and about 12 percent of civilian employees are in 
sales at all levels of trade.
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Leaving aside consumer discrimination, economists have a difficult 
time explaining why discrimination should be found in labor markets 
in the long run. Wage differentials, however, are found between men 
and women with the same education and years of job experience, though 
these differentials have narrowed in recent years. Several possible ex 
planations are: economists don't know how to model the labor market; 
the labor market isn't competitive; adjustments to eliminate discrimination 
take a very long time; or people with the same length of job experience 
and years of schooling are not equally skilled, perhaps because of treat 
ment within the family.
As a practicing economist I am willing to reject the first reason out 
of hand, and I note that numerous studies have generated results consis 
tent with economic models of the labor market. While Akerlof (1985) 
has shown how discrimination could persist in a noncompetitive labor 
market, it is difficult to believe that such noncompetitiveness is per 
vasive enough to have a major impact on wage ratios.
It is possible that the adjustment process is very slow. For example, 
Margo (1986) shows that a child's literacy depends strongly on the parents' 
literacy. The time since emancipation in this country a date when less 
than 20 percent of blacks could read (Smith 1984, p. 691) may not be 
long enough to have made blacks and whites functionally literate to the 
same degree, given this intergenerational link. However, if adjustment 
takes this long, economic theorems about the long run lose much of their 
interest.
The possibility that differential treatment in the family produces sons 
and daughters with different quantity and quality of skills and human 
capital remains and is the focus for the remainder of this paper.
The Role of the Family
Parents can be very important in shaping the socioeconomic outcomes 
of their offspring. For example, among same sex identical twins about 
50 years old, the correlation in earnings is nearly .6 (even with no 
allowance for measurement error).7 On measures more closely attuned
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to childhood, the identical twin correlations are even higher, ranging 
up to .95 for IQ.
These twin correlations occur because of both genetic and environmen 
tal linkages. I will not dwell at great length on the genetic linkage or 
its measurement though I will note that I have generated some (con 
troversial) estimates that suggest that genes explain much of the individual 
difference (variance) in schooling and earnings.8 It is of more impor 
tance to consider how much parents can influence their children through 
the provision of their environment. Of course, if all effects are either 
genetic or environmental, then it must follow that environmental effects 
are "surprisingly small," but they are nowhere near zero.
In some samples it is possible to divide environmental effects into those 
"common" to siblings and those that are specific to a child.9 The available 
literature suggests that the "common" environmental component, with 
which no parental discrimination can be associated, has limited impact 
on the across-family variance in socioeconomic and psychological 
outcomes though most studies measure this common environment for 
brothers. See Behrman et al. (1980), Behrman, Pollak and Taubman 
(1989), Scarr and Weinberg (1976), and Tellegen et al. (1988), which 
use a variety of techniques and samples. Individual specific environ 
ment can be provided both in and outside of the family. The individual 
environment provided by the family could differ by gender and make 
daughters and sons unequally skilled.
I next examine what we know about differential provision of environ 
ment by child's gender and then refine by definition of parental 
discrimination.
The Treatment of Daughters and Sons
Smith (1984, p. 687), using published Census documents,10 presents 
estimates of average years of schooling completed for white and black 
males and females. His table 3 is reproduced (with permission of the 
AER) as my table 1. As shown in this table, through the 1916 to 1920 
birth cohort, white women have up to .5 of a year more education than
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white men. From then through the 1946-50 birth cohort, white men 
(many more of whom would have been eligible for education benefits 
from the G.I. Bill) have an advantage over white women of less than 
.25 of a year of schooling. My updated results from the 1980 Census 
suggest a slight advantage for white women in the next age 
cohort 1955-1959. Black women have generally had about .5 of a year 
more education in most birth cohorts than black men.
Table 1










































































































SOURCE Smith 1984, p 687
The differences in any birth cohort are small and in this dimension 
of human capital there seems to be no presumption of gender discrimina 
tion by parents. However, the use of averages does not speak fully to
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the issue. Until about 1980, a larger fraction of men than women went 
to college. See Goldin (1990). While this may indicate a greater paren 
tal financial contribution to sons, it should be noted that after finishing 
school, daughters typically work before marriage. If she lives with her 
parents and contributes funds, the family is foregoing some of this poten 
tial income while the daughter finishes high school.
Parents may also affect children's future prospects by sending them 
to private and parochial precollege schools. 11 Table 2 presents infor 
mation on the percentage of each sex who attended public school in 
various years. Only small differences exist with no clear gender pat 
tern. Similar results hold when education is divided into elementary 
and secondary levels. Also, the number of female and male students 
in Catholic schools are about equal.
Table 2
Percentage of All Students of Each Gender 
3 to 34 Years Old Enrolled in Public Schools















I have also estimated a logit model, in which I distinguish public, 
Catholic, and other private high schools, for a 1957 Wisconsin High 
School senior sample. While IQ, living in a rural community, and paren 
tal income have highly significant coefficients, the coefficients on gender 
are very small and highly insignificant.
Parents can support their children at college and influence their col 
lege choices via nonmonetary means. In the Ivy League, less than half 
of the undergraduate body is female, though the female percentage may 
be rising. At the University of Pennsylvania, which has an undergraduate 
nursing school, engineering school, business school, and college of arts 
and sciences, the percentage of female freshmen matriculants has risen
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from about 40 percent in 1978 to about 45 percent in 1988. Penn's ad 
missions are need-blind. About half of Penn's students are not eligible 
for financial aid because of own and parental income and wealth. Women 
account for 42 percent of the freshmen students receiving aid in 1988.
In interpreting these results, note that Penn admits about a fourth of 
its freshmen solely on the basis of academic standing. The remainder 
are admitted on a combination of academic and nonacademic creden 
tials, but as far as I am aware gender is not a criteria of diversity. Thus, 
judging by Penn, there is a slight tendency for daughters to have a 
marginally smaller chance to attend an Ivy League school, and those 
daughters who attend come from slightly wealthier families. The 
available evidence, e.g., Taubman (1975), which is based solely on men, 
indicates that people who went to schools where students have higher 
SAT scores and better facilities have greater income, even after con 
trolling for own intelligence, job preferences, and a huge number of 
family background variables.
While years of schooling is the easiest data to obtain about daughters 
and sons, some additional information is known. For example, Behrman 
and Taubman (1986) indicate that daughters who attend college receive 
$315 per year more parental monetary support than sons in college.
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1989) have begun to examine a new 
sample of 1985 Pennsylvania high school seniors, which was provided 
to them by Professor M. Tierney. This sample matches records from 
applications to the Pennsylvania Higher Education Authority (PHEA) 
(by Pennsylvania residents) with records from the Education Testing 
Service (ETS). The PHEA data include parents' (or if they are indepen 
dent their own) federal income tax returns, the school they are attend 
ing, and the cost of attendance net of scholarships, and also net of loans 
provided by the federal and state government. 12
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman examine the college choices of sons 
and daughters. Schools in the sample can be characterized by type, such 
as private high-cost, out-of-state, etc., and by dollar amount of costs 
before and after scholarships. In logit equations for type of school, there 
are strong effects of parental income, SAT scores, and ethnicity. There 
are also significant but very small effects of gender in a sample where
Discrimination Within the Family 35
women are 53 percent of the total. The largest difference is no more 
than 10 percent, and sons only have an advantage for Pennsylvania state- 
owned schools 13 and community colleges, which are the inexpensive 
choices. However, the female percentage is generally smaller than the 
53 percent found in the samples.
They also examine the amount spent on colleges. Tuition (gross and 
net of scholarships and loans) is positively related to parental income 
and to the child's gender. Girls expend 2 to 3 percent more, even with 
parental income held constant. Hence, there is little overall difference 
in the type of college attended by the 10,000 students except in the greater 
attendance of men in the low-cost groups given above. This is at variance 
with the Penn experience.
Parents can contribute more than money to prepare their children for 
adulthood. Parental time, examples, and emotional support can all help 
determine the amount of human capital a child takes to the labor market. 
Economists have not tried to measure the other two elements, but they 
have done a little work on parental time inputs. Leibowitz (1974) has 
used the data in the Terman sample of California children in school 
around 1920. However, these individuals were in the top 2 percent of 
the IQ distribution, and it is not clear how her results generalize to the 
whole IQ distribution, the rest of the country, or more recent genera 
tions. Nevertheless, parental "hometime" spent with the child was about 
the same for daughters and sons (p. S131).
More recent time budget studies such as those summarized in Hill 
(1985) make a distinction between fathers and mothers, but not usually 
between daughters and sons. However, Hill and Stafford (1980), using 
a detailed time budget study, note that (p. 221) "college-educated 
mothers devoted more time to the care of their preschool daughters than 
to their preschool sons, while the converse was true for those mothers 
with less than a college education." 14
Studies that relate men's and women's earnings to parental 
characteristics, such as education, exist, though their interpretation is 
complicated by the large number of women not working at a point of 
time. This is less of a problem when studying years of schooling. A 
recent summary of this education literature is given in Behrman and
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Taubman (1985), where some evidence is presented that the father's 
education has relatively larger impacts on the son's success and the 
mother's on the daughter's success.
As noted earlier, Bound, Griliches, and Hall (1986) find that latent 
family effects for the variance of IQ, years of schooling, and the natural 
logarithm of earnings are essentially the same for both sexes. When 
panel data are available for siblings, it is possible to estimate an in 
dividual fixed effect. Furthermore, using sibling panel data, the fixed 
effect can be decomposed into a family effect common to each sibling 
and an individual specific effect. Solon et al. (1987) find that the fami 
ly component shared by siblings and the individual effect not shared 
by siblings are about the same share of the variance in the log of in 
come for both sexes.
Childhood activities may also affect both the amount of schooling 
progenies obtain and their future labor market success. For example, 
for men Taubman (1975) shows that having spent much time on chores 
as a child is associated with about a 10 percent reduction in earnings 
near age 50, but that a large amount of time spent on part-time work 
is associated with a corresponding increase in earnings at the same age.
Generally it is not clear if the parents influence the children's will 
ingness to take part-time jobs or to drop out of work. When child labor 
was common, as in the nineteenth century, there is less of an inter 
pretative issue. Parsons and Goldin (1989) show that beginning in the 
age category of 5 to 10, males are more likely to be at work and not 
in school than females, though the differential varies by children's wage 
opportunities and fathers' wages. 15
As shown in table 3, there are differences in labor force participa 
tion rates 16 between males and females aged 16 to 17. Males are more 
likely to work whether black or white; however, the gender differen 
tial has narrowed substantially over time. Over time, males have par 
ticipated less in the labor force while female participation has increas 
ed. It is not obvious to me if these trends represent parental changes 
in support for their children, parental discrimination, growth in fast food 
and other teenage work opportunities, or extra protectiveness for 
daughters in the past.
Discrimination Within the Family 37
Table 3














































SOURCE U S Department of Labor (1985)
It is possible to extend the story back to slightly earlier ages. Tim- 
mer, Eccles, and O'Brien (1985) use diaries collected from children 
to determine how they spend their time. During the week, boys and 
girls aged 12 to 17 average about 20 minutes a week at market work. 
However, girls spend 40 minutes and boys 16 minutes per week at 
housework, which may have consequences in the future. During 
weekends males and females average about 60 minutes and 25 minutes 
at market work, respectively, while household work averages 45 minutes 
and 1.5 hours for males and females.
A few studies have examined the distribution of financial assets. Men- 
chick (1980) finds that estates are split evenly among daughters and 
sons. In another study, he found that more than 80 percent of estates 
with multiple surviving children are split evenly; hence, little room ex 
ists for gender differences.
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1989) examine the distribution of 
"help from relatives." They use the Michigan Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). The PSID surveyed a random sample of people in 
1968. The same people and split-offs from their household have been 
followed through the current time period. Behrman, Pollak, and Taub 
man studied the average-help-received variable for the period 1982 
through 1984 for children who were less than 18 in 1968 and not students 
in 1984. They found that females receive about one-third less help than
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men, but this amounts to less than $90 per year. Incidentally, they found 
only minor effects of own earnings or parental income on help receiv 
ed from relatives.
There is little evidence of differential treatment by gender of children. 
Would such differences, if found, be evidence of discrimination, and 
is the absence of differences evidence of nondiscrimination? The answer 
to both questions is "not necessarily," for reasons shown in the ap 
pendix to this essay.
Conclusion
In this paper I have examined the little evidence available on the treat 
ment of daughters and sons by parents. Raw statistics on bequests, 
transfers, earnings and educational attainment suggest little difference 
by gender. College expenditure data for Pennsylvanians indicate that 
girls on average go to slightly more expensive schools.
I have also constructed a formal model in which I translate discrimina 
tion into parents caring more for or giving more weight to one child's 
earnings in the parents' utility function. By making some strong assump 
tions, it is possible to generate an equation where we can determine 
if parents discriminate against one sex in the provision of education. 
Based on one U.S. sample, parents care equally for sons and daughters. 
Hence, if there are labor market differences in earnings, they are not 
arising because of parents favoring boys.
NOTES
1 See The Torah- The Five Books of Moses (1962)
2 Recently the increased labor force participation of women with high-earnings spouses had led 
to increased inequality in family income (adjusted for family size) See Danziger, Gottschalk, 
and Smolensky (1989) This suggests a recent increase in skills of the female labor force 
3. See Bishop (1989), who uses data on SAT scores which peaked in the mid-1960s and other 
measures of knowledge
4 For some evidence on this, see Goldm (1990); however, see Smith and Ward (1989) for con 
trary evidence
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5. See Hill and Stafford (1980)
6. See Arrow (1973) for more formal proof.
7. Behrman et al (1980)
8. See Behrman et al (1980) and Behrman and Taubman (1989)
9. Corcoran and Datcher (1981) indicate that much of sibling similarity in schooling and earnings 
can be proxied by a list of parental characteristics such as education, they do not worry how much 
of these effects are genetic or environmental, and sibling similarity omits about half of the genetic 
effect and specific environment provided by parents to a child
10 There may be a bias in his data for our purposes because some members of a birth cohort 
died prior to the 1940 Census the first one used Age-specific mortality is related to education, 
with the more educated living longer, and to sex, with women generally living longer, but birth- 
related deaths may have affected older female cohorts more strongly
11 See Taubman (1975) for some evidence on the effect of going to such schools on male earn 
ings around age 50
12 While the data are not perfect because there are income eligibility limits, there is no reason
to think the percentage above the limits varies by gender
13. The "state-owned" category includes schools such as Bloomsburg It does not include Penn
State
14 In conversation, Stafford has indicated that these results are more reliable than earlier ones
he summarized in this article based on another sample
15. They also suggest parents chose cities to maximize family income, including that for child 
labor, which greatly complicates the analysis since parents' earnings may go down even as fami 
ly income rises.
16. You participate if you have or are actively looking for a job
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Appendix 
Altruism and Investment in Human Capital
This appendix summarizes the work of Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 
(1986). Altruistic parents are those whose utility function depends on their 
children's consumption or income, as well as the parents' own consumption. 
In general, an equilibrium allocation of resources between altruistic parents 
and each child requires that (to the parents) the ratio of the marginal utility 
of parental consumption and the marginal utility of a child's consumption equal 
the ratio of the price of each type of consumption. This also means the ratio 
of the marginal utility of one child's consumption to another child's equal the 
ratio of their prices of consumption goods.
A child's earnings depend on both his or her genetic endowments and home 
and other environments. Parents can influence their children's future consump 
tion possibilities by investing time, money, and affection in them. For simplici 
ty, call these investments the home environment, E^. It is also possible that 
other environmental influences exist, for example, accidents, particular 
teachers, own friends, and the institution of governmental policies not expected 
when parents chose a neighborhood.
Suppose the parent's utility function can be divided into two separable parts: 
parental consumption and children's earnings. We will concentrate on the lat 
ter part. Let us examine the resources (R) devoted just to the child's environ 
ment. Let there be just two children, one of each gender. The parameters of 
the utility help determine the distribution of resources invested in each child, 
but do not necessarily indicate discrimination.
Parents discriminate for or against each child only if the weights they give 
to each child's earnings are not equal. With this definition, unequal education 
or unequal income is not necessarily parental discrimination nor is equal educa 
tion and income a guarantee of parental nondiscrimination.
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1986) studied the interaction of the parents' 
utility function and the child's human capital function to see how parental 
discrimination may affect the level of schooling and earnings by gender. For 
the functional forms they use, they find that whether or not parents discriminate 
depends solely on the shape of the parents' utility function. Their empirical 
work suggests no favoritism towards males.
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The Deteriorating Economic 
Circumstances of Children
Barbara L. Wolfe 
University of Wisconsin
Since Samuel Preston raised the issue in his 1984 presidential address 
to the Population Association of America (Preston 1984), there has been 
heated debate over whether children are receiving less than their share 
of public resources. Preston argued that more and more of our public 
resources are being directed toward the elderly, while a smaller and 
smaller share is going to children. He pointed to public spending on 
Social Security and Medicare, which has risen rapidly, in contrast to 
spending on welfare and education, which has stagnated or fallen. More 
recently, we have again focused on the plight of children, particularly 
those in single-parent households. To some, the current plight of many 
of our children is a time bomb; we are seen as leaving to the next genera 
tion a legacy of unproductive, poorly educated children, ill-equipped 
to function in an increasingly demanding labor market. While this un 
equal treatment is not technically discrimination, it has similar deleterious 
effects.
In this paper, I contribute some facts and draw some conclusions from 
this debate. I look at the economic situation of children and the elderly 
and how they have changed over time. Next I describe how public 
resources have been allocated to these two groups. Then I explore the 
likely effects of insufficient resources for children, and why there is such 
disparity between our treatment of the young and our treatment of the 
old. Finally, I present two proposals for increasing our investment in 
children.
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Facts About Children and the Elderly
First, let me describe these two populations:
Children: Children 18 and under in the United States are increasingly 
nonwhite and increasingly likely to live in single-parent families or in 
families in which both parents work. In 1987, a quarter of all children 
were nonwhite and nearly a quarter over 23 percent lived in single- 
parent families. The picture is starker for nonwhites: nearly 50 percent 
live in families headed by a woman. These proportions have doubled 
in 20 years and are likely to continue to grow. Because almost two of 
three new marriages dissolve and a quarter of all births are out of wedlock, 
it is estimated that almost 60 percent of all children and 90 percent of 
black children will spend some time in a single-parent household 
(Levitan, Mangum, and Pines 1989, p. 6). For children born in 1980, 
the predictions are even worse. Seventy percent of white children and 
94 percent of black children can expect to spend some time in a single- 
parent household 31 percent of their childhood for whites but nearly 
60 percent for blacks (U.S. House of Representatives 1989, pp. 832-833).
Two-parent families in which there are two earners are also a growing 
trend. In 1983, only 41 percent of two-parent families had a mother who 
stayed at home, compared to 62 percent 20 years earlier. The increase is 
greatest among women with preschool-age children (Haveman et al. 1988).
The elderly: The elderly are surviving longer. As a result, the pro 
portion of our population that is elderly has been growing, especially 
the proportion aged 75 and older. And, they are less likely to be widowed 
than in 1970. Like children, the elderly have changed their living ar 
rangements over time. They used to live in other people's households, 
especially those of their children. Now they are much more likely to 
be living alone or with a spouse (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989). In 
1987, 12 percent of the population were aged 65 or older. Of these, 16 
percent of the men and 41 percent of the women were living alone. Most, 
53 percent, were living io married-couple households, but this is more 
true for men than for women.
To compare the economic status of these two groups, we look at poverty 
rates (see table 1 and figure 1). Poverty rates tell us the proportion of
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Table 1
The Trends in Poverty: Among Children by Family Type 















































































































SOURCES Danziger(1989b) Computations for 1949-1979 by Sheldon Danziger from computer 
tapes of the 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980 Censuses of Population, 1987 data from U S Bureau 
of the Census, Current Population Reports, Poverty in the United States, Series P-60, No 163 
(Washington, DC US Government Printing Office, 1987) 
NOTE For 1949-1979, children 0-14 years of age. for 1987, children 0-18
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a population that falls below an arbitrary income level defined by the 
Census Bureau as the poverty line. This poverty line varies by household 
size; it is based on income, which includes cash transfers but not in- 
kind transfers such as food stamps, subsidized housing, or medical 
assistance.
The poverty rate for the elderly has fallen substantially in the last five 
decades, especially in the last two. In 1969, 26 percent of the elderly 
were poor. In 1987, 12 percent of the elderly were poor, compared to 
a poverty rate of 13.5 percent for the population as a whole.
The poverty rate among children declined for most of this time but 
started to rise 20 years ago, and since 1974 it has exceeded that of the 
elderly. In fact, as can be seen in figure 1, during the Reagan years the 
child poverty rate fluctuated around 20 percent, compared to about 16 
percent in the eight preceding years. This means that one in every five 
children was poor. In recent years, children have been the largest group 
in the poverty population; about 40 percent of all the poor are children 
(Danziger 1989a, p. 6).
We must remember, however, that although the elderly as a group are 
doing well, and children as a group are falling behind, there remain many 
among the elderly who have very low incomes (for example, single elderly 
black women). Moreover, among children, some groups have far more 
poverty than others. In 1985, for example, nearly 65 percent of children 
who lived in Hispanic and black families headed by a single parent were 
poor, while only 8.3 percent of white children in two-parent families 
could be classified as poor (Smolensky, Danziger, and Gottschalk 1988, 
p. 40).
Having established that children as a group are more likely to be poor 
than the old, let us look at the sources of support for the two groups. 
First we look at those aspects of the economy and government spending 
that are designed to benefit all children, such as the earnings of family 
heads and education, and then those designed to reach all of the elder 
ly, such as Social Security. Then we examine those programs that help 
the needy: for children, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 
Medicaid, and food stamps; for the elderly, Supplemental Security In 
come, Medicaid, and food stamps.
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Comparing Sources of Support for the Two Groups
Earnings vs. Social Security
The real earnings of the median worker declined between 1970 and 
1989 (Smolensky, Danziger, and Gottschalk 1988, pp. 42-44). In fact, 
the exact year the decline began was 1973, the year of the first OPEC 
oil crisis, which set off lines at gas stations, inflation, and a major reces 
sion. Grown-up children from the baby boom entered the labor force 
largely during this period and were particularly hard hit by the poor 
economic conditions. At the same time, mean social security benefits 
continued to increase relative to the median earnings of males. These 
benefits are available to retired members of the workforce 62 and over 
and their families. Some economists attribute the decline in poverty 
among the elderly and its increase among children to this pattern of mean 
earnings of prime-age males and social security. 1 The 1972 Social Security 
Amendments increased benefits by 20 percent and introduced an 
automatic indexing of benefits to "keep pace with inflation," at a time 
when wages of men were not keeping up with inflation. Earnings of 
women increased but were still lower than men's and, as mentioned 
earlier, the number of children living with only one parent has been 
rising. Average benefits per retired worker increased by 46 percent be 
tween 1973 and 1984. Total federal expenditures per elderly person in 
1985 real dollars went from $5,500 in 1971 to more than $9,000 in 1985, 
an increase of 65 percent in 14 years. Added to this is the increase in 
the standard deduction for the elderly as well. Real earnings dropped 
by 12 percent for men 35-44 from 1973 to 1986, by half that for men 
45-55, and by more than 20 percent for men 25-34 who are high school 
graduates. Low wage jobs have increased while middle wage ones 
decreased.
Education
Public education is our major public investment in children. The 
percentage of federal budget outlays spent on education decreased from 
5.9 percent in 1980 to 4.1 percent in 1985 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1989). Enrollments stayed at roughly the same level over this period.
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The federal share of expenditures on public primary and secondary educa 
tion declined from 9 to 6 percent or by one-third, while real expenditures 
per pupil increased slightly by 2.5 percent per year from 1980 to 1985. 
This is an improvement over the 1970s, when per pupil expenditures 
increased by 2.2 percent per annum even though enrollments in public 
schools declined by five million, or by more than 10 percent. Over the 
last three decades, the proportion of classroom teachers to all staff declin 
ed from 65 percent to 54 percent. Thus more educational dollars now 
go to noninstructional personnel (bus drivers, security officers) who only 
indirectly influence our children's education.
Another indication of the lessening commitment to invest in children's 
education is the pay scale for primary and secondary teachers. The ratio 
of average starting salaries of teachers relative to liberal arts graduates 
declined about 3 percent from 1975 to 1987, when it stood at 85 percent 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989). The ratio of the average salary of 
teachers to net earnings of physicians stayed about the same over this 
period at about 22 percent, or $25,000 versus $112,800 in 1986. The 
status of physicians is also much higher than that of teachers. (By the 
prestige scale of the National Opinion Research Center [NORC], a high 
school teacher's rating is 63, a physician's 82 [and a university professor's, 
78].) It should come as little surprise that there is a big difference in 
the college entrance examination scores of pre-med students and education 
majors. The achievement test scores of students planning on teaching 
are relatively low and have dropped more rapidly than among the overall 
population of entering students. And the best students in terms of en 
trance exam scores are less likely to become teachers (Vance and 
Schlechty 1982).
We turn now to the relationship between education and poverty. Level 
of education and poverty are closely related. Children in poor families 
are three times more likely to drop out of high school than are children 
in more prosperous families. Each year a child lives in poverty reduces 
his or her probability of graduation by nearly 1 percent (Haveman et 
al. 1988). The high school dropout rate is higher today than it was 20 
years ago. About 750,000 students per year drop out (Congressional 
Research Service 1988b). The high school graduation rate differs by
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race and income. As of 1986, 83 percent of whites aged 18-24, 76 per 
cent of blacks, but only 60 percent of Hispanics had graduated from 
high school. Enrollment in college among this age group follows a similar 
pattern it is highest for whites, next highest for blacks, and lowest for 
Hispanics (18 percent). In general, rates of college enrollment are down, 
at least for nonwhites, since 1976.
According to a report of the Congressional Research Service (1988a), 
children in single-parent families and those living in poverty have, on 
average, some degree of "depressed educational attainment." School 
policies (or the absence of special policies) evidently play a role in in 
fluencing this outcome. Children living in single-parent households, 
especially those headed by mothers, have lower educational attainment, 
whether measured by years completed, grades, test scores, or behavior 
in school. The educational difference, on average, between those who 
ever lived in a single-parent household and those who had never lived 
in a single-parent household is 1.1 years. This may not just reflect fami 
ly structure: single parents tend to have lower education levels and lower 
financial resources than parents in two-parent families. As noted previous 
ly, over half of children in one-parent families live in poverty.
In an ongoing study that I am conducting with Robert Haveman at 
the University of Wisconsin, we are looking at factors that influence 
the probability of high school completion, using data from the Michigan 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We are following children who were 
between the ages of zero and 6 in 1968 to the present. Early findings 
are the following. (1) Children who grow up in a single-parent family 
headed by a woman who has not graduated from high school have only 
a 69 percent probability of graduating from high school. (2) If the single 
parent graduated from high school, the probability of the child graduating 
from high school increases by 9 percent. (And, as expected, if either 
parent attended college the probability of graduation is further increas 
ed.) (3) Children whose parents separate have lower school attainment 
and children whose family structure does not change.
There is evidence that schools play a role in determining these relatively 
poor educational outcomes. One study has noted that when families are 
going through a transition, children tend to be absent, late, truant, and
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aggressive. They are also likely to change schools. Evidence suggests 
that schools and teachers respond to these problems in ways that "are 
more negative than warranted," says the Consortium for the Study of 
School Needs of Children from One-Parent Families. According to a 
study by Hetherington, Camara, and Featherman (1983), schools do 
not give children in such families the benefit of the doubt. One piece 
of evidence consistent with this conclusion is that living in single-parent 
families causes children to get lower grades than their achievement test 
scores warrant (Hetherington, Camara, and Featherman 1983, p. 283). 
Schools and teachers also tend not to schedule conferences, assemblies, 
and other social activities when working parents can attend; nor do they 
provide transportation so that children whose parents cannot chauffeur 
them can attend various extracurricular events. There is also evidence 
that school staffs have negative expectations of children of single parents 
and of these parents (Clay 1981, pp. 29-32, 49-55). There is a tenden 
cy to place children from low-income families in nonacademic tracks. 
This both limits their options to future education and concentrates such 
children together.
Health Care
Another area of public investment is health care, particularly financ 
ing in the form of public insurance. Most health insurance for children 
is private and most is based on a parent's insurance at his or her place 
of employment. The percentage of children without health insurance 
has been going up: from 13 percent in 1980 to 16 percent in 1986 (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1989). Children make up about a third of the 
uninsured.
In 1978, per capita spending by government on health care was 15.6 
times as high for the elderly as for children (Meyer and Moon 1988). 
And in 1986, about 75 percent of the federal government expenditures 
on health care went to the elderly, compared to 5 percent to children. 
Big differences in utilization would occur even without public 
spending but they increased with the introduction of Medicare and 
Medicaid in 1966. Medicare is a federal program that provides health 
insurance or financing of medical care for those aged 65 or older, some 
disabled persons, and those with end-stage renal disease. Medicaid is
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a joint federal/state health insurance program for certain categories of 
low-income persons. Over 11 million children had no health insurance 
in 1987 (Short, Monheit, and Beauregard 1989). Nearly all the elderly 
are covered by health insurance. Medicare, which is tied to social securi 
ty, covers virtually all the elderly, although there are gaps in coverage. 
Medicaid, which was designed to provide health protection for specified 
groups of the poor, should cover the elderly poor. Only about one-third 
of the elderly poor are beneficiaries of Medicaid, however.
Children's health coverage primarily depends on whether they have 
a parent who works in a job that offers health insurance coverage or 
whether their family is eligible for AFDC and hence Medicaid. This 
eligibility varies from state to state, although since 1986 all children 
younger than age 7 who live in families with incomes below the pover 
ty line may be covered at the state's option. Many children who live 
in families with incomes as low as 30 to 50 percent of the poverty line 
do not have any coverage for medical care.
As a result, many do not obtain even minimal health services. It is 
generally assumed that children receive free vaccinations. Yet fewer 
children 1-4 are vaccinated against measles, rubella, DPT (diptheria- 
tetanus-pertussis), polio, or mumps today than in the period 1976-1983 
(see table 2). White children are more likely to be vaccinated for each 
of these diseases than are nonwhites. In fact, according to the Division 
of Immunization of the Centers for Disease Control, less than half of 
nonwhite children ages 1-4 are vaccinated against any of these diseases 
(National Center for Health Statistics 1988, p. 80).
Discrimination or inequities toward children begins early with in 
adequate prenatal care of mothers. According to a study by the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (1987), nearly two-thirds of Medicaid reci 
pients and uninsured women reported insufficient prenatal care. Near 
ly all (84 percent) uninsured women who received insufficient care cited 
not enough money as the most important barrier to receipt of care; among 
the Medicaid group, one-third cited no transportation as the most im 
portant barrier. Among women who applied for eligibility when preg 
nant, about a fifth had difficulties that kept them from receiving suffi 
cient care. Difficulties included long delays in receiving notification
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Table 2
Changes in Health Status As Measured by Immunizations 
and Life Expectancy






















































































































SOURCE National Center for Health Statistics, various years
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of eligibility and being unable to get a provider to see them. Physician 
participation rates in Medicaid vary from 60 percent in the South to 
69 percent in the North Central region (Mitchell and Schurman 1984, 
pp. 1026-1037). (These low rates reflect relatively low rates of Medicaid 
reimbursement.)
One more contrast should be made in the role of the public sector 
in subsidizing health insurance. The purchase of private health insurance 
is heavily subsidized because the employer contribution to the premium 
is excluded from the worker's taxable income. This subsidy is greater, 
the greater one's marginal tax bracket. Furthermore, not all jobs offer 
health insurance. Low-paying, part-time, and retail and service jobs 
are less likely to be covered than well-paying jobs. Full-time workers 
in firms with 100 or more employees are almost always covered. The 
value of the tax exclusions has been estimated to be about $50 billion 
in foregone revenue (as of 1986), which is about twice the federal outlays 
for Medicaid. The tax exclusions may well have increased the coverage 
of employees, leading to increased demand, higher prices, and distor 
tion of the location of medical care facilities to higher-income areas. 
All of these changes have negative consequences for access of the poor, 
including children.
Aid to the Needy
A number of government programs are designed specifically to pro 
vide for the needy. How are they distributed between children and the 
elderly? Is the beneficent hand of government more open to the old? 
That appears to be the case (see table 3 and figure 2).
All of the poor can participate in the food stamp program, a program 
that enables them to purchase food at very low cost. The old and young 
are served equally by this program, although some studies have shown 
that the old are less likely to make use of it. In addition, the principal 
benefit for poor children is Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), commonly known as welfare. This program is directed at 
children in single-parent families and, since 1988, at children in two- 
parent families if the breadwinner is unemployed. In 1986, the
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average AFDC payment was only 40 percent of the poverty line, and 
only 59 percent of poor children received the benefit (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1989).
Table 3
Trends in Federal Spending for Social Programs 
(millions of 1985 dollars)
1967
AFDC 8,103































SOURCE Haveman (1988, Table A 26)
Compare this with the principal benefit for the low income elderly, 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). In 1974, Supplemental Security 
Income was implemented on a federal level. Both cash assistance and 
eligibility for Medicaid were determined by national standards to cover 
the elderly and disabled. In 1986, an elderly couple receiving SSI and 
food stamps had an income that was greater than 80 percent of the pover 
ty line, and almost all of the elderly poor received some cash benefits 
(Smolensky, Danziger, and Gottschalk 1988).
Most of the elderly also receive Social Security benefits. As I men 
tioned earlier these payments have continued to increase relative to the 
median earnings of men, the poverty line, and AFDC payments. Ac 
cording to recent data (U.S. House of Representatives 1989), our transfer 
policies including both welfare (cash and noncash) and social insurance 
remove from poverty 21.2 percent of two-parent families with children, 
23 percent of poor sole-parent families with children, and 80 percent 
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Average cash transfers to families with children who are poor before 
receiving any assistance from government declined from 1973 to 1984, 
whereas average cash transfers to the elderly poor increased and came 
to more than double the average payments to families with children 
($7,322 to the elderly poor versus $2,946 for two-parent families and 
$3,276 for female-headed families in 1984). The result, according to 
Danziger (1989a), is that 13 percent of white, 41 percent of black, and 
37 percent of Hispanic children remained poor in 1985, either because 
they and their families received no transfers or because the transfers 
were not large enough to enable them to escape poverty. The small sizes 
of transfers to families with children reflect in part the significant changes 
made during the Reagan era to reduce eligibility for AFDC. These 
changes were targeted on the working poor, making it extremely dif 
ficult for them to supplement earnings with welfare. Cash benefits also 
declined in that they failed to keep up with inflation. Among the elder 
ly, 13 percent remained poor after receiving transfers. Many of these 
are widows. One reason for their low incomes is that social security 
benefits fall by one-third when a husband dies. The size of the reported 
increase in poverty, however, is somewhat arbitrary, since the poverty 
line falls by 20 percent as family size shrinks from two persons to one, 
whereas benefits are cut 33 percent. If the poverty-line adjustment was 
consistent with the social security adjustment, 14 percent of white elderly 
widows and 36 percent of black elderly widows would have incomes 
below the poverty line (Smolensky, Danziger, and Gottschalk 1988, 
p. 36). Both couples and widows who have private pensions are far 
less likely to become poor than those without pensions. Poverty is not 
necessarily a permanent state, however, even for widows. A recent study 
by Burkhauser and Duncan using the Retirement History Survey found 
that, on average, most recently retired persons in poverty in any year 
were not in poverty the year before or the year after (1988, p. 75).
Effects of Underinvestment in Children
Perhaps the most crucial implication of the reduced commitment to 
children is the reduction in human capital. Not only will the life chances
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of children be lowered, so will our national income. Employers look 
at human capital both educational attainment and health in making 
employment decisions. Years of schooling is the single most important 
factor. (Differences in formal education account for 38 percent of the 
wage gap between black men and white men [Corcoran and Duncan 
1979].) Simple tabulations from the Census suggest that male high school 
dropouts earn on average about 78 percent as much as those who graduate 
from high school but don't continue with their schooling. Male dropouts 
earn 56 percent as much as those who go to college. Women who drop 
out of high school earn 75 percent and 52 percent as much as women 
who graduate high school and women who attend college. High school 
dropouts are also less likely to be employed than graduates. In 1985, 
for example, 76 percent of men of prime working ages who did not 
graduate from high school were in the labor force, compared to 90 per 
cent of those who graduated from high school but had no additional 
education. Among those in the labor force, dropouts are also more likely 
to be unemployed (U.S. Department of Labor 1986).
The effects of lack of investment in medical care and health insurance 
are profound. Health influences productivity, first in the school and 
later at home and/or in the workplace. Poor health limits activities, cuts 
back days of productive activity at school or work, and lowers energy 
and concentration. Health is determined by a variety of factors including 
sanitation, shelter, and nutritious food. It is also influenced by hereditary 
factors, life style, and medical care. Health is difficult to measure ac 
curately. One commonly used indicator is life expectancy. If we use 
it to compare the elderly versus children, we find the elderly have been 
doing better in recent years. Between 1974 and 1985, life expectancy 
at age 65 increased by 8 percent compared to life expectancy at birth, 
which increased by only 4 percent (see table 2). Large strides have been 
made in controlling at least two of the diseases that smite the elderly: 
heart disease and cerebrovascular disease. The death rate from these 
two illnesses was cut in half between 1970 and 1984 (National Center 
for Health Statistics 1988). At the same time, death rates for homicide 
and heart disease increased for children under 15. Infant mortality rates, 
another commonly used measure of health, have been stagnant in the
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1980s after a period of substantial decline in the 1970s. Early and ade 
quate prenatal care prevents stillbirths and miscarriages, as well as low 
birth weight among babies which is a signal of poor health and sometimes 
lifetime physical and mental disabilities. According to a GAO report 
(1987) babies born to mothers who receive no prenatal care are three 
times more likely to be of low birth weight. The report cites an Oregon 
study which found that insufficient care was associated with a two to 
five times greater probability of low birth weight and infant mortality.
In a study published in 1982, van der Gaag and I looked at deter 
minants of child health. We found that if the mother in a household 
is employed, a child's health tends to be poorer. The negative associa 
tion was higher for part-time work than for full-time work, perhaps 
reflecting different (better) child-care arrangements for full-time workers. 
We found that mothers' schooling is positively associated with health. 
So is parents' marital status. Children of never-married women had 
significantly poorer health and children of divorced mothers somewhat 
worse health than children of married parents. Being nonwhite was also 
negatively associated with health.
Medical care can intervene in some cases of ill health, both as a preven 
tive and as a curative factor. Access to and use of medical care can 
therefore be an important determinant of health. The use of medical 
care is determined by the usual factors that apply to demand, but in 
the case of medical care there is an important intervening factor namely, 
health insurance. Health insurance lowers the price of medical care and 
hence increases utilization.
Poor children who do not have health insurance use less medical care 
than poor children with coverage or children of higher-income families. 
Having a comprehensive and generous health insurance plan has a greater 
effect on the use of medical care by poor children than by other children. 
Children with Medicaid tend to have as many general check-ups and 
immunizations as other insured children, though among children with 
health problems use of health services is still somewhat below that of 
children in higher-income families (U.S. Congress 1988, pp. 17-18).
The failure to invest adequately in the human capital of all of our 
children will mean that the United States will have lower productivity,
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be less competitive in the international market, and have a lower na 
tional income. Recall that more and more of our children are growing 
up with fewer parental resources less time, only one parent, stress 
due to separations, etc. Instead of compensating for this loss, we seem 
to be making matters worse. Schools have too few resources. We do 
not attract enough bright students to teaching. Teachers have little or 
no training on how to deal with children who are facing the stresses 
of separation, moves, and low income. Seventeen-year-olds in 1986 
scored lower (5 percent) on science proficiency tests than their counter 
parts 20 years ago. And 13-year-old children in the United States score 
below children in other developed countries in math and science (Na 
tional Center for Education Statistics 1989). Many children have no 
health insurance and do not receive the medical care that they need. 
Many children who are born with low birth weight never fully recover. 
Many children do not receive services to prevent problems that lower 
their productivity at school and at work. Lack of preventive services 
and lower nutrition result in less productive workers. Additional social 
problems may develop especially if income inequality increases as a 
result of the lack of investment in some of our children. Not only are 
individuals less able to compete, there are ramifications for the entire 
economy. Lower levels of human capital for some are likely to increase 
inequality, with its demoralizing and destabilizing effects on a racially 
diverse society.
How Did We Get Here?
Why has this disparity between our treatment of the young and our 
treatment of the old developed? One explanation is that somehow the 
U.S. public believes that social insurance Social Security, for 
example has been earned and paid for by contributions made while 
working, and thus it is deserved. (This is not the case Social Security 
payments are transfers from today's workforce to the retired but the 
perception persists.) Because benefits to single parents welfare are 
not based on earnings but rather are based on "need," they are thought
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by many to be payments that support lazy people who choose not to 
work. Children are heavily dependent on the earnings and health in 
surance of their parents. As earnings growth declines, as more and more 
babies are born to parents who belong to minority groups, and as children 
spend more and more time in single-parent rather than two-parent 
households, the well-being of children declines.
Children and their parents are also losing political power. The elder 
ly have increased in number and will continue to increase as a propor 
tion of our population. They vote more than other age groups and belong 
to well-organized lobbying groups such as the AARP. They have, 
therefore, become a powerful political force, or at least are perceived 
as a potentially major force. In addition, some of the middle-aged popula 
tion support policies for the elderly both because it is a way to shift 
part of the burden of caring for their parents away from themselves 
and onto the public sector, and because they expect to share in the benefits 
when they retire. During this century, the proportion of U.S. citizens 
who agreed that children should accept financial responsibility for their 
old parents dropped from 50 percent in the 1950s to 10 percent in the 
1970s (Crystal 1982). A similar change in view is taking place concern 
ing who should take care of the elderly. It is no longer viewed as the 
responsibility of the children (usually daughters), since most women 
work (Crystal 1982).
At the other end of the age spectrum, children can't vote and are a 
declining percentage of the population. The middle-aged population will 
never again be children, and fewer older adults are grandparents, who 
may feel a greater stake in the future of the young. An increasing percent 
age of adults are childless, which decreases the bloc of voters who would 
naturally support policies toward children. And children are more likely 
to belong to minority groups, toward whom some of the majority popula 
tion may feel less commitment. Parents are still expected to take finan 
cial responsibility for their children, and policies to require that they 
do so are being pursued with increased vigor (enforcement of the laws 
obligating absent parents to pay child support, for example). These fac 
tors plus the stagnation in real earnings, which has led to a real decline 
in living standards of children, particularly those who do not live with 
parents who are both earners, are putting our future generations at risk.
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What Might Be Done?
It is clear that we are investing less in our nation's children and that 
these children have, on average, fewer private resources than was the 
case in the past. We have been allocating more resources to the elderly 
as a group, although the rate of increase in Social Security benefits should 
be curbed by changes made in this decade. All of this argues for some 
fundamental changes in public investments or allocation of resources.
In terms of investment, the nation seems to have put our troubled 
education system and child care on its agenda. We regularly read of 
the need to attract brighter students to education, 2 and there are several 
bills in Congress to support child care, so I mention here two ideas 
that focus on other aspects of the problem one for health insurance 
coverage, the other for providing resources to children so they can in 
vest in themselves.
Numerous bills are being considered to extend Medicaid to children 
not otherwise covered. 3 The 1988 Family Support Act extended Medicaid 
coverage for 12 months to all who lose eligibility because of increased 
income or work. But Medicaid reimbursement is low compared to the 
amount paid by private coverage. This discourages medical practitioners 
from providing services, forcing Medicaid recipients to use emergen 
cy rooms, which are more expensive and do not have the benefit of 
medical records.
A more comprehensive approach is clearly needed. In order to target 
children, we should introduce what I like to call Healthy-kid, a pro 
gram that is federally operated and covers all children below a specified 
age, say 18. This plan would provide coverage for a specific set of ser 
vices. For children living in families with income below 1.75 times the 
poverty line, these services would be provided without cost. For children 
in higher-income families, there would be income-based copayments; 
that is, the percentage of each charge paid by families would be higher 
among higher-income families. Coverage of other services beyond this 
specific package of services would require cost-sharing by the poor and 
private insurance or direct payments by the better-off. In other words, 
the federal government would provide a federal minimum of health
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insurance coverage for all children. This plan would also cover preg 
nant women again with copayments tied to income. The plan would 
be operated through the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), 
which now runs Medicare. Children could obtain their coverage by sign 
ing up with an HMO that has a contract with the HCFA, or they could 
use services on a fee-for-service basis. The payments to providers would 
not depend on the child's household income but only on the child's loca 
tion (and perhaps his or her underlying health status for HMOs). This 
program should avoid the current disincentives to serve the poor com 
pared to middle- and upper-income families. This insurance or financ 
ing may save some money in the long run by decreasing the need for 
high-cost care such as intensive care for infants with low birth weights. 
Some of the costs of the program could be financed by taxing the value 
of health insurance premiums paid by the employer beyond a maximum 
amount (or cap). The cap could be set at 80 percent of the actuarial 
value of basic benefits, or the entire value of employer-based premiums 
could be taxed at 50 percent of the full value.
Alternatively, we could move to provide basic coverage for all citizens. 
Again, it is only basic services that would be provided, and again, 
copayments would be tied to income. However, I think we should start 
with Healthy-kid. By doing so, we will gain some knowledge of the 
costs of running a nationwide program that covers basic services only, 
for everyone, regardless of income.
My second proposal is to use the Social Security Trust Fund as a way 
to increase an individual's capacities. The Social Security system could 
serve as collateral for loans to young people to enable them to increase 
their productivity. Thus one young adult might take a loan from the 
Social Security system to finance a college education or a graduate 
degree. Another might finance an apprenticeship. These loans would 
be available to individuals 18 or over only for approved investments. 
A new office in the local Social Security office would review the ap 
plication. Payment of the proceeds of the loan would be made directly 
to a college, apprenticeship program, etc. Defaulting the loan would 
reduce the defaulter's future Social Security pension benefits, but at 
a rate that would not reduce a person's income below 85 percent of 
the poverty line.
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This approach would provide equality of opportunity, making youth 
less dependent upon the fortunes of their parents. It would improve the 
productivity of young adults and add to their income, the national in 
come, and the Social Security Trust Fund. It also carries some risk for 
the individual who borrows, since nonrepayment hurts his/her own 
economic condition in retirement.
Finally, let me just briefly state how we might change things at the 
other end of the age spectrum. We can turn Social Security into a 
minimum standard benefit sufficient to keep the elderly out of poverty. 
We would expect those who want larger incomes in their old age to 
save during their working years, perhaps by putting their money in 
special accounts that provide tax advantages. Of course, such a change 
would have to be phased in gradually over time.
I am not advocating depriving the old of their hard-won security. There 
are numerous other ways to finance increased resources to the young. 
What I am proposing is that we reallocate our spending so that those 
who are most needy and who are needed by all of us our children- 
have the opportunity to become productive citizens.
NOTES
1 According to a report of the U S. House of Representatives (1989), 28 percent of the increase 
in poverty among families with children was due to declines in real market income over the years 
1979-1987, 46 percent to declines in means-tested programs, 14 percent to changes in social in 
surance programs, and 3 percent to federal tax changes (p 977)
2. For education, one of the prevailing views is that we need to find a way to create incentives 
for bright promising teachers to enter the profession, for them to be appropriately rewarded, and 
for information to be communicated on programs and approaches that are successful Some resources 
for experimental schools would also be useful Privatization and/or allowing parents freedom of 
choice in selecting schools is another current popular option
3 For example, Lloyd Bentsen, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, has introduced a bill 
to provide Medicaid coverage to all pregnant women and children up to age 6 in families with 
incomes up to 1 8 times the poverty line President Bush has suggested extending coverage to 
women and infants living in families with incomes up to 1 3 times the poverty line and to finance 
immunizations for all children receiving food stamps
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Underclass and Overclass
Race, Class, and Economic Inequality 
in the Managerial Age
William A. Darity, Jr. 
University of North Carolina
Managers tend to identify the welfare of mankind as a whole 
with their own interests and the salvation of mankind with 





Contentious disputes over the underclass concept and the underclass 
"problem" in the United States have overlooked the necessity of examina 
tion of the nature of the overdass. After all, there cannot be one without 
the other. The purpose of this discussion is to illuminate the comparatively 
uncharted geography of the elite who dominate society from above as 
a complement to the conventional inquiry into the lifestyles of those who 
live at the bottom of modern America. The full range offerees imping 
ing on the lives of the underclass cannot be understood, anyway, without 
a careful look at the motives and methods of the overclass.
It may seem odd but imagine, as the entry point to the investigation 
of America's overclass, that we are in twelfth-century England. Follow 
David Lebedoff s description of the marital selection process among the 
serf population on a feudal demesne:
It was time for Thomas to get married. He was almost eighteen, his 
father had died, and the patch of land was now his. He needed a wife
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to help with the work, to cook and sew and bear children. He needed 
a wife as much as he needed the sun and the rain and the protection of 
his feudal lord. He wanted companionship, too, and sex. These needs 
were urgent and could not be postponed.
The problem was finding a bride. In Thomas' limited world there were 
three single women of marriageable age. One was sickly, one was strong, 
and one was beautiful. He married the one who was strong. There was 
really no other choice. The sickly woman could not work his poor land, 
and the beautiful one did not want to. She had other alternatives.
Thomas' bride was named Katherine. The couple got on very well; 
neither Thomas nor Katherine ever wondered who was smarter. In 
telligence was not a factor in marital selection. There was no such thing 
as an IQ test. No one even suspected that intelligence could be measured. 
There would have been no point to such measurement. There was no 
social mobility. A person was born to a certain role and stayed there. 
The great majority of people spent their lives on the land in harsh 
drudgery.
As it happened, Katherine was much the brighter of the two. By to 
day's measurement, Thomas had an IQ of 105, and Katherine, 147. Which 
means that Thomas' intelligence was very near average (100) and 
Katherme's close to genius. Neither suspected this disparity. Both were 
illiterate. Almost everyone was. The conditions of their lives did not 
recognize, let alone reward, Katherine's special gifts.
Thomas and Katherine lived in England in the twelfth century, but the 
circumstances of their union would have been much the same in Italy 
or Russia or China, in the Middle Ages or the Renaissance. From the 
dawn of time until the eighteenth century, the process of marital selec 
tion was very much the same. Spouses were chosen from the very small 
pool of those who happened to live nearby. They were chosen without 
regard to, and without any way of knowing, what their general intelligence 
might be. 1
The consequence, according to Lebedoff, was the random distribution 
of measured intelligence across the population. Measured intelligence 
and social status were two separate matters in the Middle Ages:
By and large intelligence had nothing to do with one's station in life. A 
genius comparable to Einstein could die illiterate after a lifetime of serf 
dom in the fields. No one knew of his ability, and no one would have 
cared.2
Underclass and Overclass 69
Lebedoff contends that three factors have altered the world of Katherine 
and Thomas, a world where measured or "general" intelligence was a 
matter of peripheral importance, to our current condition where measured 
intelligence has become a matter of central importance. First, there is 
greater geographic and social mobility, exposing people to a much wider 
range of possible marital partners. Second, virtually universal educa 
tion in the Western world (and in Japan) has had the following perverse 
effect: "If everyone can read and write, everyone can be graded and 
tested. Children can be told precisely how smart they are supposed to 
be; and that information, accepted by both the child and society, helps 
determine the choice of spouse." Third, and "most important," is the 
fact "that, today, intellectual ability is rewarded." 3 Says Lebedoff:
Now, by and large, people can rise to the level that their talent permits. 
Those with high grades go on to college and to higher-status jobs. Those 
with lower scores leave school earlier and take other kinds of jobs. The 
son of a cobbler is no longer destined always to be a cobbler himself. 
People still marry within their social and economic class, but member 
ship in such classes has come to depend more on measurable intelligence 
and less on the circumstances of birth. People of high I.Q. marry other 
people of high I.Q. no matter how disparate their parentage may be. 
Equality of opportunity has led to people being socially and economically 
stratified by virtue of their measured intelligence.4
An extreme vision of a society stratified on the basis of measured in 
telligence has been advanced by Harvard social psychologist Richard 
Hernnstein, who argued in the early 1970s for a hereditarian founda 
tion to an emerging IQ meritocracy:
... if ... one grants the possibility that mental abilities do vary at all 
genetically, then a powerful and surprising conclusion follows namely, 
that society may segregate people into social groupings or classes based 
at least partly on biology. For if mental capacity is to any degree inherited, 
and if social standing reflects mental capacity, then social standing must 
be a mirror, albeit an imperfect one, of inherited ability. Moreover, as 
society equalizes the opportunities for advancement, which is to say as 
society becomes "fairer," by the ordinary standards of fairness, it will 
tend more and more to base its social distinctions on genetic grounds. 
In other words, if parents no longer can pass social and economic
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advantages on to their children let us say, because of taxes and welfare 
and public housing and uniformly excellent public schools they will in 
stead contribute to their children's success and failure only by their genetic 
legacy.5
Both Lebedoff and Hernnstein are wrong in their acceptance of the 
"equal opportunity" myth. There is substantial evidence that academically 
high-achieving youths tend to be children of academically high-achieving 
parents. This is indicative of diminishing interclass mobility, rather than 
increasing equalization of opportunities, because high-achieving parents 
are far more able to guarantee quality education for their own children 
than parents who have been defeated by the educational system.6
Nevertheless, Lebedoff and Hernnstein have glimpsed an idealized 
vision of our unfolding future Lebedoff as a brutal critic and Hernn 
stein as an unabashed enthusiast in which putative mental capacity dic 
tates social class position. Both of them have grasped the great transi 
tion that is international in character the rise to dominance of intellec 
tuals, the intelligentsia, and the technocrats.
Recent events in Eastern Europe, suggestive of the collapse of socialism 
and the victory of the Western way, obscure the continued preeminence 
there, as well, of the intellectuals, intelligentsia, and the technocrats. 
For the movement toward democraticization and the dismantling of a 
totalitarian apparatus means a switch from the control of one group of 
social managers predisposed toward political and economic bureaucratic 
authoritarianism, to another group, predisposed toward electoral politics 
and the rejuvenation of private enterprise.7
What Lebedoff and Hernnstein sense is the international convergence 
toward a class structure where the dominant class the modern 
overclass possesses vast ideological fluidity. The class structure has 
at its apex the managerial class, comprised of those with putative men 
tal capacity and putative ability to manage, i.e., design and execute social 
control strategies and tactics. The managerial class analyzes, constructs, 
and administers social policy. The cultural manifestation of their influence 
over contemporary America is evident in the lifestyles of the "Yuppies." 8
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Class analytical explorations of social stratification patterns have been 
ambiguous with respect to the position of those persons holding profes 
sional positions. In Marxist class-theoretic studies, professional workers 
typically either fold into the working class or are treated as agents of 
capital.9
It is, however, more fruitful to view the professionals as forming an 
independent social class situated apart from labor proper and capital. 
Not only do they form a separate social class, but they form a social 
class driven toward its own destiny. Only by recognizing the distinc- 
tiveness of the managerial class can we see the rich outlines of the 
emergency of the new social order. The importance of mental capacity 
and the ability to manage has overtaken the authority of wealth and 
finance.10 Capitalism winds down and the managerial estate winds up.
The Genesis of the Managerial Class
In the United States, the origins of the managerial class can be traced 
to the Progressive Era at the turn of the century. Development of a cadre 
of workers ("social" workers in the broadest sense) to minister to the 
perceived needs of the working class was the incubator for the develop 
ment of the professions. The process was sponsored by corporate 
America.11 The managerial class in its infancy was the progeny of 
American capital.
Consequently, this new class was dependent on corporate capital and, 
necessarily, subservient. Largely coterminous with the middle classes 
that also harbored an older group of small businessmen the petty 
bourgeoisie the members of the managerial class, even those who were 
social workers for the working class, espoused a certain attachment to 
the precepts of rugged individualism.
But the decisive event that changed all this was the Great Depression. 
An ideological shift took place among the middle classes from in 
dividualism to New Dealism a cry for "relief." 12 The managerial class 
endorsed an apparent "reform" of capitalism that was in fact a revolu 
tion. Of course, it was not a revolution on behalf of the working class, 
but on behalf of the middle classes themselves.
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Here is the starting point of James Burnham's "managerial revolu 
tion" in the crucible of maximal capitalist crisis.13 Here are the begin 
nings of the self-conscious commitment to macroeconomic stabilization 
policy, activist fiscal and monetary policy, and macroeconomic manage 
ment, bolstered by the gathering of data and the development of national 
income accounts. Here is where the foundation of the welfare state was 
established, where the federal government de facto took an open hand 
in the development of a national family policy.
The principle of an unlimited, rather than the formerly limited, ter 
rain for the state became accepted. The extension of the state meant that 
the welfare state cushioned both the members of the middle and work 
ing classes from the exigencies of the capitalist business cycle. But, in 
addition, the extension of the state meant expanded employment oppor 
tunities for the middle class, giving them a dual benefit.
Thus, the managerial class discovered a route for loosening the um 
bilical cord, which had bound it to corporate capital, through the growth 
of the public sector. World War n and, thereafter, the Great Society and 
civil rights movement constituted further bases for still more dramatic 
expansion. The social programs of the 1960s coupled with civil rights 
legislation can be construed as a response to race revolt, and the new 
positions in public sector welfare agencies were obtained disproportionate 
ly by black professionals.14 This was the essential source of growth in 
the black middle class trumpeted by scholars and journalists in the 1970s.
The combination of the Great Society and civil rights movement took 
the scope of government beyond the breakthrough achieved by the New 
Deal. The judiciary, in particular, took on direct involvement in public 
policymaking, including management of school systems and prison 
systems.15 The inherent limitlessness to the managerial state was manifest.
Curing Poverty and Racial Inequality?
Simultaneously, the ideological illusion was fostered that poverty could 
be abolished by constructive public action. This illusion was consistent 
with the belief system of the rising managerial class. Their social manage-
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ment mentality led to a presumption that they could solve any problem 
with research and sound thinking a certain characteristic "arrogance 
of the new elite." 16
Under the passing regime of men of business the classic capitalist 
social order poverty and the social system were blatantly interconnected. 
Mercantilist thinkers, the heralds of capitalism, were cruelly straightfor 
ward in advancing the doctrine of the utility of poverty the notion that 
poverty was necessary to extract adequate effort from the laboring classes. 
Classical political economy, particularly in Ricardo's hands, elaborated 
a variety of schemes to repress wages in order to keep down costs of 
production and delay the inevitable approach to the stationary state.
Neoclassical economies' story of wage generation is encapsulated in 
the labor-leisure choice and human capital theory. Labor-leisure choice 
means some people with preferences for leisure, in effect, will select 
lower incomes. In the neoclassical' preferred world of minimum govern 
ment interference in market processes, some persons will be "idlers" 
and, hence, in poverty. But, regardless, if more persons choose to ac 
quire higher levels of human capital and pursue more work, they drive 
down the returns for everyone potentially, for some categories of jobs, 
to poverty-level wages.
In Marxist analysis, wage repression was an important avenue to 
counteract the law of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Capitalist 
society possessed an inherent tendency to produce unemployment, to 
create a reserve of labor, a tendency driven by the functionality of the 
reserve. The reserve was necessary to hold back the wage demands of 
those with work and to make readily available a pool of workers to throw 
into new lines of activity without disrupting older sectors.
Of course, in principle, one could always engineer a redistribution 
of income or wealth in such a way that everyone is comfortably above 
the poverty line. But the mercantilists' blunt logic holds sway. Such a 
policy would produce a large incentive problem for employers hiring 
for occupations at the low end of the wage scale. Therefore, poverty 
could not be eliminated under capitalism.
Although poverty could not be eliminated altogether, poverty could 
be reallocated by race or by gender. Proponents of racial equality 
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rather than general equality presumably seek a racial reallocation of 
poverty so that the proportion of blacks who are poor falls and/or the 
proportion of whites who are poor rises until the same ratio prevails 
among both races, e.g., 20 percent of families of each race being in 
poverty.
But would it always be the same families? William Wilson's big con 
cern in his research on the underclass is the intergenerational transmis 
sion of poverty status. He focuses on an underclass that is dispropor 
tionately black and that replicates poverty status from generation to 
generation. Therefore, racial equality for Wilson also must be understood 
in intergenerational terms.17
Suppose we have a population of twelve families; three families are 
enumerated as black and nine families are enumerated as white. In Year
1. two black families are poor or 67 percent of all black families, while 
three white families are poor or 33 percent of all white families. A racially 
equal society with respect to poverty status would be one where in Year
2. one out of the three black families (33 percent) would be poor, and 
it would be the family that was nonpoor in Year 1. And now six out 
of the nine white families (67 percent) would be poor again the families 
that previously were nonpoor. This rotation could continue indefinitely. 
While this would be a community characterized by perpetual general 
inequality, it certainly would be a community without racial inequality.
Since poverty could not be eliminated under capitalism, then the 
previous hypothetical situation reveals one feature of the best an 
egalitarian might hope for: to distribute exposure to poverty evenly across 
the population by generations. Of course, one might also hope to reduce 
poverty's scope to the level necessary for continuation of the system, 
given that one is willing to leave the social system itself intact or is un 
willing to mount an attack upon it.
Both of these egalitarian steps we might call them steps toward 
Wilsonian equality where one seeks to mute the effects of poverty while 
failing to challenge the social system have been pursued with great 
timidity, if at all. Identification of the minimum incidence of poverty 
necessary to capitalism has proved to be a virtually intractable proposi 
tion. And those groups with the power to resist exposure to the depriva 
tions of poverty will exercise their power to avoid taking their turn.
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A hierarchical society typically will have a hierarchical occupational 
structure. It is hierarchy that lays the material foundation for discrimina 
tion. Occupations with better pay, superior status, great stability, and, 
within the evolving cultural norms, which give greater weight to men 
tal rather than manual work will be preferred. If they are captured by 
a specific ethnic or racial group, the group will defend their turf from 
invasion.
This is far from Lebedoff s and Hernnstein's pure IQ meritocracy 
rooted in a genetic allocation of social status. This is stratification bas 
ed upon naked group power. Control over training, credentials, ex 
perience, and information networks dictates access to preferred 
positions not mythical equal opportunity. Indeed, to the extent that 
measured intelligence can be nurtured (to the extent that Hernnstein 
has overemphasized the hereditarian component), that can affect the 
racial distribution of slots. Ethnic or racial groups with power can ac 
tively transform potential rivals into noncompetitors by distorting the 
nurturing mechanisms. For example, they can not only insure that their 
own children go to quality schools, but they can channel children from 
potential rival ethnic or racial groups into schools where they will be 
subject to programmed retardation. Then those who are poor appear 
ex post facto to be social failures because of their own deficiencies, 
when, in fact, the genesis of those apparent deficiencies can be found 
in the execution of raw aggression by more powerful ethnic or racial 
groups seeking to preserve their own comparatively aristocratic status.
The foregoing should suggest that the transition from capitalism to 
managerial society holds no greater promise for elimination of pover 
ty. Nonetheless, the managerial elite, in all likelihood, will invest much 
time and rhetoric in holding out just such a possibility through 
"discovery" of the proper array of policies. Because managerial society 
is hierarchical as well, the motivation still will exist to produce non- 
competing groups among potential rivals. The groups reduced to the 
most extreme noncompetitive status will constitute the underclass and 
will display the central feature of a caste group the intergenerational 
repetition of low social status. Indeed, society as a whole will take on 
the character of caste civilization, for the sons and daughters of the
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managerial class also will follow in their parents' upscale footsteps. 
Thus the overclass will constitute the upper caste, de facto the perma 
nent Brahmins.
Dominant ethnic or racial groups will find it especially useful to 
degrade the mental capacity of potential rival groups, often to the point 
where members of the disinherited come to doubt their own capacity 
to perform intellectually. Consider, for example, the case of the black 
athlete and the NCAA's Proposition 48 requiring a minimum 700 SAT 
score and 2.0 high school GPA for an athlete to be eligible to play as 
a college freshman at a Division 1 school. Proposition 48 has met the 
opposition from many black coaches and presidents of historically black 
colleges and universities, suggesting that even they do not believe that 
large numbers of young black athletes are capable of meeting such 
standards.
The further twist, however, is that tests like the SAT are broadly ac 
cepted markers for access to the university. In managerial society, such 
testing and refinement of tests become the norms for entry to specializ 
ed or advanced training, separating the overclass from those beneath 
them. In American society, standardized tests tend to establish racial 
separation as well. Proportionately fewer blacks cross the mental capacity 
hurdles; of course, proportionately fewer are given the preparation to 
do so.
Managerial society aspires to pure meritocracy. Instead, it delivers 
a modern "slavocracy" based upon race and measured (or credential- 
ed) mental capacity that admits blacks in far smaller proportions than 
whites into the new elite. And even the occasional admits still are viewed 
with a skepticism not faced by their white peers. Invariably, black in 
tellectuals are stigmatized as necessarily being less capable. Two direct 
conclusions can be drawn. Poverty will not vanish in managerial society; 
neither will racial discrimination in all its dimensions.
Eugenics Once Again?
The Great Society-cum-civil rights movement was an accommoda 
tion to the aspirations of the black middle class to cope with black urban
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revolt. It was a problematic accommodation. Housing desegregation 
led to black middle class out-migration from black urban ghettos con 
tributing to destruction of the class diversity of black communities. 
School desegregation went hand in hand with deterioration of the quality 
of schooling for large numbers of black youths. Affirmative action's 
original mission was to serve as a mechanism to put those blacks into 
positions for which they were well qualified but had been excluded on 
strictly racial grounds. Later it became viewed as a means for engineering 
an end to the historically produced numerical racial imbalances across 
American society, leading to stigmatization of blacks as recipients of 
a special boost, like handicap golfers, into the positions they have 
attained.
Concomitantly, there has been a pattern of increased polarization be 
tween the black middle class and the black underclass. This is paradox 
ical, given the black middle class's overrepresentation as service pro 
viders in social welfare agencies and the black underclass's overrepresen 
tation as service recipients. 18 Spatially separate and economically distinct, 
both segments of black America share mutual vulnerability to cutbacks 
in social programs. Moreover, since the last years of the Carter ad 
ministration and throughout the Reagan administration, the accommoda 
tion plainly has been undergoing progressive reversal.
Managerial society has and will have its race and poverty problems  
glaring blots on the ostensible social perfectibility the managers' prom 
ise. Highly educated professionals long have possessed a certain fascina 
tion with eugenics social perfectibility via managed procreation. 19 
There is evidence to suggest that eugenics, which fell into disfavor with 
National Socialism's enthusiasm for its premises in the 1930s and 1940s, 
is riding a covert upsurge. For if the poor and the black poor in 
particular are not to be transformed from "undesirables" into 
"desirables," they may be removed literally by population control 
measures.
Even while eugenics was in eclipse, the managerial class generally 
maintained an ideological anti-natalism. The last eight administrations 
prior to Reagan's, dating from Roosevelt through Carter, endorsed 
population control as a significant part of an antipoverty package both 
domestically and internationally. 20 The Reagan administration was the
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first to demur. The Roosevelt administration marked the rise to 
dominance of the managerial elite with New Dealism. Population con 
trol has been targeted at the black poor both through active policy and 
through neglect. Family planning programs have been located dispropor 
tionately in black communities with the self-conscious intent of reduc 
ing black fertility. At 1970 hearings before the House Subcommittee 
on Public Health and Welfare, Atlanta physician John McCain recom 
mended continuation of the policy of funneling one-quarter of Georgia's 
family planning program into Atlanta. He pointed out that the cost of 
a "satisfactory" program would be $20 million in Georgia, $5 million 
of which should go to Atlanta. The cost of a "minimum" program would 
be $10 million, $2.5 million of which should go to Atlanta. But the 
City of Atlanta, with a population of about 497,000 people at the time, 
contained about 10 percent of the state's population. Why, then, should 
it receive one-quarter of the state's family planning budget, particular 
ly when it costs more per patient to deliver family planning services 
in rural than in urban areas? 21 It was probably more than mere coin 
cidence that Atlanta contained one-quarter of the state's black population.
Birth control services were first funded at the state level in the South 
in the early 1960s. Southern state legislatures have never been recognized 
for their desire to protect women's fertility rights. Lincoln Pashute con 
cluded an empirical study on the determinants of the introduction of 
birth control services at the state level in the U.S. with the observation 
that "Southern society and its policies [were] motivated, at least in part, 
by the desire to reduce the fertility of blacks whether for racial reasons 
or because they believe blacks make welfare demands upon the state 
in excess of their contribution, or both together." 22
The invidious and often race-specific thrust of population control 
measures apparently has affected the size of families receiving cash 
transfer assistance. In the Washington, D.C. area an area with a 75-80 
percent black population the regional welfare caseload fell 9.5 per 
cent between 1975 and 1978 according to a study prepared by Janice 
Outtz for the Greater Washington Research Center. Outtz said one reason 
was the decline in the size of the average welfare family from four 
persons in 1970 to three in 1977. A Washington Post staff writer
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speculated the decline was due to "the availability of publicly financed 
abortions under the Medicaid program that serves welfare recipients." 23 
Indeed, by 1979 there were 13,611 induced abortions performed on 
residents of the District of Columbia, considerably larger than the 9,404 
recorded live births. 24
Increased access to abortions for the poor in the 1970s coincided with 
a real decline in public assistance that continues nationally to the pres 
ent. Again in the Washington, D.C. area, the cost of living rose 68 
percent between 1970 and 1978, while payments rose only 13 percent 
in nominal terms. 25 Nationally, the combined money value of food 
stamps and AFDC payments for a family of four rose less than the cost 
of living. Between 1974 and 1979, the real purchasing power of mon 
thly AFDC plus food stamps fell from $520 to $478 or 8 percent. The 
State of Texas held AFDC payments constant at $140 per month for 
a family of four for over a decade. 26
What would be more subtly genocidal than simultaneously to pro 
vide more resources for people to limit their family size while depriv 
ing them of resources to support their children who are living? The con 
tradictions have been quite plain. Of the 5 million or so women in the 
national population whom the government identified as being "in need" 
of family planning services in the early 1970s, 70 percent were white. 
Yet "... little if anything [was] being done to reach these 3,500,000 
white women." 27 As public health physician W.A. Mason observed 
at the time, "It is no secret that in many communities, contraceptive 
services are concentrated in black communities, serving primarily blacks 
with little or no attention to the white poor, the middle class or the af 
fluent." 28
Since Joseph Califano's tenure as Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare, public funds no longer can be used to fund abortions. Jour 
nalist Ken Auletta has been quoted as expressing displeasure with this 
policy because of "the 'incalculable costs' of making abortion harder 
to obtain. Among those costs: More future city criminals will be in 
cubated, unwanted kids, entering the world without nurturing and self- 
esteem. " 29 Better to land a preemptory strike before birth, in Auletta's 
estimation.
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Indeed, involuntary sterilization of black women, especially welfare 
mothers, and the involuntary use of blacks in medical experiments have 
occurred on an extensive basis in the U.S. 30 The absence of public health 
and public policy measures to contain AIDS, illegal drug use, cardio 
vascular diseases, cancers, and other illnesses in the black population 
is glaring. Imprisonment and military service siphons off the black male 
population.
Capitalist society possesses a certain ambivalence about population. 
A growing population might dilute per capita income, but on the other 
hand it could provide both an extended market and slow wage growth. 
Certainly, one of Marx's key theoretical claims was the proposition that 
capitalism needed a surplus population, albeit a reasonably disciplined 
surplus was preferable. 31
An Unfinished Counterrevolution
Managerial society, in contrast, possesses undiluted anti-natalist im 
pulses. All things are to be managed and controlled, including popula 
tion, on both quantity and quality dimensions. The reversal of popula 
tion policy under Reagan's presidency is revealing of his administra 
tion's exceptionalism.
The Reagan presidency represented capital's counterrevolution against 
the managerial estate the attempt to restore a social and economic order 
that predated the New Deal. Thus, steps were taken to roll back the 
welfare state, to reduce the scope and scale of government, and to 
deregulate the financial sector. At base, what was called "meanness 
mania'' by some observers (or pure racism by others) was not primari 
ly an assault on the U.S. working class, nor was it primarily an assault 
on black America. It was first and foremost class warfare conducted 
by the business interests against the managerial class with the intention 
of reducing that class to the sycophant function it possessed in the 1920s.
But this has been an incomplete counterrevolution. A capitalist restora 
tion now depends upon an ideological struggle requiring reliance on 
expert knowledge. The business interests can go out and get their
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own experts as hired guns or mercenaries. But the language, the 
arguments, the very terms of social policy debates are established by 
members of their rival class. Ultimately, then, the managerial class will 
determine how broad or narrow the scope will be for the private sec 
tor. The right-leaning faction favors an extensive role for private enter 
prise; the left-leaning faction favors industrial policy, worker manage 
ment, and state planning of investment. This is the core ideological rup 
ture within the managerial class, aggravated by the fact that members 
of the managerial class can flexibly alter their allegiances and can even 
move back and forth between public and private sector positions. 32
Furthermore, to conduct its struggle against the managerial class, 
capital must enlist the support of the working class, particularly when 
electoral politics matter. The alliance of the 1930s was between the work 
ing class and the managerial class. This was the making of the New 
Deal coalition that only fractured some 40 years later. The alliance of 
the 1930s was built over shared benefits associated with construction 
and expansion of the welfare state. The goal was the restoration of 
economic well-being.
The alliance of the 1970s was between the working class and capital. 
This alliance was built over the issues of family, schooling, and lifestyle. 
The goals were restoration of morality, family ties, and personal worth. 
Both alliances are inherently fragile. The managerial class is uncom 
fortable with the anti-intellectualism of the working class. The work 
ing class dislikes the arrogant paternalism of the managerial class. These 
are culturally incompatible social classes.
Capital is uncomfortable with prospects of any renewal of working 
class demands for higher wages, improved working conditions, and 
especially reductions in the length of the working day. The working 
class recognizes that capital is their natural enemy. These are economical 
ly incompatible social classes.
Consider again the aforementioned fluidity of the managerial class. 
The chameleon-like quality permits the class to shift broadly, as times 
dictate, to advocacy of more free market-oriented or more state planning- 
oriented policies. This is both a class strength and weakness. It is a 
strength in dealing with capital, since the class can adapt rapidly to
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changed conditions favorable or unfavorable to its hegemony. It is a 
weakness insofar as an ideologically fractioned class can split into in 
ternal welfare.
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The Federal Anti-Bias Effort
Jonathan S. Leonard 
University of California
Affirmative action under the federal contract compliance program (Ex 
ecutive Order 11246 as amended) is a policy that, at times, has promoted 
modest employment advances for minorities, but always at the cost of 
great social discord. To its proponents, affirmative action is both equitable 
and efficient. To its critics, it is neither.
Federal affirmative action may be modeled as a tax on white male 
employment in contractor firms, and so can be analyzed in the standard 
two-sector models applied to unionization or taxation (Leonard 1984a). 
A controversial question is whether this tax improves or reduces effi 
ciency. Some proponents of affirmative action advocate it for equity 
reasons, arguing for retribution for past wrongs such as slavery, or for 
an investment in future social peace and cohesion. Increased equity may 
also improve efficiency by counterbalancing discrimination. In Decker's 
model of discrimination, for example, an affirmative action tax forces 
employers towards the efficient use of labor (Leonard 1984c). The two 
questions to be asked of affirmative action are first, whether it has in 
creased minority and female employment, and second (and more dif 
ficult), whether this has induced or reduced discrimination.
The purpose and development of affirmative action cannot be fully 
understood outside of history, a history that includes most saliently the 
institution of slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the 
civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth century. The genesis in discord 
and crisis of the first Executive Order by President Roosevelt is most 
instructive. To protest employment discrimination at the beginning of 
World War II, A. Philip Randolph, president of the Sleeping Car Porters 
Union, threatened to disrupt the defense effort by a mass demonstration 
of blacks in Washington, D.C. on July 1, 1941. Less than one week before
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the planned rally, Executive Order 8802 was issued and the demonstra 
tion called off (Goldstein 1981, p. 10). In the words of the U.S. Com 
mission on Civil Rights, "the Executive Order was prompted by the threat 
of a Negro March on Washington, which would have revealed to the 
world a divided country at a time when national unity was essential" 
(USCCR 1961, p. 10). Accommodation was only reached under dire 
threat, and even then was of a limited nature.
The distance this country has come in terms of the growing import 
of affirmative action, expanding intervention by the federal government, 
and changing attitudes towards discrimination since 1941 can best be 
judged by considering the words of Mark Ethridge, first chairman of 
the Fair Employment Practice Committee, established to supervise com 
pliance with the executive order. In the following quote, Ethridge sharply 
limits the scope of antidiscrimination policy in a manner startling to 
modern eyes.
Although he defended the granting of civil rights and equal oppor 
tunity to Negroes, he also affirmed his personal support of segrega 
tion in the South. Stressing that 'the committee has taken no posi 
tion on the question of segregation of industrial workers,' he em 
phasized that 'Executive Order 8802 is a war order, and not a social 
document,' that it did not require the elimination of segregation, 
and that had it done so, he would have considered it 'against the 
general peace and welfare ... in the Nazi dictatorial pattern rather 
than in the slower, more painful but sounder pattern of the 
democratic process.' (Ruchames 1953, p. 28)
Of course, the delicate question of how to swiftly remedy the harm 
done by discrimination without distorting the democratic process is still 
with us, as is the question of whether the democratic process can func 
tion well outside an integrated society. Democratic society requires a 
consensus for change, but it depends upon the full participation of its 
members. The last 40 years have witnessed a slow and at times painful 
process of confrontation and accommodation, developing a consensus 
that provides the foundation for a lasting change in attitudes towards 
discrimination.
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Prior to Executive Order 10925, issued March 6, 1961 by President 
Kennedy, the antidiscrimination program for federal contractors lacked 
any real teeth. In a detailed study of the presidential Fair Employment 
Practice Committees, Norgren and Hill (1964, p. 169, p. 171) state: "One 
can only conclude that the twenty years of intermittent activity by 
presidential committees has had little effect on traditional patterns of 
Negro employment," and that "it is evident that the non-discrimination 
clause in government contracts was virtually unenforced by the contracting 
agencies during the years preceding 1961." Compliance programs, such 
as Plans for Progress and its predecessors, were voluntary. Their history 
strikes at least a cautionary note about the effectiveness of programs 
that have no legal sanctions behind them. The 1961 Executive Order 
was the first to go beyond antidiscrimination and to require contractors 
to take affirmative action, and the first to establish specific sanctions 
including termination of contract and debarment. Coming on the heels 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Executive Order 11246, which 
made the Secretary of Labor rather than a presidential committee respon 
sible for administering enforcement, was the first to be enforced stringent 
ly enough to provoke serious conflict and debate. On October 13, 1967, 
Executive Order 11375 amended 11246 to expand its coverage to women, 
although effective regulation against sex discrimination did not reach 
full stride until after the Equal Employment Act of 1972 was enacted.
The details of the affirmative action obligation began to be elaborated 
in a twisting history. Detailed regulations, including numerical goals, 
were introduced in 1969, after the Comptroller General ruled that the 
affirmative action obligation was too vague to fulfill the requirement 
that minimum contract standards be made clear to prospective bidders 
[48 Comp. Gen. 326 (1968)]. Numerical goals were first introduced in 
the manning tables embodied in the Cleveland and Philadelphia plans 
for construction contractors (see Jones 1982), and later won the tacit 
approval of Congress and the courts.
Under Executive Order 11246, federal contractors agree "not to 
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because 
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and to take affirmative 
action to ensure that applicants are employed and employees are treated
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during employment without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin" [3 C.F.R 169 202(1) (1974)]. This language imposes two 
obligations: first, not to discriminate; and second, whether or not there 
is any evidence of discrimination, to take affirmative action not to discrim 
inate. It is a measure of this nation's progress that the first obligation 
is now largely beyond debate. The redundant sounding second obliga 
tion, however, is anything but. It has provoked continual controversy, 
and its meaning and effect are not well understood. In the heated political 
arguments over whether and what affirmative action should be, mythic 
visions have come to overwhelm any clear conception of what affirmative 
action actually is. To say that this second obligation, as it has been 
developed in the regulations, has provoked a good deal of debate would 
be a considerable understatement (see also Fiss 1971 and Glazer 1975). 
Reviewing the development of affirmative action into "quotas," 
Lawrence Silberman, former Undersecretary of Labor from 1970 to 1973, 
wrote:
In practice, employers anxious to avoid inquiry from government 
officials concerned only with results (rather than merely with ef 
forts) often earmarked jobs for minorities without regard to 
qualifications. . . . We wished to create a generalized, firm, but 
gentle pressure to balance the residue of discrimination. Unfor 
tunately, the pressure numerical standards generate cannot be 
generalized or gentle; it inevitably causes injustice. . . . Our use 
of numerical standards in pursuit of equal opportunity has led in- 
eluctably to the very quotas, guaranteeing equal results, that we 
initially wished to avoid. . . . Federal courts already had begun 
to fashion orders in employment discrimination cases which went 
beyond relief for those specifically discriminated against. The orders 
required employers found guilty of discrimination to hire in accor 
dance with a set ratio of whites to blacks, whether or not new black 
applicants had suffered discrimination. Thus was introduced a group 
rights concept antithetical to traditional American notions of in 
dividual merit and responsibility.
This raises at least two issues. The first is that an affirmative action 
program without measurable results invites sham efforts and may also 
fail to meet the requirement of federal procurement law that prospective
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bidders be informed of the minimum standards for a contract. On the 
other hand,numerical standards in the quest for equal opportunity open 
the door to an emphasis on equal results. The second issue raised is 
whether discrimination and its remedy should be addressed in terms of 
groups or individuals.
In the past, the affirmative action obligation has been criticized as 
being vague and open-ended. In 1967, the director of the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance (OFCC), Edward Sylvester, stated: "There is no 
fixed and firm definition of affirmative action. I would say that in a 
general way, affirmative action is anything you have to do to get 
results. . . . Affirmative action is really designed to get employers to 
apply the same kind of imagination and ingenuity that they apply to other 
phases of their operation" (Report 1967, pp. 73-74).
To be vague concerning methods is the ideal decentralized approach, 
but this is also vague about the critical issue of ends. What is the goal 
against which results are judged: nondiscrimination or increased minority 
and female employment? The distinct, practical question of whether the 
two can be distinguished in an operational sense is, of course, one of 
the important questions that will concern us here.
Past Studies
The literature on affirmative action can be divided into studies of the 
regulatory process that finds it mortally flawed and studies of impact 
that find it successful. The process studies by the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights (USCCR), the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the 
House and Senate Committees on Labor and Public Welfare all conclude 
that affirmative action has been ineffective and blame weak enforce 
ment and a reluctance to apply sanctions. For example, in its 1975 ap 
praisal of the contract compliance program, the GAO found (p. 30) that 
"the almost nonexistence of enforcement actions taken could imply to 
contractors that the compliance agencies do not intend to enforce the 
program." That this is not merely politics can be judged from the fact 
that the Department of Labor has been sued with some measure of
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success more than once for failure to enforce affirmative action proper 
ly. [See, e.g., the case of Legal Aid Society ofAlameda County v. Bren- 
nan, 608 R2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert, denied 100 S.Ct. 3010 (1980).] 
Debarment, the ultimate sanction, has been used less than 30 times; 
debarment of the first nonconstruction contractor did not occur until 
1974. The GAO and USCCR have found that other forms of regulatory 
pressure, such as pre-award reviews, delay of contract award, and 
withholding of progress payments, have not been forcefully and con 
sistently pursued. However, as evidenced by the increased incidence of 
debarment and back-pay awards, enforcement did become more ag 
gressive after 1973.
In light of the unanimity of these process studies in finding the affir 
mative action regulatory mechanism seriously deficient, it is surprising 
that the few econometric studies of the impact of affirmative action in 
its first years (Burman 1973; Ashenfelter and Heckman 1976; Goldstein 
and Smith 1976; Heckman and Wolpin 1976), all based on a comparison 
of EEO-1 forms by contractor status, have generally found significant 
evidence that it has been effective for black males. These few studies 
of the initial years of affirmative action (1966-73) are not directly com 
parable because of different specifications, samples, and periods. They 
do find, nevertheless, that despite weak enforcement in its early years, 
and despite the ineffectiveness of compliance reviews, affirmative ac 
tion has been effective in increasing black male employment share in 
the contractor sector, but generally ineffective for other protected groups. 
(See Brown 1984a for a review.) These past studies are all based on data 
for a period that largely predates the beginning of substantial enforce 
ment of regulations barring sex discrimination, the start of aggressive 
enforcement in the mid-seventies, and the major reorganization of the 
contract compliance agencies into the Office of Federal Contract Com 
pliance Programs (OFCCP) in 1978.
The effects are not large, generally on the order of less than a 1 per 
cent increase in the black male share of employment per year. However, 
they do imply that even with seemingly weak enforcement, affirmative 
action under the contract compliance program did increase the propor 
tion of black males in federal contractor firms in the early 1970s.
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The Impact of Affirmative Action on Employment
Has affirmative action been effective in increasing the employment 
of minorities and women? Affirmative action under the executive order 
applies only to federal contractors. One method of judging the effect 
of affirmative action is then to compare the growth of minority and female 
employment at federal contractor establishments with their employment 
growth at similar establishments that do not bear the affirmative action 
obligation. With the cooperation of the U.S. Department of Labor, I per 
formed such a comparison using EEO-1 data on employment 
demographics reported by 68,690 establishments in 1974 and 1980. This 
sample includes more than 16 million employees. The results summarized 
here are reported at length in Leonard (1983) and (1984a).
Table 1 (reproduced from Leonard 1984a) compares the mean employ 
ment share of demographic groups in 1974 and 1980 across contractor 
and noncontractor establishments. Between 1974 and 1980, black male 
and female and white female employment shares increased significant 
ly faster in contractor establishments than in noncontractor "establishments. 
In Leonard (1984a), I have estimated the impact of affirmative action 
after controlling for establishment size, growth, region, industry, oc 
cupational and corporate structure. Even controlling for these other fac 
tors, the employment of members of protected groups grew significant 
ly faster in contractor than in noncontractor establishments.
Expressed as an annual growth rate, black male employment is 0.62 
percent greater in the contractor sector. For white males, the annual 
growth rate is 0.2 percent slower among contractors, so contractor status 
appears to shift the demand for black males relative to white males by 
0.82 percent per year. The annual demand shifts relative to white males 
for other groups are: other minority males 1.48 percent; white females 
0.66 percent; and black females 2.15 percent. These effects are signifi 
cant at the 99 percent confidence level or better, and are robust across 
a number of specifications. The effects for black males are similar in 
magnitude to those previously estimated by Ashenfelter and Heckman 
(1976) and by Heckman and Wolpin (1976).
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NOTE. The last column reports f-statistics for whether the change in demographic share be 
tween 1974 and 1980 differs by contractor status. N=noncontractor in 1974 (27,432 establishments), 
Y=contractor in 1974 (41,258 establishments).
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Compliance reviews are the main enforcement mechanism; they in 
volve an audit of employee demographics and employer's personnel pro 
cedures, with negotiations over suggested changes. Compliance reviews 
have played a significant role over and above that of contractor status. 
For example, for black males the growth rate in their employment was 
3.8 percent greater in the contractor sector than in the noncontractor 
sector, while it was an additional 7.9 percent greater for those who had 
a compliance review compared to those who had not had such a review. 
Conversely, compliance reviews have retarded the employment growth 
of whites. The effect is significantly negative in the case of white females, 
but small and insignificant in the case of white males, whom one would 
have expected to bear the brunt of the adjustment. The anomalous result 
for white females is sensitive to specification. It is also difficult to recon 
cile with the positive impact of contractor status on white females, but 
may be influenced by a review process that asks for more than last year, 
rather than more than average, in a time of sharply increasing female 
labor supply. Direct pressure does make a difference. Simultaneity is 
unlikely to bias these estimates because, as we shall see, the probability 
of being reviewed hardly depends upon demographics.
The total impact of affirmative action on the growth rate of employ 
ment for black men among federal contractors is then the weighted average 
of the annual 0.62 percent shift among nonreviewed contractors and the 
1.91 percent shift among reviewed contractors, or 0.84 percent per year. 
The corresponding demand shifts for other groups are black females 
2.13 percent, minority males 1.69 percent, and white females 0.37 percent.
Regression estimates also indicate that minorities and females ex 
perienced significantly greater increases in representation in 
establishments that were growing and so had many job openings, irrespec 
tive of affirmative action. The elasticity of white male employment growth 
with respect to total employment growth is .976, significantly less than 
one. This indicates that members of protected groups dominate the net 
incoming flows in both contractor and noncontractor establishments. The 
supply of blacks has not greatly increased, so this suggests the impor 
tance in expanding employment opportunities of broader forces, such 
as Title VII, which apply to all sample establishments. The respective 
elasticities for black males, black females, white females, and other males
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(1.22, 1.19, 1.02 and 1.09) are significantly greater than one. The efficacy 
of affirmative action also depends heavily on employment growth. Af 
firmative action has been far more successful at establishments that are 
growing and have more job openings to accommodate federal pressure. 
Although affirmative action has lacked public consensus and vigorous 
enforcement, and has frequently been criticized as an exercise in paper 
pushing, it has actually been of material importance in prompting com 
panies to increase their employment of blacks.
Occupational Advance
One of the major affirmative action battlefields lies in the white-collar 
and craft occupations. In these skilled positions, employers are most 
sensitive to productivity differences and have complained the most about 
the burden of goals for minority and female employment. It is also in 
this region of relatively inelastic supply that the potential wage gains 
to members of protected groups are the greatest.
The four econometric studies mentioned earlier, which found employ 
ment gains for blacks despite little enforcement of affirmative action 
in its early years, also found that while affirmative action increases total 
black male employment among federal contractors, it does not increase 
their employment share in the skilled occupations (Burman 1973; 
Ashenfelter and Heckman 1976; Goldstein and Smith 1976; Heckman 
and Wolpin 1976). These studies suggest that contractors had been able 
to fulfill their obligations by hiring into relatively unskilled positions. 
Before 1974, affirmative action appears to have been more effective in 
increasing employment than in promoting occupational advancement.
Some might argue that such a result is only to be expected, given a 
short supply of skilled minorities or females. However, even in the case 
of a small fixed supply, affirmative action should induce a reshuffling 
of skilled blacks and women from noncontractor to contractor firms, 
without any increase in overall supply being necessary. The long-run 
presumption behind affirmative action, however, is that trainable members 
of protected groups will be considered for promotion to skilled employ 
ment. Indeed, by the later 1970s, affirmative action was no longer as
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ineffective as it may have been in its early years at increasing minority 
employment in skilled occupations (Leonard 1984b). This difference may 
reflect the increasing supply of highly educated blacks, as well as the more 
aggressive enforcement program that developed in the mid- to late 1970s.
Analyzing occupational advance within nine broad occupations be 
tween 1974 and 1980, Leonard (1984b) finds black males' share of employ 
ment increased faster in contractor than in noncontractor establishments 
in every occupation except laborers and white-collar trainees, and ex 
cept for operatives and professionals these differences are significant. 
The impact is found in both the proportionate change in black males' 
share of total employment, and in the proportionate change in the ratio 
of black male to white male share.
The total impact of the contract compliance program, the weighted 
sum of contractor and review effects, shows some evidence of a twist 
in demand toward more highly skilled black males. The contract com 
pliance program has not reduced the demand for black males in low- 
skilled occupations except for laborers. It has raised the demand for black 
males more in the highly skilled white-collar and craft jobs than in the 
blue-collar operative, laborer, and service occupations. While this may 
help explain why highly skilled black males have been better off than 
their less skilled brethren, it does not help explain why black males should 
be having greater difficulty over the years in finding and holding jobs. 
Neither employment-population ratios nor unemployment rates of blacks 
relative to whites have shown a marked improvement over the past two 
decades.
Establishments that are not part of multiplant corporations have 
significantly lower growth rates of employment for members of protected 
groups. Corporate size is probably of greater consequence than establish 
ment size, with larger corporations showing greater increases in minority 
and female employment. Establishment size itself has insignificant ef 
fects on white and black males, but other males and black females grow 
significantly faster at larger establishments, while white females grow 
significantly slower. It is also important to note that the tests here also 
control for the skill requirements of each establishment. Establishments 
that are nonclerical white-collar-intensive exhibit faster employment 
growth for both male and female blacks and significantly slower growth 
for white males.
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For a program lacking public consensus and vigorous enforcement, 
this is a surprisingly strong showing. While the gains of white females 
are smaller than those of blacks, it is important to keep in mind that 
the employment of females and minorities has been increasing in both 
sectors. Indeed, if the OFCCP pressured establishments to hire more 
females and minorities relative to their own past records rather than to 
industry and region averages, the observed pattern is just what we would 
expect to see during a period when female labor supply had been grow 
ing. Females' share would increase at all establishments because of the 
supply shift, and contractor establishments would be under little pressure 
to employ more females than noncontractors. The relatively short history 
of affirmative action for females may also help explain the differential 
impact of affirmative action across protected groups.
Affirmative action has also helped nonblack minority males, although 
to a lesser extent. There is evidence of a twist in demand toward Hispanic, 
Asian, and American Indian males in white-collar occupations, par 
ticularly in sales and clerical positions, and away from this group in 
operative and laborer positions. Compliance reviews have had a strong 
and significant additional impact in the professional, managerial, and 
craft occupations. The total impact of the contract compliance program 
on nonblack minority males is positive in the white-collar, craft, and 
service occupations, and in training programs. Relative to white males, 
affirmative action has increased the occupational status of nonblack 
minority males by 2 percent.
The evidence within occupations suggests that the contract compliance 
program has had a mixed, and often negative impact on white females. 
For technical, sales, clerical, craft, and trainee workers, contractor status 
is associated with a significant decline in white females' employment 
share. Compliance reviews have also often had a negative impact. While 
both contracts and reviews produce a significant 1 percent increase in 
the index of white females' occupational status, this positive impact disap 
pears when change in white females' occupational status are compared 
to the relatively greater gains of white males.
Black females in contractor establishments have increased their employ 
ment share in all occupations except technical, craft, and white-collar
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trainee. The positive impact of the contract program is even more marked 
when the position of black females is compared with that of white females.
It is possible that part of this occupational upgrading may be overstated 
because of biased reporting to the government, in particular the upward 
reclassification of minority or female-intensive occupations, as argued 
in the useful paper by Smith and Welch (1984). To the extent that con 
tractors may have selectively reclassifled black- and female-intensive 
occupations at a faster rate than did noncontractors, most studies will 
overstate the actual occupational advance due to affirmative action. 
However, this effect is unlikely to overwhelm the general direction of 
the results; pure reclassification would cause black losses in the lower 
occupations, which is generally not observed.
Moreover, this finding of occupational advance for nonwhite males 
is reinforced by evidence from Current Population Survey wage equa 
tions that affirmative action has narrowed the difference in earnings be 
tween the races by raising the occupational level of nonwhite males. These 
wage equations are reported at greater length in Leonard (1984d). These 
estimates of the wage effects of affirmative action offer evidence sug 
gesting that the underlying supply of labor is not perfectly elastic. Minori 
ty male wages are higher relative to those of white males in cities and 
industries with a high proportion of employment in federal contractor 
establishments subject to affirmative action, although the effect is not 
always significant.
Affirmative action does not appear to have contributed to the economic 
bifurcation of the black community. Given increased pressure to justify 
the nonpromotion or discharge of blacks, fears have been raised that 
employers will screen blacks more intensely and be less willing to risk 
employing less skilled blacks. In practice, affirmative action appears 
to increase the demand for poorly educated minority males as well as 
for the highly educated. The lesson to be drawn from this evidence is 
that affirmative action programs work best when they are vigorouly en 
forced, when they work with other policies that augment the skills of 
members of protected groups, and when they work with growing 
employers.
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Goals or Quotas?
Have these employment advances been achieved through the use of 
rigid quotas? The goals and timetables for the employment of minorities 
and females drawn from federal contractors under affirmative action stand 
accused of two mutually inconsistent charges. The first is that "goal" 
is really just an expedient and polite word for quota. Affirmative action 
has really imposed inflexible quotas for minority and female employ 
ment. The second is that these goals are worth less than the paper they 
are written on. Affirmative action is a game played for paper stakes and 
has never been enforced stringently enough to produce significant results.
Under Executive Order 11246, federal contractors are required to take 
affirmative action not to discriminate and to develop affirmative action 
plans (AAPs), including goals and timetables, for good-faith efforts to 
correct deficiencies in minority and female employment. The aim of 
this section, which summarizes Leonard (1985b), is to measure good 
faith, to determine what affirmative action promises are worth. Is negotia 
tion over affirmative action goals an empty charade played with proper 
ly penciled forms, or does it in fact lead to more jobs for minorities 
and females in the contractor sector? If the latter is the case, are these 
goals so strictly adhered to as to constitute quotas? Since the reviews 
examined here have already been shown to be useful (Leonard 1984a), 
the question here is not "Are reviews effective?" but rather "Do pro 
mises extracted during the review process contribute to the impact of 
reviews?"
It is not beyond reason to suppose that they do not. Neither the penalties 
for inflating promises to hasten the departure of federal inspectors nor 
the prospects of being apprehended seems great. The ultimate sanction 
available to the government in the case of affirmative action is debar- 
ment, in which a firm is barred from holding federal contracts. The first 
debarment of a nonconstruction contractor did not take place until 1974, 
and in total only 26 firms have ever been debarred. If the OFCCP finds 
the establishment's affirmative action plan unacceptable, it may issue 
a show-cause notice as a preliminary step to high sanctions. This step 
has been taken in only 1 to 4 percent of all reviews (USCCR 1975,
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p. 297). Of these, one-third to one-half involve basic and blatant paper 
work deficiencies such as the failure to prepare or update an AAP (U.S. 
GAO 1975, p. 26).
The other major sanction used by the OFCCP is back-pay awarded 
as part of a conciliation agreement. In 1973 and 1974, $54 million was 
awarded in 91 settlements, averaging $63 per beneficiary (U.S. GAO 1975, 
p. 46). In 1980, in an even more skewed distribution, $9.2 million was 
awarded to 4,336 employees in 743 conciliation agreements (USCCR 
1982, p. 47). These beneficiaries represented less than two-thirds of 1 
percent of all protected-group employees at just the reviewed 
establishments. While these affirmative action sanctions have not been 
heavily employed, in many cases regulatory sanctions, like weapons of 
war, are judged most successful just when they are used the least. That 
does not seem to be the case here. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
the General Accounting Office, committees of both houses of Congress, 
and the courts have all concurred in the judgment that the contract com 
pliance agencies have not made full and effective use of the sanctions 
at their disposal.
The low penalties are compounded by the low probability of apprehen 
sion, although the Department of Defense (DOD), upon whose review 
this section concentrates, had one of the most vigorous programs. In 
1976 DOD is reported to have reviewed 24 percent of its identified con 
tractors, compared to an average for all compliance agencies of 11 per 
cent (USCCR 1977, p. 113). In 1977 DOD had a ratio of 42 contractor 
facilities per staff member, and a total budget of $345 per contractor 
(USCCR 1977, p. 107). It is striking to note that compliance reviews 
have not typically been targeted directly against the most blatant form 
of employment discrimination. An establishment's history of employ 
ment demographics has typically not played a role in the incidence of 
compliance reviews, for a reason as procedurally obvious as it is logically 
obscure: compliance officers have not generally looked at an establish 
ment's past Affirmative Action Plans (AAPs) or EEO-1 forms in targeting 
reviews. Heckman and Wolpin (1976) report that reviews are esential- 
ly random with respect to the level or growth rates of an establishment's 
demographics. Leonard (1985b) finds evidence that establishments with
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more blacks and females are actually more likely to be subsequently 
reviewed. These two empirical studies agree that affirmative action com 
pliance reviews have not been targeted with greater frequency at 
establishments with relatively few minorities or females.
In this light, the expected penalties for making promises to the govern 
ment with little regard for the likelihood of fulfilling those promises 
do not seem overwhelming. In such circumstances, affirmative action 
promises may contain little, if any, information about the establishment's 
future employment. On the other hand, the OFCCP may use more subtle 
and less easily observed pressures. Firms may care about their reputa 
tions, not only with the OFCCP, but also with their own employees and 
the public, and so strive to set reasonable goals. More important, firms 
may react to the threat of Title VII litigation, with its substantial legal 
costs and penalties, hanging over their heads while under affirmative 
action review.
The employment goals that firms agree to under affirmative action 
are not vacuous; neither are they adhered to as strictly as quotas. While 
affirmative action promises are inflated, they are not hollow. For a sample 
of establishments that experienced more than one compliance review 
during the 1970s, Leonard (1985b) compares the goals with the employ 
ment actually achieved one year later. The model year for which pro 
jections are made is 1976. Establishments on average overestimate the 
growth of total employment. They project 1 percent employment growth 
one year ahead, but on average, employment subsequently falls by 3 
percent.
Neither absolute minority nor female employment increased, but both 
minority and female employment shares did increase. This is because 
the contraction in employment that occurred was almost lily-white and 
predominantly male. Most of the average employment decline of 27 was 
accounted for by white males, whose employment fell by 21. Put another 
way, while white males averaged 63 percent of initial employment, they 
accounted for 78 percent of the employment decline. Since females and 
minorities typically have lower seniority, they are usually found to suf 
fer disproportionately more during a downturn. In this perspective, the 
finding here that white males accounted for most of the employment
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decline is itself striking evidence of the impact of affirmative action. 
These establishments are projecting swift and substantial increases in 
black male employment.
These projections and actualizations can also be expressed as shares 
of total employment. Over time, minority and female employment shares 
are indeed growing, but not nearly as fast as projected. The firms pro 
ject growth in minority and female employment share far in excess of 
their own past history, and far in excess of what they will actually fulfill. 
Is there then any information at all in their projections, or is the entire 
procedure an exercise in futility?
The administrative records of completed compliance reviews include 
data on past and projected employment demographics, indications of 
deficiencies found in affirmative action plans, and an indicator for pre- 
award compliance reviews in which case one might expect the govern 
ment's leverage to be greater. These records also indicate successively 
higher levels of government pressures brought to bear: hours expended 
by review officers, progress reports required, conciliation process in 
itiated, and, finally, show-cause notice issued. Each of these mileposts 
in the bargaining process reflects both the establishment's resistance to 
bureaucratic pressures and, at the same time, increasing levels of 
bureaucratic pressure itself. If establishment resistance can be control 
led for, then these may be taken roughly as inputs into a regulatory pro 
duction function. By assuming that corporate resistance is controlled 
for by past growth rates of protected-group employment share, and by 
initial notification of deficiencies, we can then ask what the marginal 
impact is on factors of regulatory production such as conciliation 
agreements and show-cause notices. These identifying assumptions are 
open to question. Caution should be exercised in interpreting the following 
results since they may be biased toward finding ineffective enforcement 
if enforcement has been targeted against the most recalcitrant cases.
In general, the results on the impact of various enforcement tools are 
mixed and often insignificant. On average, employers had not significantly 
altered their demographics a year later in response to pre-award reviews, 
interim progress reports, conciliation agreements, or show-cause notices. 
On the whole, there is no compelling evidence that these detailed com 
ponents of the enforcement process have a significant impact on the 
employment of members of protected groups.
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The major finding in Leonard (1985b) is that goals set in these costly 
negotiations do have a measurable and significant correlation with im 
provements in the employment of minorities and females at reviewed 
establishments. At the same time, these goals are not being fulfilled with 
the rigidity one would expect of quotas. While the projections of future 
employment of members of protected groups are inflated, the 
establishments that promise to employ more do actually employ more. 
The striking finding is that the affirmative action goal is the single best 
predictor of subsequent employment demographics. It is far better than 
the establishment's own past history, even controlling for the direct im 
pact of detailed regulatory pressure.
This indicates that while establishments promise more than they deliver, 
the ones that promise more do deliver more, even conditioning on the 
past growth rate of employment share. There is significant information 
in the projection over and above what could have been predicted on the 
basis of past history. On the other hand, the projection falls far short 
of perfect information. For example, on average a projected 11 percent 
age point increase in the growth rate of black male employment share 
results in an actual increase of 1 percentage point, ceteris paribus.
Not only do establishments generally overpromise minority and female 
employment, they also overpromise white male employment. This reveals 
something of their strategy in formulating promises. They do not promise 
direct substitution of minority and female workers for white males; in 
stead they promise more for all. More accurately, they promise to make 
room for more minority and female employees by increasing the size 
of the total employment pie. The first step in bringing these projections 
down to earth may simply be to ask the establishment whether the pro 
jected growth in total employment is reasonable.
We have a policy that appears to be effective in its whole and ineffec 
tive in its parts. Protected-group employment share does generally grow 
more rapidly at reviewed firms, and goals are strongly correlated with 
this growth. Do our results then indicate only the establishments' pro 
jections reflect variations in supply known to them rather than induced 
variations in demand? Alternatively, can we infer that extracting greater 
promises will result in greater achievement? The critical evidence is that
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there is an overall response to pressure. Within labor markets of the same 
industry and region, reviewed contractors do better than the nonreviewed, 
as other work shows. As discussed here, within a given SMSA the 
establishments that set higher goals achieve greater growth rates of 
protected-group employment. My reading of this evidence is that while 
much of the nitpicking over paperwork is ineffective, the system of af 
firmative action goals has played a significant role in improving employ 
ment opportunities for members of protected groups.
The Targeting of Compliance Reviews
Affirmative action can be broadly conceived of as pursuing either anti 
discrimination or job and earnings redistribution goals. That is to say, 
it can either pursue equality of opportunity or equality of result. Given 
the historical record, progress toward one goal will often entail progress 
toward the other. In particular, discrimination seems to be a broad enough 
target that it can be hit even with imperfect aim. The central question 
that this section, drawn from Leonard (1985a), seeks to answer is: what 
are the actual goals of affirmative action? The approach taken here is 
to infer the ends of affirmative action policy from an analysis of the 
historical record of actual enforcement.
Assertions concerning the ends of affirmative action are surprisingly 
common, especially when one realizes that only once in the past has 
the actual pattern of enforcement been analyzed. This pathbreaking study 
of Heckman and Wolpin (1976) examined the incidence of compliance 
reviews at a sample of 1,185 Chicago area establishments during 1972. 
These compliance reviews are the first, the most common, and usually 
the last step in the enforcement process. Heckman and Wolpin find that 
the probability of review is not affected by establishment size, minority 
employment, or change in minority employment. They discover "no 
evidence of a systematic government policy for reviewing contractor 
firms." In other words, they find an essentially random enforcement pro 
cess. This first analysis of targeting studied a relatively small sample
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in one city during the early 1970s, before the contract compliance pro 
gram reached full stride. Do these early findings hold true for the na 
tion as a whole after affirmative action regulations and procedures 
matured? Just as important, how are such results to be interpreted?
Which establishments does the OFCCP actually choose to review? 
Can we judge its motives from its targeting policy, and do the goals so 
revealed conform to those mandated in the executive order? The OFCCP 
has had, on paper, formal targeting systems such as the Revised McKersie 
System or the later EISEN system. These systems generally target in 
a sensible fashion against discrimination by selecting for review those 
establishments with a low proportion of minorities or females relative 
to other establishments in the same area and industry. But interviews 
with OFCCP officials in Washington and in the field suggest that these 
formal targeting systems were never really used. Instead of targeting on 
the basis of an establishment's past demographic record, compliance 
officers claim they simply reviewed the firms with the most employees, 
and the growing firms. This section shows which types of establishments 
were actually reviewed between 1974 and 1980, primarily by the Depart 
ment of Defense. As such, the patterns shown here may not be indicative 
of current policies or practices of the OFCCP, nor of past practices of 
their compliance agencies. In addition, part of the patterns observed here 
may reflect the requirements for pre-award compliance reviews.
The model of affirmative action as an earnings redistribution program 
has two testable implications. One can at best offer weak support for 
the hypothesis, while the second can provide somewhat stronger sup 
port. The first is that no particular pressure should be applied to firms 
with relatively few minorities or females, as observed in Leonard (1985a). 
While this strongly rejects the model of affirmative action as anti 
discrimination in employment, if offers weak support for the alternative 
hypothesis of affirmative action as earnings redistribution because it is 
also compatible with other models of regulatory behavior. The second 
implication of the earnings redistribution model is that greater pressure 
should be brought to bear to shift demand curves where the supply of 
labor is relatively inelastic. In particular, this implies a higher incidence 
of compliance reviews at establishments with nonclerical, white-collar-
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intensive workforces. I find significant evidence that this is what the 
OFCCP has done.
If one thought of the OFCCP's primary concern as fighting the most 
blatant forms of prima fade employment discrimination directly in the 
workplace, one might then expect reviews to be concentrated at 
establishments with a relatively small proportion of females and black 
males, controlling for size, industry, and region. There is little consis 
tent significant evidence of this in the past. In part, this may be explain 
ed by the requirement of pre-award compliance reviews. Establishments 
with the smallest proportion of minorities or females, ceteris paribus, 
are not consistently more likely to be reviewed for compliance with Ex 
ecutive Order 11246. Reviews are significantly more likely to take place, 
ceteris paribus, in nonclerical, white-collar-intensive establishments. 
Reviews are also more likely to occur at both large and growing 
establishments, where any costs to white males are likely to be more 
diffused.
How can the lack of a consistent targeting pattern by race or sex be 
explained? The larger establishments often employ a greater proportion 
of minorities and females. In interviews, field officers of the OFCCP 
have stated that they do not generally look at an establishment's past 
demographic record in targeting reviews. Reviewing large nonclerical, 
white-collar-intensive establishments with little regard for their past record 
of minority or female employment is consistent with an affirmative ac 
tion effort that in terms of compliance review targeting is primarily con 
cerned not with attacking the grossest prima facie forms of current 
employment discrimination, but rather with redistributing jobs and earn 
ings to minorities and women.
The 1980s
Black economic advance faltered along a number of dimensions dur 
ing the 1980s. I do not know how much of this was due to weakened 
affirmative action, but I do know that affirmative action under the con 
tract compliance program virtually ceased to exist in all but name after 
1980 (Leonard 1987). From a public relations perspective, the gutting
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of the program had a certain artfulness. With no greater staffing or budget, 
the OFCCP doubled the number of compliance reviews. A wondrously 
invigorated bureaucracy doubling its efficiency? It is easy to go twice 
as fast when they are just going through the motions, with more desk 
reviews and fewer in-depth audits. After 1980, fewer administrative com 
plaints were filed, back-pay awards were phased out, and the already 
rare penalty of debarment became an endangered species. Over the same 
period, staffing and real budget were reduced. This type of surface en 
forcement resulted not just in stagnation, but in a reversal of black ad 
vances under affirmative action. Between 1980 and 1984, both male and 
female black employment grew much more slowly among contractors 
than noncontractors (Leonard 1987). Affirmative action, such as it was, 
no longer aided blacks. Consider the different response before and after 
1980 of black male employment growth to total establishment employ 
ment growth of 10 percent. Before 1980 this would result in 12 percent 
black male employment growth among noncontractors, and 17 percent 
among contractors. After 1980, the comparable rates are 11 percent among 
noncontractors and 10 percent among contractors. The reversal for black 
females is even more marked.
It was as though contractors were returning to a growth path they had 
been forced off by previous affirmative action efforts. This is discouraging 
news. Affirmative action seeks to give those discriminated against a 
chance to demonstrate their skills, and thus to break the preconceptions 
upon which prejudicial barriers are based. Under this model, affirmative 
action should serve as long-term innoculation against discrimination, 
and previous victims of discrimination should continue to progress even 
after active treatment has ceased.
The evidence supports far less optimistic views of what is at stake. 
The decline of black employment advances under the affirmative inac 
tion program of the 1980s suggests either that affirmative action during 
the 1970s resulted in discrimination against whites, or that ongoing treat 
ment is required to counteract the after-effects of generations of 
discrimination, or that there is a persistence and resiliency to the taste 
for discrimination against blacks.
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The Impact of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
While the central focus of this analysis has been on affirmative ac 
tion under the Executive Order, it should be understood that the Ex 
ecutive Order has functioned within the backdrop of Title VII's Con 
gressional mandate and substantial legal sanctions. The dominant policy 
has been established under Title VII. What impact then has Title VII 
had? Without attempting to review this question as thoroughly as I have 
affirmation action, I can sketch some results. For a more complete discus 
sion, see Brown (1984a), Freeman (1981), Butler and Heckman (1977), 
and Smith (1978).
The broadest perspective may be gained by considering what changes 
have occurred in the earnings, income, occupational positions, and 
employment of blacks relative to whites before and after passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In reviewing this evidence, Richard B. Freeman 
(1978, p. 3) finds that "virtually every indicator of positions shows a 
marked improvement in the economic status of employed black workers 
with as has been widely noted by various analysts gains concentrated 
among women, highly educated or skilled men, and young men. Vir 
tually every indicator of positions also shows a marked acceleration in 
the economic status of employed black workers after 1964, when the 
U.S. anti-bias effort intensified as a result of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of that year" (emphasis added). While a substantial part of this 
improvement can be attributed to the improved education of blacks (see 
Smith 1978), Title VII appears to have also contributed substantially and 
directly to improving the economic position of employed blacks at a given 
level of education.
While employed blacks appear to have approached parity with whites 
more rapidly since 1964, proportionately fewer blacks pass the initial 
hurdle of becoming employed. As Freeman (1978, p. 10) notes, "At the 
same time that there has been a marked movement toward equality of 
earnings between employed blacks and whites, however, there has been 
a distressing deterioration in the likelihood of blacks holding jobs, par 
ticularly among the young. In 1964 the black male civilian employ 
ment/population ratio stood at .73, in 1969 it was .73, and in 1979 it was 
.64. By contrast, for white males, the ratio went from .78 (1964) to .78
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(1969) to .75 (1979). Equally striking, the youth joblessness problem of 
the decade was one of increasing relative worsening in the black youth 
positions, for reasons that no one has yet satisfactorily explained. The 
aggregate data thus tell two stories: improvement for the employed but 
a reduction in the overall employment rate, especially in the 1970s."
More recently, attempts have been made by Beller (1979) and Leonard 
(1984c) to measure the impact of Title VII more directly using cross- 
sectional data. Beller finds some evidence that EEOC efforts have reduced 
the gender wage gap.
Before 1972, the Justice Department was empowered to bring suit 
through the courts for enforcement of Title VII's provisions. The EEOC's 
powers were limited to conciliation and persuasion. Since 1972 the power 
of litigation has been entrusted to the EEOC which, in turn, can pass 
it on to individual plaintiffs. By such recourse to the courts, the EEOC 
can sometimes accomplish in years what takes the OFCCP weeks. What 
it gives up in speed, though, it sometimes wins back in power through 
the setting of sweeping legal precedents. For example, the celebrated 
case of Griggs v. Duke Power did not simply aid Griggs or affect only 
Duke Power. By establishing the principle of disparate impact as prima 
facie evidence of discrimination, it placed a heavier burden on all 
employers to avoid the appearance of discrimination.
Between 1964 and 1981, more than 5,000 cases of litigation under Ti 
tle VII, many of which were private suits, were decided in the federal 
district courts. More than 1,700 of these were class-action suits. These 
are the tip of an iceberg consisting of cases settling out of court or decided 
in state courts, but these class-action decisions are likely to generate 
the most publicity, result in the largest awards, and affect the most peo 
ple. What has been the impact of this Title VII litigation?
The enforcement of Title VII through the courts has contributed to 
a significant improvement of the employment and occupational status 
of blacks. In regressions of the impact of the percentage of workers in 
an occupation who are members of a protected group on number of Title 
VII class action suits per corporation, percentage of employment in an 
industry by state cell that is in federal contractor establishments under 
the affirmative action obligation, and a lagged dependent variable, Title 
VII leads to sometimes negative but generally insignificant changes for
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white females, but to a moderate and significant improvement in the 
employment of blacks. The demand shifts for females may simply be 
swamped by the ongoing massive increase in labor supply. In addition, 
many of the early Title VII cases focused on racial rather than gender 
discrimination. The apparent ineffectiveness of antidiscrimination policy 
in promoting female employment remains an interesting question for 
research. Title VII litigation plays a significant role in increasing blacks' 
employment share.
In sum, these results suggest that Title VII litigation has played a signifi 
cant role over and above that of affirmative action. This impact has been 
greater for blacks than for women, and greater for the skilled than for 
the unskilled.
Antidiscrimination or Reverse Discrimination?
We have seen that despite poor targeting, affirmative action has helped 
promote the employment of minorities and women, and that Title VII 
has likely played an even greater role. This raises the most important 
and the most controversial question: has this reduced discrimination,or 
has it gone beyond and induced reverse discrimination against white 
males? This is also the question on which our evidence is least con 
clusive. The finding of decreased employment growth for white males 
is not sufficient to answer the question, since it is consistent with both 
possibilities.
The integration of the American workforce, by race and gender, has 
been among the most far-reaching and controversial goals of domestic 
policy in the past two decades. Some have argued that integration can 
be achieved only at great cost in terms of reduced productivity and pro 
fits, that forced equity will entail reduced productivity. Opponents of 
affirmative action have argued that employers were discriminating on 
the basis of merit, not on the basis of race or gender. If their contention 
is correct, then government policies that favor the hiring and promotion 
of minorities and women should cause a decline in their relative pro 
ductivity. Equal pay restrictions will compound the inefficiency. The 
hypothesis inherent in this argument is that the relative marginal pro 
ductivities of minorities and females have declined as their employment 
has increased and have not moved toward equality with relative wages.
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Using estimates of production functions relating output to inputs for 
the manufacturing sector, Leonard (1984c) finds that relative minority 
and female productivity increased between 1966 and 1977, a period coin 
ciding with government antidiscrimination policy to increase employ 
ment opportunities for members of these groups. There is no signifi 
cant evidence here to support the contention that this increase in employ 
ment equity has had marked efficiency costs. The relative marginal pro 
ductivities of minorities and women have increased as they have pro 
gressed into the workforce, suggesting that discriminatory employment 
practices have been reduced.
If we had observed that relative minority or female productivity fell 
while relative minority or female wages increased, one might suspect 
that government pressure under Title VII and Executive Order 11246 
(affirmative action) had led to reverse discrimination. I find no signifi 
cant evidence of reverse discrimination, nor of any significant decline 
in the relative productivity of minorities or females. Direct tests of the 
impact of governmental antidiscrimination and affirmative action regula 
tion on productivity find no significant evidence of a productivity decline. 
These results suggest that antidiscrimination and affirmative action ef 
forts have helped to reduce discrimination without yet inducing signifi 
cant and substantial reverse discrimination. However, the available 
evidence is not yet strong enough to be compelling on either side of 
this issue. Since the productivity estimates are not measured with great 
precision, strong policy conclusions based on this particular result should 
be resisted.
Conclusion
The policy of affirmative action has had a short and turbulent history 
in this country. Of all the social programs that grew during the sixties, 
it has perhaps enjoyed the least consensus. Its bureaucratic organiza 
tion and body of regulations have undergone change at frequent inter 
vals since its inception. While the targeting of enforcement could be 
improved, and while the impact of affirmative action on other groups 
is still subject to question, the evidence in this study is that affirmative 
action and Title VII can be successful in promoting the integration of 
blacks into the American workplace.
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The Uses and Limits of
Statistical Analysis in
Measuring Economic Discrimination
Glen G. Cain 
University of Wisconsin
This paper begins with a brief discussion of the basic concepts of 
economic discrimination. In the second part, two case studies of ethnic 
discrimination from American history illustrate the uses and limits of 
statistical analysis. (The detailed evidence of discrimination against these 
groups is presented in the appendix.) The next part deals with current 
analyses of economic discrimination, and a summary concludes that 
evidence based on statistical analysis is necessary but not sufficient for 
establishing the presence of economic discrimination. It must be sup 
ported by historical and institutional evidence and interpreted within 
a theoretical framework.
Background Ideas
Economic discrimination is rooted in the practical matter of an in 
equity; usually an outcome in which equally productive people receive, 
on average, different rewards for their efforts. It is useful to distinguish 
economic discrimination, when referring to the economy as a whole, 
from labor market discrimination. Discrimination in the labor market 
may be represented by the example of equally productive groups receiv 
ing unequal earnings. In fact, the inequality in earnings is usually a result
15
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of unequal access to the better-paying jobs and will show up as in 
equality in occupational attainment.
The focus on monetary rewards is indisputably narrow and leads to 
certain anomalies. For example, a finding of equal pay leads to a ver 
dict of no labor market discrimination, but the finding may, and prob 
ably does, coexist with plenty of labor market discrimination in the or 
dinary use of the term. This seeming paradox can be resolved with a 
simple example. Assume that 10 percent of the workers are a minority 
group, that no laws bar discrimination, and that 50 percent of the 
employers discriminate against the minority by paying them less than 
majority members. All that is needed for the economic verdict of "no 
discrimination" is a sufficient number of employers who will hire the 
minority workers on a nondiscriminatory basis, and here the propor 
tion of nondiscriminating employers is relatively large. Examples of 
legal discrimination could be exposed if minority workers applied for 
jobs from discriminating employers, but the minority applicants would 
quickly shift to the employers who do not discriminate and end up receiv 
ing equal pay. 1
The economist's conventional criterion of equal pay even has the em 
barrassing property of constituting evidence for no discrimination under 
conditions of complete segregation. The Supreme Court has rejected 
the doctrine of "separate but equal," but the customary analysis in 
economics accepts the doctrine. Despite this awkward property, I will 
focus on income and pay differences between groups as the indicator 
of economic discrimination. In defense, all I will say is that the money 
measure is important in its own right, and it does tend to be associated 
with other measures of discrimination such as segregation by residence 
or schooling or occupation.
Problems in measuring economic discrimination are revealed by con 
sidering its three essential components: (1) the productive capacity of 
people, which is difficult to measure; (2) an opportunity structure fac 
ing the people, which is even more difficult to measure; and (3) the 
outcomes in the form of income and earnings, which are relatively well 
measured. The economist's method is to observe the outcomes, com 
pare these for people who are assumed to be of the same productive
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capacity, and then infer whether the opportunity structure reveals 
discrimination.
Some examples will illustrate when the worker's opportunity struc 
ture implies or does not imply discrimination. Recent immigrants who 
are unable to speak English and who are less productive for that reason 
will face restricted employment opportunities. Language facility may 
well be a justifiable requirement for hiring, but what about the require 
ment that the worker be a citizen? For long periods in our history, oc 
cupational licensing in some states required citizenship for dentists, 
engineers, master plumbers, and barbers. 2 A barrier based on citizen 
ship is arguably not only discrimination but tends to injure some ethnic 
groups more than others. In this century Asian immigrants to the United 
States were for a generation barred from citizenship in some states, 
notably California.
For another example, assume that workers in a particular ethnic group 
are untrained and have lower earnings. Their lower earnings suggest, 
but only suggest, that they are being discriminated against, but just where 
the barrier to training is located is often difficult to determine. Does 
the barrier rest with employers, with trade unions, with the educational 
system, with the workers' upbringing as children? Thus, these workers 
appear to face some type of discrimination in their economic oppor 
tunities, but it may not be labor market discrimination.
The above discussion involves wages and individual workers. The 
worker is the unit of analysis. I now turn to economic discrimination 
involving inequality in family income. The family is the unit of analysis. 
Family income is a fundamental measure of economic well-being and 
is more comprehensive than wage earnings. Moreover, examining in 
come and the family may help us understand the opportunities and pro 
ductive capacities of the person. Again, let me illustrate these points 
with examples.
A mother of young children may be working at a part-time job at 
a low wage, but her husband's earnings may be high enough to offer 
her the option of working less in the market than someone who must 
rely only on her own earnings and who works full time at a higher wage. 
The mother's low wage is not compelling evidence for labor market
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discrimination, because she may have high wage opportunities that match 
her productive capacity, but she does not choose these job opportunities 
because they require a full-time commitment. Another possible reason 
for the mother's low wage is that her housework tasks may reduce her 
productive capacity in the paid labor market because she does not have 
as much time or energy for market work as someone with less 
housework.
In this example, the mother's family context is assumed to be causal 
to her job and wage outcomes. Now consider an example when causa 
tion runs in the other direction. Assume that discrimination in the labor 
market imposes low earnings on a young person or on a mother with 
young children, and this person has to move in or stay with a larger 
household of other family members to take advantage of the pooling 
of resources and the economies of scale in living arrangements. Com 
parisons of household or family incomes are likely to be more equal 
than individual incomes, and the family comparisons can hide situa 
tions of economic discrimination.
To illustrate, young black men are less likely than young white men 
to live apart from their immediate family. 3 One reason they continue 
to live at home is that fewer young black men have good paying jobs. 
Therefore, they are less able to afford either to live alone or to marry 
and set up their own households. Table 1 shows, with a hypothetical 
example, how these living arrangements can understate the true gap 
between black and white family incomes.
The original family unit is assumed to consist of three persons the 
parents and a 22-year-old daughter or son. The black-to-white ratio of 
the family income of these original units is .75, derived from an average 
family income of $36,000 for blacks and $48,000 for whites. We do 
not observe these original family units, however; instead we observe 
living arrangements in which more 22-year-old whites live apart from 
their parents than do the 22-year-old blacks. To sharpen the comparison, 
assume that 50 percent of the young whites and 25 percent of the young 
blacks live apart from their parents. The observed family incomes show 
.90 as the black-to-white ratio of family incomes $28,800 for black 
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The simple point of this table is that the gap between black and white 
income is understated by the comparison of family incomes. A second 
and more profound point is that the family unit itself, which is a basic 
unit for income comparisons, is affected by the labor market outcomes 
and, therefore, affected by discrimination. Discrimination is a cause 
of the living arrangements of the families. This contrasts with the ex 
ample of mothers of young children, where the family unit had a causal 
effect on the labor market outcomes. Causation can run both ways, and 
one's measure of economic discrimination can be either over- or 
understated if this is not taken into account.
Two practical conclusions follow from the above examples. (1) The 
wage of the married woman with young children overstated labor market 
discrimination for her. Recall, also, that her household income show 
ed no disadvantaged outcome. (2) Labor market discrimination against 
black youth was correctly measured by their lower wages, but economic 
discrimination was understated by the comparison of black and white 
household incomes. These conclusions depend on the particular cir 
cumstances of my examples. Later I discuss how the opposite conclu 
sions might emerge from further analyses of these cases.
Measuring Discrimination Between Groups 
in a Historical Setting
Assume that we adopt the following statistical procedure to measure 
economic discrimination, if any, against a given ethnic group, using 
all other native-born whites as the comparison group. First, we classify 
the families according to the age and rural/urban residence of the primary 
earner; then we compare the average family income and average per 
capita income of the two ethnic groups across these classifications. 
Disparities in income are initial evidence of economic discrimination. 
To keep matters relatively simple, let us assume that the number of 
earners per family and family size are approximately the same in the 
two groups and that those in the ethnic group are all born in the United 
States. These steps are illustrated with hypothetical numbers in panel A 
of table 2.
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Table 2
Family Income Comparisons by Ethnic Group 
(Hypothetical Example)
Age

















Another step in the investigation is to subdivide the family groups 
according to the educational attainment of the primary earner, and then 
compare incomes within each educational category. If the same income 
disparities persist, we may view this as stronger evidence of economic 
discrimination in general and of labor market discrimination in particular. 
If, however, this statistical control for educational attainment, along 
with the controls for age and rural/urban residence, do not show in 
come differences, then we have two conventional interpretations. (Note 
that panel B of table 2 shows almost no difference in the family incomes 
of the ethnic group relative to the comparison group of native whites.) 
One interpretation is that the ethnic group's lower educational attainment
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is the source for their lower incomes, and their lower education reflects 
social disadvantages that accrued to the ethnic group before they reached 
adulthood. This view can be interpreted as exonerating the labor market, 
and employers in particular, from blame for the discrimination.
A second and contrary interpretation is that labor market discrimina 
tion is a cause of less education among members of the ethnic group 
because the market does not sufficiently reward them for additional 
schooling. Which of these two interpretations is correct is a challeng 
ing question. In the case studies that follow, data limitations prevent 
me from including education in my tabulations.
I would like to carry out the procedure outlined above for two ethnic 
groups, Irish-Americans and Japanese-Americans, for two years, 1900 
for the Irish and 1940 for the Japanese, using the decennial census. If 
the historians I have read are correct in their descriptions of the economic 
discrimination that these groups suffered in American history, then the 
economic statistics from these particular periods should show this.
The 1900 decennial census offers no data on income and earnings, 
and the 1940 census does not give earnings data for Japanese-Americans. 
These two censuses do, however, provide limited information about 
occupational attainment. I use these occupational data to support the 
proposition that a comparison of incomes in 1900 and in 1940 would 
show economic discrimination against, respectively, Irish-Americans 
and Japanese-Americans.
In 1900 the number of descendants of Irish immigrants was large 
enough to permit reliable statistics on the occupational attainments of 
those who were born in the United States. Also, within-group marriage 
was so prevalent that defining who was Irish is relatively unambiguous. 
Finally, as noted above in referring to the research of historians, it is 
likely that the Irish-Americans faced discrimination in the labor market 
during the period around 1900.
The occupational attainment of second generation Irish-American men 
in 1900 is compared to the attainments of all white men and of second- 
generation white men. 4 The group of all whites is composed of three 
ancestry subgroups: (1) 23 percent who were foreign born; (2) 20 per-
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cent who were second-generation Americans, that is, sons of foreign- 
born parents; and (3) 57 percent who were third- or higher-generation 
Americans, called native whites. 5 As a comparison group for evaluating 
the economic attainment of the second-generation Irish, all white men 
probably represent a relatively low standard of economic attainment. 
Consider that the 23 percent who are foreign born include many who 
could not speak English and some who were illiterate. Even the Irish- 
Americans who were born in Ireland were all English-speaking, and 
virtually all were literate. 6
My source for the occupational statistics from the 1900 census is 
E. P. Hutchinson, cited in footnote 5. The occupational categories are 
not well suited for measuring economic status, but I select certain oc 
cupations that should be unambiguous indicators of high or low attain 
ment. For one comparison, independent farmers along with five white- 
collar occupations (mainly professionals, agents, bookkeepers, mer 
chants, and salesmen) designate high occupational attainment. This 
assumes that the farmer occupation, which excludes farm laborers, 
represented higher economic status than most urban jobs in 1900. Three 
laborer occupations (mainly servants and waiters, other laborers in the 
service industry, and workers in the low-paying textile industry) 
designate low occupational attainment.
The 1900 census reported that 33 percent of all white men in the labor 
force were farmers or were in the five white-collar occupations, com 
pared to 24 percent among the second-generation Irish-Americans. 
Restricting the comparison to the urban labor force, 18 percent of all 
white men were in the five white-collar occupations compared to 15 
percent of the second-generation Irish. The three laborer occupations 
contained 18 percent of all white men and 23 percent of the second- 
generation Irish.
The comparison between second-generation Irish-American men and 
all second-generation white men gives similar but weaker findings, based 
mainly on the sharp contrast of representation in the low occupations. 
Only 14 percent of the second-generation whites were in the three low 
occupations, compared to 23 percent of the second-generation Irish. 
The two second-generation groups had similar percentages in farming 
and in the five white-collar occupations.
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The statistics in the above two paragraphs show a lag in the occupa 
tional attainment, and presumably in the incomes, of the second- 
generation Irish compared with other white Americans. (Further details 
and citations for these comparisons are given in appendix.)
The article on the Irish in the Harvard Encyclopedia of American 
Ethnic Groups gives a more pessimistic picture of the occupational at 
tainments of Irish-Americans. Patrick J. Blessing states that the Irish 
"were the only immigrant group whose occupational mobility during 
the late 19th century appeared almost as small as that of American 
blacks. . . . Their . . . record of movement up the occupational scale 
[was] dismal." 7 Although the occupational statistics from the 1900 census 
do not seem to me to justify this judgment, which may have referred 
to the Irish experience in Boston, I conclude that the statistical analysis 
supports the verdict of discrimination against Irish-Americans at this 
period in our history.
In 1940 nearly all the Japanese-Americans in the United States lived 
in the four western states of Arizona, California, Oregon, and 
Washington, with about 85 percent in California. The first generation 
had immigrated to the United States between 1890 and 1920. By 1940, 
almost two-thirds of the Japanese-Americans were born in the United 
States. There is abundant evidence that they faced severe social and 
legal discrimination, especially in California. Again, however, statistical 
evidence on how this discrimination affected their incomes and earn 
ings in 1940 is not directly available. Instead, I compare the occupa 
tions of second-generation Japanese-American men in the four western 
states with the occupations of all white men in California.
The occupations in 1940 are defined in modern terms, permitting a 
rough ranking by skill, although there are the customary distinctions 
between the white-collar occupation "clerical and sales" and the blue- 
collar occupation "craftsmen" where a ranking according to skill is 
uncertain. To measure the occupational attainment for the two groups, 
white men and second-generation Japanese-American men, I calculate 
average earnings for each of the two groups as follows. First, the me 
dian wage and salary earnings of each occupation is assigned to that 
occupation as a cardinal measure of its rank. There are 11 occupational
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categories, with professionals ranked highest and domestic servants rank 
ed lowest according to the earnings measure. Second, the percentage 
of each ethnic group in the occupation is multiplied by the occupation's 
median earnings, and the sum of these products gives an average earn 
ings for each ethnic group, although for the Japanese-Americans the 
average uses the occupational earnings of all the workers, who are 95 
percent white.
The ratio of this dollar-valued occupational attainment of Japanese- 
Americans to that of all whites is .92, implying a moderate lag in the 
attainments of Japanese-Americans. The ratio is probably upwardly bias 
ed. The method assumes that the earnings of Japanese-Americans and 
whites are the same within an occupation. Another source of bias is 
that second-generation Japanese-Americans had more education than 
whites in 1940, indicating that a control for educational attainment would 
show a lower ratio than .92. (The details of the above calculations and 
arguments are given in appendix.)
Let us assume, then, that a comparison of incomes in 1940 would 
reflect these findings about occupational differences between whites and 
second-generation Japanese-Americans. We may conclude, therefore, 
that the statistical analysis again supports a verdict of discrimination.
If we carry out income and occupational comparisons for the same 
two ethnic groups in 1970 and 1980, however, we find that the Irish- 
and Japanese-Americans have higher income and higher occupational 
and education attainment than other white Americans. This claim is 
stronger and clearer for Japanese-Americans, who have sharply higher 
family or per capita incomes than comparable native white Americans.
In Table 3, two comparisons are shown for family income. 8 For 
married-couple families the income of Japanese-Americans is 47 per 
cent higher than that of non-Hispanic whites; 26 percent higher if we 
look at just the primary earner's income. Not shown is a more technical 
analysis in which the incomes are standardized for age, education, marital 
status, and region of residency of the primary earner. With these 
characteristics taken into account there remains an 8 percent advantage 
in favor of Japanese-Americans. The last part of the table shows higher 
occupational attainments of Japanese-Americans.
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Table 3
Income and Occupational Attainment of American-Born Japanese 
and Non-Hispanic White Americans, 1980
Japanese- Non-Hispanic Ratio 
Americans White J/W
Average income of married- 
couple families $41,700 $28,300 1.47
Average income of married- 
couple families excluding 
income of family members 
other than the primary earner $26,900 $21,300 1.26
Occupations: Percentage in
(a) Professional, technical,
sales and administrative 54% 44% 1.23
(b) Operators, fabricators,
laborers, unemployed 13% 25% .52
SOURCE Harriet Orcutt Duleep, "The Economic Status of Americans of Asian Descent An 
Exploratory Investigation," U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Clearinghouse Publication 95, 
October 1988, pp. 35, 70, 73.
The evidence for higher incomes of Irish-Americans is not so strong, 
and the amount of their advantage is not so large. By 1970 the family 
incomes of men who reported Irish ancestry were about 5 percent above 
that of other white families. 9 Also, 48 percent of the men were in white- 
collar occupations, compared to 43 percent of other white men. One 
problem in measurement here is that Irish ancestry is defined by both 
parents being Irish. But by 1970, intermarriage between Irish-Americans 
and persons of other ancestry was common, so there is a selection of 
those who are recorded as Irish that lends an unknown bias to the in 
come and occupation comparisons.
One reason why the economic success of Irish-Americans in over 
coming discrimination is understated during this century is that 
discrimination was mainly against the Catholic Irish, and today the in 
comes and educational attainments of Irish Catholics are greater than 
for the Irish as a whole. 10
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We now have a puzzle, or maybe the right word is dilemma. If we 
accepted the 1900 and 1940 statistical evidence as supporting a verdict 
of discrimination against these two ethnic groups, then how should we 
interpret the 1970 and 1980 evidence? Does the latter imply discrimina 
tion in favor of Irish- and Japanese-Americans in contemporary America? 
Was there reverse discrimination in 1970 and 1980? If we dismiss this 
interpretation, should we then call into question our verdicts of 
discrimination in 1900 and 1940? Our investigatory procedures should 
be consistent. I believe, and this is my principal theme, that consisten 
cy is achieved by supplementing the statistical evidence with institu 
tional and historical evidence and with theoretical analysis. Indeed, my 
preference is to consider statistics as supplementary to the institutional- 
theoretical analysis.
The limitations of space and of my knowledge about the history of 
ethnic groups in America prevent an extensive discussion about how 
we should interpret the potentially inconsistent evidence presented above. 
The case of Japanese-Americans, however, appears to offer a straightfor 
ward reconciliation in the light of several well-known historical facts.
I claim that the statistical evidence supports the verdict of discrimina 
tion in 1940 and a verdict of no "reverse discrimination" in 1980. The 
reasons for the conclusion about 1940 are easiest. The record in the 
United States of legal and social persecution of Japanese immigrants 
and their offspring is astounding and appalling, culminating in the ef 
fective robbery of much of their land and wealth in 1942 when almost 
all Japanese-Americans were imprisoned in concentration camps. 11 Their 
lower incomes in 1940 reflect, as we see with subsequent evidence, 
discriminatory barriers rather than voluntary choices or any innate in 
capacity for economic success. 12
The explanation for their economic success since the end of World 
War II, shown by the income statistics for 1980, is not so easy. They 
have benefited by living in the most prosperous part of the United States, 
the West Coast, especially California. Also, there were, apparently, 
two strong selective forces at work on the Japanese-American popula 
tion. One is that the Japanese government selected the immigrants who 
went to the United States, beginning around 1890 and continuing until 
1920 or so. 13
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A second selective factor is that about 50 percent of the immigrants 
returned to Japan. 14 A natural inference is that the most successful stayed 
in the United States, and supporting testimony is given by Dorothy 
Swaine Thomas: "At the time of the Immigration Commission's in 
vestigations in 1908-1909, a majority of all classes [of the Japanese- 
Americans] interviewed either expected to return to Japan or were 
undecided about their future place of residence. The proportions in 
dicating that they had decided to become permanent residents of the 
United States were, however, highest among those who had 'succeed 
ed in rising from the ranks of the laboring classes.' " 15
We could, of course, appeal to various theories about the special work 
ethic and efficiency of the Japanese people to explain their economic 
achievements. In the case of the Japanese-Americans, however, these 
theories are not needed.
Fortunately, today we have data and tools of analysis that permit us 
to use both statistical and institutional-theoretical methods to analyze 
discrimination. Unfortunately, both methods are inherently imprecise, 
and reasonable people can disagree about the uses and interpretations 
of the evidence. I turn next to the current use of statistical evidence 
to measure labor market discrimination.
Statistical Models of Wage Discrimination
One of the earliest econometric studies to measure labor market 
discrimination against women was by Henry Sanborn and based on data 
from the 1950 census. Sanborn concluded that the wages of women were 
only moderately lower than those of men of the same region of residence, 
age, education, and occupation. 16 In 1973, a study by James D. Gwartney 
and Richard Stroup based on the 1960 and 1970 censuses found a sizable 
gender wage gap and extensive discrimination against women workers. 17
The different conclusions had nothing to do with the different years 
for the data sources. Instead, there are reasons for believing that the 
first study understated, and the second study overstated, labor market 
discrimination defined as unequal pay for the same productive
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capacities. The early study by Sanborn compared the wages of men and 
women in the same occupation, but because barriers to occupational 
entry are the most important form of labor market discrimination, this 
study surely understated it. A diagram of this model is shown in the 
first row of figure 1. By controlling for occupation in the statistical 
analysis, the researcher may be said to have "overcontrolled."
The models shown in figure 1 are deliberately simplified and are in 
tended to serve pedagogic purposes. They should not be viewed as 
representing the precise models used in the research literature I cite. 
With this qualification in mind, let us interpret Model I. Arrows denote 
causal paths. The right-side column headed "Outcomes" is self- 
explanatory, except for the important distinction between Model I, where 
only the wage is listed, and the other models, which treat occupation 
as another outcome that measures labor market success or failure. The 
conventional economic proposition that workers' wages are determin 
ed by their productivity is represented in column 3 (which is the sec 
ond of two columns under the heading "Intervening Variables"). A 
distinction is made between "productivity" in Model I, which is 
associated with the occupational skills of the worker, and "productive 
capacity," which determines, among other things, the worker's ability 
to enter various occupations. Once workers are in a particular occupa 
tion, their productivity may be enhanced by on-the-job training specific 
to that occupation.
The first column lists variables or traits of workers that may sometimes 
be assumed to be exogenous to the workings of the labor market. In 
the case of education, the assumption I adopt for convenience in Models 
I-III is that education is determined before the person enters the labor 
market and is unaffected by the operation of the labor market.
Model II in figure 1 describes the assumptions behind the 1973 study 
by Gwartney and Stroup that showed a large gender wage gap. The 1973 
study, however, did not allow for the difference between men and women 
in their years of experience in the labor market a gap which is related to 
the two careers, home and market, of many women. Without control 
ling for labor market experience, the observed lower average wage for 
women probably overstates labor market discrimination against women.
Figure 1
Analytic Models of Labor Market Discrimination: Women 
(Arrows denote causal paths)
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Later studies of the gender gap in wages allowed for the effects of 
the woman's previous employment experience either indirectly, by in 
cluding a fertility variable, or with a variable that directly measured 
the woman's previous years of labor market experience. 18 (See Model 
III in figure 1.) The gender gap in wages was much smaller in these 
studies. In my view, however, accounting for women's dual careers 
by statistical methods is an intractable problem in measuring labor market 
discrimination. Let me try to explain my view.
Recall the two sources of complexity caused by women's dual careers: 
first, that their choice of a less demanding job may be voluntary, perhaps 
as a consequence of their total family income; second, that the housework 
demands on their time and energy reduce their productive capacity in 
the paid labor market. These interpretations rationalize statistical 
strategies that include the following sorts of control variables when com 
paring women's and men's wages: full- or part-time work, years of 
experience in the paid labor market, numbers and ages of children, and 
marital status.
These control variables are usually interpreted to be explanations for 
the lag in women's wages that was otherwise attributed to labor market 
discrimination. This conclusion, however, may be challenged with an 
alternative interpretation that is based on the mutual causation between 
women's wages and the variables measuring their productivity. In this 
model (IV in figure 1), the restricted opportunities for women in the 
labor market that are attributable to discrimination are causal to their 
concentration on housework at the expense of market work. Statistical 
analysis can measure associations, but it cannot determine causation, 
at least not without a supporting theoretical rationalization.
This theoretical point about mutual causation may be explained without 
mentioning labor market discrimination. During recent decades, employ 
ment opportunities in the labor market have improved for women, and 
women have postponed their age of first marriage, had fewer children, 
and increased their rates of marital breakup. But what is cause, and 
what is effect? Was the decision to have fewer children independent 
of what was occurring in the labor market, and did increased market 
work by women then follow the decline in the birth rate? Or were the
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improved wage and job opportunities in the labor market causal to the 
decision to have fewer children? Economists have not been successful 
in identifying and quantifying the causal forces in these events. It is 
even more difficult to determine the additional causal role of discrimina 
tion in the labor market in these outcomes.
Summary
I am pessimistic about the power of statistical methods to determine 
and measure economic discrimination. We are not sure what variables 
should be used as control variables in the analysis. If relevant causal 
variables are omitted, the model "undercontrols" and, therefore, 
overstates economic discrimination. If, however, the control variables 
are themselves effects of labor market discrimination, then they should 
not be included in the model; this is the problem of "overcontrolling," 
which leads to an understatement of economic discrimination.
These statements are expressions of humility but not of despair. We 
can take a lesson from the historical studies, such as those alluded to 
above concerning Irish-Americans and Japanese-Americans. We need 
a theoretical framework supported by knowledge about the institutional 
and historical factors. In the modern context of assessing discrimina 
tion by employers and labor unions, we need to study the histories of 
the firms and unions to try to determine motivations and intentions. 
Statistical methods are indispensable in the task of measuring labor 
market discrimination, but they are still only one component of the 
analysis.
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Appendix
The Evidence for Economic Discrimination 
Against Irish- and Japanese-Americans in 1900 and 1940
In the text of this paper I assumed the following hypothetical proposition. 
If we had for 1900 and 1940 the type of economic data that we have had since, 
say, 1960, we would be able to show economic discrimination against Irish- 
Americans in 1900 and against Japanese-Americans in 1940 by conventional 
methods of economic research. The evidence mentioned in the text to support 
this proposition is admittedly meager. I doubt that the necessary data exist 
from these earlier years for applying conventional methods. This appendix 
discusses in more detail the evidence that is available. First, a theoretical point.
The Economic Theory of Labor Market Discrimination
The point was made in the text that merely documenting examples of 
employer discrimination against a minority group is not sufficient to indicate 
that the incomes or earnings of the minority group are lower than those of 
the majority group for workers of the same productive capacity. The documen 
tation is necessary for a verdict of economic discrimination, because it pro 
vides the historical and institutional evidence for how discrimination occur 
red. Statistical evidence showing lower earnings of the minority group is also 
necessary, however.
In the case of Irish-Americans at the turn of this century, for example, it 
is not enough to refer to the legacy of the infamous signs, "No Irish Need 
Apply." Knowing that some, even many, employers discriminated against the 
Irish does not tell us that the employers who did not were too few to enable 
Irish workers to earn a wage equal to that of other workers with their produc 
tive capacity.
In the hypothetical example of the text, where minority workers were 10 
percent of the workforce, and half of the employers did and half did not 
discriminate against the minority group, the claim was that competitive forces 
would secure pay for the minority workers in accordance with their produc 
tive capacity. The reason is that the same competitive forces that tend to equate 
the wage and productivity of majority workers would accomplish this for the 
minority workers. In other words, we should expect that the labor demand 
for minority workers by the 50 percent of employers who do not discriminate
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will provide enough bidding to ensure the same competitive solution for the 
minority group.
It is important to note that a large percentage of employers, relative to the 
percentage that the minority group constitutes, is not necessary to achieve a 
nondiscriminatory outcome. The argument runs as follows. Assume that only 
a few employers do not discriminate against the minority group. They will 
hire the minority workers because, unlike the discriminating employers, they 
suffer no nonpecuniary disutility from employing minority workers. At the 
outset, the nondiscriminating employers have no incentive to pay the minority 
workers any more than their market wage, which, by assumption, is less than 
the prevailing wage paid to workers in the majority group. By employing the 
equally productive but lower-paid minority workers, the nondiscriminating 
employers will make extra profits, and, to repeat a point, they suffer no disutility 
from employing the minority workers. The nondiscriminating employers will 
expand production in response to their extra profits, and this increases the de 
mand for and wages of minority workers.
The discriminating employers, who are losing their share of the market out 
put and losing their minority workers, will be forced to raise the wages of 
the minority workers if they want to keep them. In any case, the bidding for 
the labor of minority workers by nondiscriminating employers will continue 
to raise the wages of the minority workers until their wage equals that of the 
majority workers. Only at this point will excess profits disappear, permitting 
an equilibrium allocation of the share of output among the employers.
The point of this argument is that a comparison of earnings of minority and 
majority workers is needed to tell us whether the demand for labor by employers 
and consumers has produced a discriminatory outcome by the economist's 
definition. Recall, however, that some employers may be discriminating in 
the legal sense even though the market shows equality in earnings of the two 
groups.
Available Data on Irish-Americans
In view of the lack of data on incomes, how might we measure the economic 
status of Irish-Americans around the turn of the century? Several historical 
works have examined the occupational attainments of Irish-Americans in 
specific cities. Stephan Thernstrom, for example, reports relatively slow pro 
gress in occupational attainment by the Irish in Boston in the period around 
1900. 19 Andrew M. Greeley argues, however, that the historical record in 
Boston understates the occupational achievements of the Irish in the United 
States as a whole. 20
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Nationwide data on the occupations of the labor force from the Bureau of 
the Census seem to me to be our best source. From 1870 to 1900, the decen 
nial censuses reported the occupations of American workers classified by nativi 
ty and country of origin. This information is summarized in the book, cited 
in footnote 5, by E.P. Hutchinson. Unfortunately, the occupational classifica 
tions used for those censuses were based mainly on the workers' industry. 
Hutchinson commented that, "The primarily industrial basis of classification 
largely conceals whatever characteristics of skill or occupational status 
the ... [worker] may have had." 21 For example, in the 1900 census, the oc 
cupation of "iron and steel workers" includes unskilled and skilled workers.
Despite this problem, I am forced to use the 1900 occupational classifica 
tions instead of those in the 1910 census which do correspond to our current 
occupational classifications, because the 1910 census did not report the coun 
try of origin of the workers. In fact, the 1950 census is the next one to provide 
occupational data for workers according to their country of origin.
Although the 1900 occupational classifications do not, in general, permit 
a ranking by skill, there are several high-status and low-status occupations 
that clearly correspond with economic status. (Unless otherwise noted, the 
statistics that follow are from Hutchinson, pp. 172-175.) From 34 listed oc 
cupations from the 1900 census, I select the following five high-status occupa 
tions: (1) professional service, (2) agents, (3) bookkeepers and accountants, 
(4) merchants and dealers, and (5) salesmen. Occupations 2-5 are all contain 
ed in the "trade and transportation" industry. A large and relatively high- 
status occupation in 1900 is that of "farmers, planters, and overseers." 
Agricultural laborers are excluded, so this farm occupation probably has a 
higher status than the occupations of most urban workers. The low-status oc 
cupations that I selected are (1) servants and waiters, (2) other laborers, both 
from the "domestic and personal service" industry and (3) "textile mill 
operatives," selected because the textile industry was the lowest-paying 
manufacturing industry. 22
The occupational data from the 1900 census report whether the worker was 
born in Ireland, designating a first-generation Irish-American, or has foreign- 
born parents, designating a second-generation Irish-American. The Irish- 
American male workers are compared to all white male workers and to all 
second-generation white male workers. Table A. 1 summarizes the occupa 
tional statistics for these four groups. As noted in the text, in 1900 the all- 
worker group was composed of native workers (57 percent), foreign-born 
workers (23 percent), and second-generation foreign workers (20 percent).
The first evaluation of the occupational attainments of second-generation 
Irish-American males compares them with all white males. Row 3 of table A. 1
Table A.I
Occupational Distribution of Selected Occupations for 




In total labor force:
1. Farmers, planters and
overseersb
2. Five high occupations0
3. Sum of 1, 2
In urban labor force:
4. Five high occupations0








































SOURCE. E.P. Hutchinson, Immigrants and Their Children, 1850-1950 (New York John Wiley and Sons, 1956), pp 159, 172-174
a. Ist-generation is the same as foreign-born
b Does not include agricultural laborers
c. Professionals, agents, bookkeepers and accountants, merchants and dealers, salesmen (The latter four are in the trade and transportation industry )
d Laborers, servants and waiters (both groups from the domestic and personal service industry), textile mill operatives
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shows that 24 percent of the second-generation Irish are in the farmer occupa 
tion and the five high-status (white-collar) occupations, and the corresponding 
figure for all whites is 33 percent. In the urban sector, 15 percent of the second- 
generation Irish are in the five high-status occupations and 23 percent are in 
the three low-status occupations. They compare unfavorably to the urban oc 
cupational attainments of all whites—18 percent in the five high-status occupa 
tions and 18 percent in the three low-status occupations.
Another comparison is between the second-generation Irish and the second- 
generation of all whites. The two groups had nearly the same percentage, 24 
and 25, respectively, in the combined farmer and five high-status occupations. 
In the urban sector, the occupations of the second-generation whites show 
somewhat higher attainments: 16 percent are in the five high-status occupa 
tions and only 14 percent are in the three low-status occupations, compared 
with 15 and 23 percent, respectively, for the second-generation Irish. The oc 
cupations of the first-generation Irish are considerably lower in all comparisons.
Available Data on Japanese-Americans
The 1940 census publications included a special report that gives 
demographic, educational, and occupational information, but no wage and 
salary data, for Japanese-Americans by country of birth. 23 The data cover the 
four western states, Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, where near 
ly all Japanese-Americans lived. The occupations are limited to 11 broad 
categories. Another problem is the small population of Japanese-Americans 
in 1940. Of the total of 127,000, 63 percent (80,000) were born in the United 
States, but 50,000 of the latter were less than 20 years old. As a result, there 
were only 15,000 second-generation Japanese-American workers in 1940. By 
contrast, there were over one million second-generation Irish-Americans in 
the labor force in 1900.
Adding to the difficulty of using the occupational data to evaluate the 
economic attainments of Japanese-Americans are the following problems:
(1) About 14 percent of the second-generation Japanese-American men 
and 5 percent of white men worked in agriculture. In 1940, unlike 1900, we 
cannot assume that farmers have higher incomes and economic status than most 
urban employees, so I exclude farmers from the occupational comparisons. 
Farm laborers are included because the low wages in this occupation are a 
clear indication of its low rank.
(2) Second-generation Japanese-American workers were, on average, 
much younger than white workers. Because occupational attainment depends on
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age, the occupational comparison needs to take account of the age differences 
in the two populations.
(3) Two occupations, "proprietors, managers, and officials (excluding 
farmers)" and "clerical, sales, and kindred workers" are likely to consist of 
jobs with lower status and lower workers' incomes among the second-generation 
Japanese-Americans than among white workers. Dorothy Swaine Thomas 
reports that, among the Japanese-Americans, "the personnel of so many enter 
prises consisted merely of an Issei [first-generation] 'entrepreneur' and his 
cooperating relatives. . . . Thus, the concentration of Nisei [second-generation] 
males at 'white-collar' levels . . . may be interpreted to mean that many of 
those classified in the proprietor/managerial group were in fact working in 
secondary positions in the larger, Issei-controlled enterprises, and that most 
of those classified in the clerical/sales category were, similarly, working for 
other Japanese. The few who had progressed beyond the limits of the Japanese 
business community were, for the most part, on low rungs of the urban oc 
cupational ladder and held the less desirable jobs." 24
Each of the problems listed above is addressed below in the comparisons 
of occupational attainments of Japanese-American and white workers.
The 1940 census included, for the first time, wage and salary information 
for the labor force, and this permits a quantitative economic scale for the oc 
cupations. (No data on occupational earnings are available for Japanese- 
Americans, however.) Given the concentration of Japanese-Americans in 
California (about 85 percent lived there), I use the occupations and wages of 
male workers in this state, 95 percent of whom were white, to construct a 
dollar value for the occupational attainments of the white and Japanese- 
American workers. Farmers are excluded, as noted above, and the median 
wage and salary earned by "professional workers" is assigned to the "pro 
prietors, managers, and officials" because income data from self-employment 
were not collected. 25
The occupational distributions and median earnings are shown in table A.2. 
An average earnings of white workers, excluding farmers, is calculated by 
multiplying the median earnings of each occupation by the percentage of white 
workers in the occupation and then summing the products. (To be precise, 
the median earnings are for workers who worked 12 months in 1939.) This 
average, shown in table A.2 to be $1,646, is a dollar measure of the occupa 
tional attainments of white workers.
The same method is used for evaluating the occupational attainments of 
second-generation Japanese-American workers. Their occupation percentages 
are multiplied by the white median earnings in each occupation. Thus, the dollar 
measure of the occupational attainments of Japanese-Americans assumes that
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Japanese-American and white workers in the same occupation received the 
same earnings. As shown in table A.2, the ratio of the dollar value of the 
Japanese-American occupational attainments to that of white workers is .87 
( = 1435/1646).
A second ratio of the two groups' occupational attainments uses the same 
earnings figures, but the occupational distribution of the Japanese-Americans 
who lived in the states of California and Washington in 1940 is adjusted to 
match the age distribution of the entire population of workers in these states. 
(About 90 percent of all Japanese-Americans lived in these two states in 1940, 
and about 95 percent of the entire population in the two states was white.) 
The age-adjusted occupational distribution of Japanese-Americans is taken from 
Thomas. 26 The method may be explained with a simple example.
Assume that 5 percent of the Japanese-Americans over 35 years of age, and 
2 percent of those under 35 years of age, were professionals, and that 80 per 
cent of the Japanese-American population of workers were under 35. Thus, 
their overall percentage professional is 2.6 percent ( = .8 X .02 + .2 X .05). 
Assume the white population has 50 percent of its labor force over 35. Then 
if the Japanese workers had the same age distribution as whites, 3.5 percent 
( = .5 X .02+ .5 X .05) would be in the professional occupation. The age- 
adjusted percentage of professionals for the Japanese-Americans is, therefore, 
3.5 percent.
The ratio of the dollar value of the Japanese-American occupations to that 
of the white workers, adjusting for age, is .97 ( = 1601/1646). The ratio without 
the age adjustment, .87, is biased down because of the younger ages of the 
second-generation Japanese-Americans. The ratio of .97 is biased up because 
of Thomas's point about the lower status and earnings of the large age-adjusted 
percentage (44.6) of Japanese-Americans in the proprietors and clerical/sales 
occupations, relative to the status and earnings of whites (28.6 percent) in these 
occupations. Both ratios are probably biased up because the calculation assumes 
the same median earnings of Japanese-Americans and whites within each oc 
cupation. Impressionistic evidence suggests that the earnings of Japanese- 
Americans were lower than those of whites. I simply averaged the two ratios 
and used .92 in the text to measure the lag in occupational attainment of 
Japanese-Americans.
Another reason why the occupational measure may understate discrimina 
tion against second-generation Japanese-Americans in 1940 is that it does not 
allow for their higher educational attainment relative to whites. Thomas reports 
an age-adjusted distribution of years of school completed for the second- 
generation Japanese-Americans who were 25 years of age or older. 27 Her data 
show that the median years of school completed in 1940 was 11.2 for the 
Japanese-American males and 10.6 for all males.
Table A.2
Occupational Distribution of White Males and Second-Generation Japanese-American Males 






Professionals and semiprofessionals $2,263
Farmers and farm managers
Proprietors, managers, and officials
(excluding farms) $2,263
Clerical, sales, and kindred $1,680
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred $1,730
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The educational advantage of the Japanese-Americans, therefore, did not 
translate into an occupational advantage. This leads to the observation by 
Thomas that among the Nisei, "Engineers, accountants, teachers, and social 
workers found it almost impossible to practice the skills they learned." 28 Sup 
porting this point are the following amazing statistics reported in another study: 
among male Japanese-American college graduates who entered the labor force 
before 1942, only 10 percent went into professional jobs. In the 1950s, by 
contrast, about 70 percent of Japanese-American college graduates entered pro 
fessional occupations. 29 All this supports the conclusion that second-generation 
Japanese-Americans faced considerable economic discrimination in the period 
around 1940.
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Though the earnings gap between women and men has been narrow 
ing in recent years, it remains substantial. Hence it is not surprising 
to find that there is continued concern about the inability of even the 
most meticulous studies using differences in a large number of 
productivity-related characteristics of workers to explain more than half 
of the differential. It has, however, also been found that adding detail 
ed occupational categories succeeds in accounting for a substantially 
larger share (Treiman and Hartmann 1981). Since a good deal of oc 
cupational segregation remains even within these categories (Blau and 
Ferber 1987), it may be assumed that there would be a further reduc 
tion if an even finer breakdown were used. On this basis, some argue 
that most of the male-female earnings gap could be explained without 
introducing discrimination.
The problem with this line of reasoning is the tacit assumption that 
people's occupations and the differences in earnings between occupa 
tions are not themselves tainted by discrimination. The question remains 
controversial. A number of researchers (Mincer and Polachek 1974; 
Zellner 1975; Landes 1977; Polachek 1979, 1981) focus on women's 
"household responsibilities" as the chief explanation for lower earn 
ings in female occupations. Women expect only intermittent labor force 
participation. Hence they will opt for jobs requiring less investment 
in human capital and not subject to as much depreciation of skills
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during periods of absence. Similarly, employers will be less inclined 
to hire women for jobs that involve a great deal of investment in their 
training. As a result, women will be concentrated in occupations with 
flat earnings profiles, relatively high early on, but rising little at later 
stages. It has also been argued that women expend less energy on their 
market work, simply because they put more effort into housework even 
when they are employed full time (Becker 1985).
Little empirical support has been found for either of these hypotheses. 
Some of the implications with respect to intermittent labor force par 
ticipation have been successfully challenged, especially by England 
(1982, 1984), and Bielby and Bielby (1988) have actually provided 
evidence (albeit based on self-reporting) that women put more effort 
into their paid work than do men. The possibility that discrimination 
may play a part in reducing wages in predominantly female occupa 
tions can therefore not be ignored. 1
Some earlier work supports this view by showing that there is a 
negative correlation between earnings of both men and women and the 
proportion of workers in an occupation who are female (Stevenson 1975; 
Ferber and Lowry 1976; Jusenius 1980; Treiman and Hartmann 1981; 
England, Chassie and McCormack 1982). These studies, however, 
though they take into account one or more of such variables as educa 
tion, skill demands, and age, lack information on such crucial factors 
as general and job-specific experience of individuals, hours and weeks 
worked, and size of firm, not to mention the level of authority attained 
by each worker. Critics argue that the omission of these and other 
possibly relevant variables is likely to vitiate these estimates. This issue 
deserves attention. It is addressed in this paper, utilizing a unique data 
set that includes a great deal of detailed information about the human 
capital individual workers have accumulated, about various aspects of 
the job, including the extent to which it involves control over resources, 
and about a number of characteristics of the employer, including size 
as well as type of industry.
Building on earlier work (Ferber and Spaeth 1984; Ferber, Green, 
and Spaeth 1986), this paper begins by determining which of the at 
tributes of workers, jobs, and employers have a significant effect on
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earnings, then goes on to investigate whether women have the same 
opportunity for attaining valuable control over money and supervisory 
authority as do men with comparable qualifications. Last, we examine 
whether even after all these factors are accounted for, and the chance 
that omitted variables would bias the results has been considerably reduc 
ed, the proportion of women in an occupation nonetheless remains 
significant. A recent study concluded "that men experience no loss in 
autonomy and decisionmaking authority as the female sex composition 
increases while females suffer substantially by virtue of holding female- 
dominated occupations" (Jaffee 1989, p. 387). To the extent such ef 
fects exist, we conclude they constitute another aspect of discrimination. 
Because the sample employed in this study has a disproportionate 
representation of individuals in managerial positions, we have exten 
sive information on at least a small number of a "rare population," 
namely women in "top management." We take advantage of this to 
also briefly examine how this group fares, though the sample size 
precludes going much beyond raising questions for further exploration.
Data
The data set used in Ferber and Spaeth (1984) and in Ferber, Green, 
and Spaeth (1986) was collected in 1982 as part of a practicum in survey 
research methods by carefully trained and supervised students. A more 
thorough description of the data collection and construction of variables 
in provided in Spaeth (1985).
Telephone interviews were conducted with 245 women and 312 men 
living in the State of Illinois in Spring 1982 who were employed at least 
20 hours a week on a single job. The numbers for Chicago were ob 
tained by random digit dialing, because unlisted numbers are very com 
mon in that city. Systematic sampling from directories was used for 
the rest of the state, where nonlisting is infrequent (Sudman 1976). In 
order to increase the number of female respondents, interviewers were 
instructed to ask for a woman first, and to interview another eligible
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respondent only if no such woman was available. The N for this sam 
ple was 557.
Indicators designed to measure six dimensions of "work authority" 
were collected. They are (a) control over monetary resources, (b) super 
visory authority, (c) subordinate's discretion, (d) respondent's discre 
tion, (e) control over organizational structure, and (f) control over in 
formation. Of these, only the first two are found to add to the explanatory 
power of the earnings regression.
The index for control over monetary resources is based on answers 
to the following three questions: (1) About how much money was in 
volved in the largest monetary decision in which you participated last 
year? (2) What was the largest monetary decision in which you had the 
final say? (3) How much money can you ordinarily spend without get 
ting authorization from higher up? The first step toward producing a 
single number was to standardize the mean and standard deviations of 
the answers to the first and third question to the second one. If they 
answered questions (1) and (2), these were averaged. If they answered 
question (1) but not (2), that was used. If neither (1) nor (2) were 
answered, the response to question (3) was used. At each stage of this 
procedure the correlations with earnings were compared with the original 
correlation, and they did not change. Supervisory authority is simply 
equal to the answer to the question, "how many people are responsible 
to you both directly and indirectly?"
More recently, a "multiplicity" sample, based on the original sam 
ple, has been added. It was designed so as to achieve a disproportionate 
representation of workers in high-level positions who have achieved 
a good deal of the control over resources emphasized in this study. The 
approach was to attempt to interview the supervisor of every person 
in the original sample who had one, then interview the supervisor of 
that person, and so on until the topmost organizational level was reach 
ed. 2 Each respondent was then asked how many persons could have 
nominated him or her. This number represents that person's "multiplici 
ty," which is proportional to the probability that the nominee will fall 
into the sample. The resulting total sample (of the two together) con 
sists of 1,313 men and 404 women. Fifty-nine percent of these are
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managers and executives; among them are 360 men and 39 women who 
identify themselves as being members of "top management." The ac 
tual sample sizes for the regressions are somewhat smaller because not 
all the variables are available for all individuals.
Two earlier studies (Ferber and Spaeth 1984; Ferber, Green, and 
Spaeth 1986) utilizing only the first sample, examined the effect of the 
wide variety of variables collected on earnings. Because we found one 
of these, control over financial resources, to be highly significant, we 
also investigated what differences there might be in the extent to which 
different variables influenced the attainment of such control. The results 
showed that women did not attain as much financial authority as men 
with the same characteristics. These findings are consistent with the 
results of other research that showed unequal access to training and jobs 
such as Cabral, Ferber, and Green (1979), Duncan and Hoffman (1979), 
Halaby (1979), and Olson and Becker (1983).
The random sample of workers used in earlier studies was not, 
however, ideally suited to an investigation of the role of workers' con 
trol over resources, because so few women had any such authority. The 
present research is based on the larger sample which includes a 
disproportionate number of high-level employees, better suited for an 
investigation that specifically focuses on the contribution control over 
resources makes to the earnings of women and men, and on the ques 
tion whether the sex composition of occupations influences earnings 
not only directly, but also indirectly via differences in the attainment 
both of control over money and supervisory authority. The extent to 
which this is the case, when so many different attributes of workers 
and of jobs are accounted for, would suggest that sex bias helps to ex 
plain lower wages in women's occupations.
Analysis
Table 1 presents an overall view of selected variables for "male" 
vs. "female" occupations. To generate this table we separated the 3-digit 
Census occupations into those with more than 40 percent women, and 
those with 40 percent or fewer women using 2-digit categories from
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the 1980 Census. This division was chosen in part because it approx 
imates the proportion of the total labor force that is female, and also 
because it enabled us to obtain a reasonable representation in each group, 
as seen in table 1. Nonetheless, such a division is somewhat arbitrary; 
for further analysis we use the percent female in individual occupations.
The table shows that the means for many of the variables differ not 
only as between men and women, but also among individual men and 
women depending on whether they are in primarily male or primarily 
female occupations. 3 These differences, including the substantially 
greater supervisory authority and control over money men have, help 
to account for the higher earnings of men as compared to women, and 
of workers in predominantly male as compared to predominantly female 
occupations, without invoking discrimination. But they do not explain 
the whole earnings gap. Table 2 shows regressions with earnings of 
men and women as the dependent variable, and the percent of women 
in each occupation as an independent variable included in addition to 
all the ones used in the earlier studies. They are comprised of the stan 
dard measures of education and experience, plus weeks and hours work 
ed, and a dummy for marital status, variables generally relied on in 
human capital explanations of earnings. To these were added "core 
industry" 4 and number of employees of the organization, to control 
for type of employer, and finally whether the worker had a supervisor, 
and two indices of control over resources, both of which were found 
to influence earnings.
With all these variables, we go well beyond the standard regressions 
current in the literature in taking account of characteristics of workers 
and jobs that would help to explain the earnings gap between women 
and men. Therefore, finding that the proportion of workers in an oc 
cupation who are women nonetheless has a significant effect on earn 
ings may be seen as strongly suggesting discrimination. Not only do 
we find this to be the case, but the effect is quite substantial. For in 
stance, given the mean proportion of women in the female and male 
occupations in our sample, the difference in this variable represents a 
difference of 15 percent in earnings. Thus it is clear that the gender 
composition of occupations itself plays an important role as a determi 
nant of earnings.
Table 1
Meaas of Selected Variables for Men and Women 
in Male and Female Occupations
Occupations with more than 
40 percent women
Years of education
Years of experience before current employer
Years in previous job with current employer





In number of employees of organization
No supervisor
Sex of supervisor, M=l, F=0
Supervisory authority
Control over money
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Table 2
Determinants of In Earnings of Men and Women 
(standard errors in parentheses)
Years of education
Years of experience before current employer
Years of experience before current
employer, squared
Years in previous job with current employer
Years in previous job with current
employer, squared





In number of employees of organization
No supervisor
Sex of supervisor, M = l, F=0
Supervisory authority
Control over money













































































*Sigmficant at the 10 level
**Sigmficant at the 05 level
***Sigmficant at the 01 level
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With all these variables, we go well beyond the standard regressions 
current in the literature in taking account of characteristics of workers 
and jobs that would help to explain the earnings gap between women 
and men. Therefore, finding that the proportion of workers in an oc 
cupation who are women nonetheless has a significant effect on earn 
ings may be seen as strongly suggesting discrimination. Not only do 
we find this to be the case, but the effect is quite substantial. For in 
stance, given the mean proportion of women in the female and male 
occupations in our sample, the difference in this variable represents a 
difference of 15 percent in earnings. Thus it is clear that the gender 
composition of occupations itself plays an important role as a determi 
nant of earnings.
Another variable in this regression also deserves attention. Having 
a male supervisor has a significant positive effect on the earnings of 
women. The coefficient is positive for the earnings of men as well, 
though it is not significant. 5 Because there is a widespread belief that 
both women and men tend to prefer male supervisors, this might be 
interpreted to show that workers perform more efficiently when their 
boss is a man. However, a study which investigated how employees 
actually rated their supervisors—as opposed to merely expressing an 
abstract preference for men or women—found that female bosses receiv 
ed higher ratings (Ferber, Huber, and Spitze 1979). Therefore we are 
more inclined toward the view that there may be a tendency to devalue 
women's work more when even the supervisor is a woman, 6 and perhaps 
at times sex of the supervisor may be a proxy for the sex-type of job 
(a category considerably more detailed than occupation).
The regression for earnings does not, however, tell the whole story. 
So far we have taken supervisory authority and control over money as 
given. Similar to Jaffee (1989), the results of Tobit regressions in tables 
3 and 4 show that a higher percent female has a significant negative 
effect on attainment of supervisory authority and control over money 
by women. 7 On the other hand, the coefficient for this variable is positive 
for both the regressions for men and significant for attainment of super 
visory authority. Thus men appear to have an advantage as compared 
to women, at least in attaining supervisory authority as the occupation 
they are in becomes increasingly female, but women are at a disadvan 
tage in attaining both types of authority.
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It may be that in women's occupations, supervisory authority is more 
often over persons in the same occupation, such as a nurse supervising 
other nurses, or a social worker supervising other social workers, as 
opposed to being in charge of persons in another occupation, such as 
a manager supervising a secretary. This would be expected to reduce 
the opportunity for attaining such authority, as is apparently the case 
for women. For men, however, this is likely to be offset by their heavy 
concentration at higher levels of the hierarchy as the proportion of women 
in occupations rises. This possibility has also been suggested in OECD 
(1985). Perhaps the more traditional women who tend to enter the tradi 
tionally female fields are less willing to compete for these jobs, and 
possibly are less willing to accept other women in a supervisory role. 
Frequently, women in these occupations also believe that having a male 
supervisor is likely to raise their status—a view which receives some 
support from our research. It should be noted this does not imply that 
men constitute a larger proportion of supervisors in female than in male 
occupations, but only that a disproportionate share of the few men in 
female occupations are likely to be in such positions.
Overall, our findings show that the proportion of workers who are 
women influences earnings both directly and, to some extent indirect 
ly, even when a large number of other factors are accounted for. They 
are consistent both with the "overcrowding" model (Bergmann 1974) 
and with the proposition that women are hired in fields abandoned by 
men when they can get higher pay elsewhere (Reskin and Roos, 1990; 
Strober and Arnold 1984), as well as various other segmented labor 
market theories (reviewed in Cain 1976). Discrimination is an integral 
part, implicitly or explicitly, of each of these hypotheses. Hence to the 
extent that they are applicable, they support our conclusion that occupa 
tions themselves are tainted as an explanation of the earnings gap.
This study does not itself answer, or even address the question why 
so many women continue to enter occupations where rewards are lower, 
perhaps because of "overcrowding." Traditional attitudes, social 
pressures, discrimination in education, training, and hiring have all been 
suggested as possible contributing factors. The recent influx of women 
into male occupations may be regarded as evidence that as some of these
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Table 3
Determinants of Supervisory Authority of Men and Women 
Tobit Analysis (standard errors in parentheses)
Years of education
Years of experience before current employer
Years of experience before current
employer, squared
Years in previous job with current employer
Years in previous job with current
employer, squared





In number of employees of organization
No supervisor
Sex of supervisor, M = l, F=0
Percent women in occupation
Constant



































































*Sigmficant at the .10 level.
**Sigmficant at the .05 level
***Sigmficant at the 01 level.
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Table 4 
Determinants of Control Over Money 
Tobit Analysis (standard errors in parentheses)
Years of education
Years of experience before current employer
Years of experience before current 
employer, squared
Years in previous job with current employer
Years in previous job with current 
employer, squared





In number of employees of organization
No supervisor
Sex of supervisor, M = l, F=0
Percent women in occupation
Constant



































































*Sigmficant at the 10 level
**Sigmficant at the 05 level
***Sigmficant at the 01 level
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barriers have been crumbling, so is women's willingness to take poor 
ly paid jobs declining. As yet, however, there is no agreement on the 
answer.
Women in A Male Domain
The analysis up to this point shows that women will tend to do better 
as their proportion in an occupation declines. An interesting question 
is whether this will hold in an environment that is entirely dominated 
by members of the opposite sex. This issue is particularly important 
because so many of the most prestigious, and all the most highly paid 
occupations have been, and to a considerable extent continue to be, male 
preserves.
Empirical evidence on this subject is rather scarce, since clearly the 
number of women in such situations tends to be extremely small. Because 
of the way our sample was chosen, we have a somewhat larger than 
usual representation in a particularly interesting occupational category, 
namely "top management." 8 It is still too small to rely on for an 
authoritative interpretation, but the results of our analysis are suggestive.
Members of this group are clearly an elite in terms of their 
characteristics and their rewards, as can be seen in table 5. These data 
are consistent with the findings of Diploy (1987) that the traits of 
managerial women differ markedly from those of the "typical" female: 
they score higher on measures of masculine personality traits than do 
women in traditionally female occupations. Table 5 also shows that the 
differences between the characteristics of men and women in this group 
are, for the most part, not as great as among other workers. Accord 
ingly, it is not surprising that there is also less of a differential in earn 
ings. Women's earnings are 54 percent of those of men among top 
managers, as compared to 42 percent among other workers.
Turning next to the earnings regressions, the small sample size may 
explain why for women only two coefficients are statistically signifi 
cant at the 10 percent level or better9 despite an adjusted R2 of .76, 
considerably higher than for the other regressions. Nonetheless, the fact
Table 5
Means of Selected Variables for Men and Women 
In "Top Management" and Among Other Workers
Variables
Age
Years of experience before current employer 
Years of previous experience with
current employer
Years in current job
Hours per week worked
Weeks per year worked
Years of education
Index of control over money








































































Years of experience before current employer
Years of experience before current
employer, squared
Years with current employer, previous job
Years with current employer, previous
job, squared





In number of employees of organization
Control over monetary resources
Supervisory authority
No supervisor
Sex of supervisor (male = l)
Constant
Adjusted R2
*Significant at . 10 level
**Sigmficant at .05 level
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that the coefficients in the women's regression for education, years of 
experience before current employer, years of previous experience with 
current employer, years in current job, weeks worked, hours worked, 
and "no supervisor," are either very much smaller (and in some cases 
even have a negative sign) than in the men's regression, deserves at 
tention. Combined with a very much larger constant for women than 
men in the case of top managers, while the opposite is true for other 
workers, these data point to the conclusion that the reward structure 
represented by the two regressions really is quite different. These results 
differ from such earlier ones as Corcoran and Duncan (1979), but are 
consistent with the views of Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Bridges 
and Berk (1978), for instance, that it is not the characteristics of the 
individual but the job that tend to determine earnings.
The extent of the difference in reward structures of women and men 
is suggested by the fact that men in top management who actually earn 
$97,992 on average, would earn only $72,079 if they were rewarded 
as women are, and that women who actually earn $53,147 would earn 
$74,280 if they were rewarded as men are. 10
One interpretation, consistent with Ranter's (1977) hypothesis, is that 
members of this extremely small minority tend to be treated not as in 
dividuals, but as "tokens." What the majority notices about them is 
not the particular characteristics that differentiate one from another, 
but rather that they all belong to a group of outsiders. 11 This would 
account for the fact that human capital differences have virtually no 
effect on their earnings. 12 Whether or not one accepts this interpreta 
tion, the case of top executives reinforces doubts about unmeasured 
characteristics as the sole explanation of earnings differences and con 
firms that some form of discrimination is likely to be the explanation 
for at least part of the earnings gap. 13
Conclusions
In this study we investigated the effects of the proportion of persons 
in an occupation who are women on the earnings of workers. In regres 
sions including not only the standard human capital and employer
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variables, but also the extent to which individuals have achieved con 
trol over human and financial resources, we found that this factor 
nonetheless had a significant negative impact. Furthermore, women, 
though not men, also achieved less supervisory authority as the per 
cent of women in the occupation increased, which in turn further reduced 
their earnings. Thus there appear to be penalties for being in female 
occupations beyond those that are warranted by existing differences in 
human capital or in the job characteristics accounted for in this research. 
We conclude that these results create at least a presumption that the 
existence of discrimination cannot be explained away by introducing 
occupations as an explanatory variable.
We also examined the qualifications and rewards of men and women 
in a very prominent, prestigious occupation with a very small minority 
of women. These highly qualified women are not only paid substan 
tially less than their male counterparts, but they are, for the most part, 
all paid about the same, regardless of their individual characteristics. 
As noted before, the sample is too small to warrant firm conclusions. 
But it may be that women who expect to avoid the disadvantages of 
female occupations by going to the opposite extreme, also encounter 
problems.
NOTES
1. It is often argued that discriminatory wage differentials could not persist in competitive labor 
markets Recent work by Krueger and Summers (1986, 1988) on interindustry wage differen 
tials, which led them to reject classical competitive theories of wage determination because they 
found persistent differences in wages for equally skilled workers, helps to undermine this contention
2. Evidence for the success of this design is provided by the fact that among the respondents are 
a number of heads of large corporations and the Governor of the State of Illinois. 
3 The descriptive data are shown to provide additional information about characteristics of this 
sample, which is clearly not representative of the population, because high-level workers are 
overrepresented.
4. The definition of "core" and "peripheral" industries is taken from Hodson( 1983) It is based 
on a factor analysis of a large number of characteristics, which initially results in 16 separate 
classifications, but is further reduced to 6 For our purposes, we reduced this to the two categories 
of "core" and "periphery " Aventt (1968) defines core firms as those that are powerful enough 
to protect themselves from the vagaries of local and single-product markets by selling a variety 
of products in national and international markets, while periphery firms tend to be small and local 
and produce a limited product line
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5. As we shall see later in table 4, the same is true for attainment of control over money
6. We also ran the same regressions, without percent female, separately for men and women in 
occupations with more than 40 percent women and in occupations with 40 percent or fewer women, 
to determine whether any consistent patterns could be found Contrary to what might be expected, 
being married had a significant negative effect in male but not in female occuaptions Consistent 
with usual beliefs that experience is more important in male occupations, years of work before 
current employer and in previous jobs with current employer have a greater effect on earnings 
for both men and women in male occupations On the other hand, this is not true of years in 
current jobs, nor of level of education attained
7. Tobit analysis was used for these dependent variables because there were many individuals 
with no supervisory authority or control over money Chow tests on the regressions in table 2 
and on OLS versions of the Tobit runs showed the male and female equations to be significantly 
different at the 1-percent level.
8. Respondents were placed in this category if their responses were positive to the following ques 
tions. (1) Would you say you are in a management position9 and (2) Would you say you are top 
management? Obviously such people include high-level managers in small organizations, not on 
ly CEOs in Fortune 500 companies or chief executives of large state agencies
9. Moreover, it is size of the organization where the woman is employed, not one of her own 
characteristics, that has the most significant effect on earnings This may be because laws are 
more likely to be enforced in large firms, as is for instance suggested by Leonard (1987).
10. It is also interesting that men in top management would earn substantially more, $78,446, 
if they were rewarded as are men not in top management, than if they were rewarded as are women 
in top management. To obtain the coefficients necessary to calculate these dollar figures, we reran 
the regressions shown in table 6 using actual earnings, rather than "In earnings" as the depen 
dent variable
11 Bartlett and Miller's (1985) finding that there is no evidence of a statistically significant rela 
tionship between leaves of absence and earnings for women executives points toward the same 
conclusion Whether an individual woman does or does not take leaves appears to make little 
difference as compared to the perception that women tend to take leaves more than men
12 The fact that the standard deviation of earnings of these top management women, who resemble 
their male peers far more than other women workers do, nonetheless is just as much lower as 
compared to the standard deviation of earnings of men, further supports this conclusion
Mean Earnings Standard Deviation
Non-top management men $47,575 $(42,718) 
Non-top management women 19,936 (13,236) 
Top management men 97,994 (82,130) 
Top management women 53,146 (39,038) 
13. Given the small sample size and the attendant uncertainty about the significance of the dif 
ferences in the regressions for male and female top managers, we also examined a combined regres 
sion, with sex as a dummy variable As would be expected in view of their representation in the 
sample, the results are similar to those for men only The R 2 is, however, higher. 450 rather 
than .406, and sex is significant at the 1-percent level, suggesting, once again, that rewards for 
women are not the same as for men.
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